System Overview

System Overview

This reference follows a federal criminal case from investigation through custody and release. Each stage has its own section, and every legal statement in it links to the statute, rule or decision that supports it.

The stages

1. Investigation and charging: how a federal case begins and when charges must be brought.
2. Pretrial: initial appearance, release or detention, and the Speedy Trial Act.
3. Plea and trial: pleas, trial, and motions after the verdict.
4. Sentencing: the presentence report, guidelines and the judgment.
5. Direct review: appeal to the court of appeals and review by the Supreme Court.
6. Post-conviction: motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, habeas petitions and other remedies after the appeal.
7. Sentence modification: ways a sentence can be reduced or corrected after it is imposed.
8. Prison and sentence execution: how the Bureau of Prisons carries out a sentence, including credits and administrative remedies.
9. Supervision and reentry: supervised release, its conditions and revocation.

Circuit notes record where a court of appeals departs from or adds to the nationwide rules. The district court directory links each court to its official local rules.

What to know before you start

The right path through the process depends on the facts of the case. Gather these first:

• the court and the circuit where the case was or is pending;
• where the case stands now, and the dates of the judgment and of any appeal decision;
• whether the person is in custody, and where;
• the decision being challenged and the relief being sought;
• any earlier motions, appeals or petitions, and how they were decided;
• the deadlines that may apply and the events that start them;
• the local rules and standing orders of the court involved.

How to read the records

Each statement of law is a separate record linked to its authorities. Most records state current law. A record marked historical describes how the law stood at an earlier time, and a record marked partially verified is supported for only part of what it says. A nationwide rule does not settle a question the controlling circuit has decided differently, and no record predicts the outcome of a particular case.

Tools

• Decision trees
• Checklists
• Worked examples
• Glossary

Investigation and Charging

Investigation and Charging

Commencement, charging instruments, limitations, venue, and preaccusation timing. This page is a verified navigation layer. The linked canonical modules, atomic claims, authority cards, and structured controls remain the legal source; this index does not create a rule from omission or shorthand.

Canonical modules

Stage use controls

• Start with the actual docket posture and controlling court, not the desired remedy.
• Calculate every deadline from its stated triggering event and current computation rule.
• Separate jurisdiction, venue, prerequisites, merits, burden, proof, remedy, review, and appealability.
• Use the circuit overlay for any circuit-sensitive proposition and stop at records marked not_verified.
• Preserve the operative filings, orders, transcripts, exhibits, agency record, and proof of filing or service.

Handoff to adjacent stages

Use the federal process decision trees to identify prerequisites, alternative vehicles, appellate routes, and postjudgment interactions. Generated diagrams are navigation aids only; linked canonical modules control.

Federal Charging and Commencement

Federal Charging and Commencement

Verification boundary

This module supplies the nationwide federal framework from investigation through a complaint, warrant or summons, grand-jury charging, indictment or information, the principal general limitation and Speedy Trial Act clocks, preaccusation delay, and charging venue. It does not decide whether any investigative method was lawful, whether a particular charging document is sufficient, whether an offense-specific limitations or venue statute applies, whether a grand-jury disclosure exception is satisfied, or how a circuit treats a superseding indictment. Those questions require the actual offense, dates, district, record, and controlling circuit law.

Investigation is not itself a single charging event

Federal constitutional law does not require prosecutors to file charges as soon as probable cause exists. Lovasco permits good-faith investigative delay while prosecutors complete an investigation and decide whether they can and should prosecute. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790–96 (1977)

That rule does not validate a search, seizure, interrogation, subpoena, surveillance technique, charging motive, or agency action. Each asserted investigative defect needs its own Fourth or Fifth Amendment, statutory, rule, and remedy analysis.

Complaint, arrest warrant, summons, and Rule 5

Rule 3 defines a complaint as a written statement of the essential facts constituting the charged offense. Except for Rule 4.1's electronic procedure, it must be made under oath before a magistrate judge or, if none is reasonably available, a state or local judicial officer. Fed. R. Crim. P. 3

Under Rule 4(a), a complaint and any supporting affidavits must establish probable cause to believe both that an offense was committed and that the defendant committed it. The judge then must issue a warrant, or at a government attorney's request must issue a summons instead. Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(a)

Rule 4 requires a warrant to identify the defendant with reasonable certainty, describe the charged offense, command arrest and prompt presentation, and bear the judge's signature; a summons uses the same form but commands appearance at a stated time and place. Execution, service, and return follow Rule 4(c). Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(b)–(c)

An arrest within the United States ordinarily leads to a Rule 5 initial appearance without unnecessary delay, while appearance on a Rule 4 summons proceeds under Rule 5(d) or (e). Rule 5 also controls the location of the initial appearance and interdistrict transfer. Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a), (c)

When the initial appearance occurs outside the alleged-offense district, Rule 5(c)(3)(D) conditions transfer on production of the warrant or an authorized copy and a judicial finding that the defendant is the person named in the indictment, information, or warrant. The rule supplies an identity finding, not a universally separate proceeding labeled an “identity hearing.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(c)(3)(D)

For a nonpetty offense, Rule 5.1 ordinarily requires a preliminary hearing unless an enumerated exception applies, including waiver, indictment, or specified informations. If held, the magistrate judge decides probable cause; dismissal and discharge for lack of probable cause do not preclude a later prosecution for the same offense. Fed. R. Crim. P. 5.1(a), (e)–(f)

The fuller presentment, preliminary-hearing, counsel-attachment, and release-or-detention sequence is in Initial Appearance and Pretrial Release or Detention.

Grand jury

The Fifth Amendment generally requires a grand-jury presentment or indictment before a person may be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, subject to the amendment's land-or-naval-forces and militia exception. U.S. Const. amend. V

Rule 6(a) requires a federal grand jury to have 16 to 23 members. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(a)(1)

While the grand jury is in session, Rule 6(d) permits government attorneys, the witness being questioned, needed interpreters, and a court reporter or recording-device operator to be present; during deliberation and voting, only jurors and any interpreter needed for an impaired juror may be present. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(d)

Except during deliberation and voting, Rule 6(e)(1) requires recording of grand-jury proceedings, but an unintentional recording failure does not invalidate a prosecution. Rule 6(e)(2) imposes secrecy on the listed participants and recipients; it does not authorize a court to impose a blanket secrecy obligation on every person. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(1)–(2)

A grand jury may indict only with at least 12 jurors concurring, and the grand jury or its foreperson or deputy must return the indictment to a magistrate judge in open court, subject to the rule's video-return provision. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(f)

A magistrate judge may direct that a returned indictment remain secret until the defendant is in custody or released pending trial; the clerk then seals it, and disclosure is limited as Rule 6(e)(4) provides. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(4)

Indictment, information, waiver, joinder, and later process

Rule 7(a) requires an indictment for an offense other than criminal contempt if the offense is punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one year; an offense punishable by one year or less may be prosecuted under Rule 58(b)(1). Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(a)

A felony otherwise requiring indictment may proceed by information only if the defendant, in open court and after advice about the nature of the charge and the defendant's rights, waives prosecution by indictment. Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(b)

An indictment or information must be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense, must be signed by a government attorney, and must give the official or customary legal citation for each count. Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1)

A citation error or omission is not itself a basis to dismiss a charging document or reverse a conviction unless it misled and thereby prejudiced the defendant. Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(2)

Rule 7(e) expressly permits amendment of an information before verdict or finding only if no additional or different offense is charged and no substantial defense right is prejudiced. That provision is not generic authority to rewrite a grand-jury indictment. Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(e)

Rule 8 permits joinder of offenses based on same-or-similar character, the same act or transaction, or a common scheme or plan, and permits joinder of defendants alleged to have participated in the same act, transaction, or series; all defendants need not appear in every count. Fed. R. Crim. P. 8

After indictment, Rule 9 requires a warrant for each named defendant or, at the government's request, a summons; for a defendant named only in an information, accompanying affidavits must establish probable cause. The first appearance then proceeds under Rule 5. Fed. R. Crim. P. 9(a), (c)(3)

Neither Rule 7 nor the general limitation statutes create one universal “relation back” rule for every superseding indictment. A later felony charge must still use the constitutionally and procedurally authorized charging form, and its timeliness requires comparison of the original and superseding charges under the applicable limitations statute and controlling circuit law. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6–7; 18 U.S.C. ch. 213

Statutes of limitation

An indictment for an offense punishable by death may be found at any time without limitation under 18 U.S.C. § 3281. 18 U.S.C. § 3281

Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, § 3282(a) requires an indictment to be found or an information instituted within five years after a noncapital offense was committed. 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a)

The five-year rule is only a default. The charged offense may have a different federal limitations period, tolling rule, or continuing-offense rule, and calculating accrual requires identifying when the offense was complete under its elements and controlling precedent. 18 U.S.C. ch. 213

Section 3288 permits a new felony indictment within its stated six-calendar-month or appellate period when the prior indictment or information is dismissed after the applicable limitations period expired, but not when the dismissal reason itself bars a new prosecution. 18 U.S.C. § 3288

Section 3289 supplies a related refiling window when a felony indictment or information is dismissed before expiration and the limitations period will expire within six calendar months of dismissal; it too excludes a new prosecution when the dismissal reason itself is time-bar or another bar. 18 U.S.C. § 3289

Speedy Trial Act clocks and sanctions

Section 3161(b) ordinarily requires an indictment or information within 30 days after the individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with the charges; for a felony in a district where no grand jury sat during that period, the statute adds 30 days. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b)

After a not-guilty plea, § 3161(c)(1) ordinarily requires trial within 70 days from the later of public filing of the indictment or information and the defendant's appearance before a judicial officer of the court where the charge is pending. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1)

The Speedy Trial Act is not computed by simply counting 30 or 70 calendar days: § 3161(h) excludes specified periods, and the actual calculation must use the docket, each exclusion, and any findings required for an ends-of-justice continuance. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)

If the § 3161(b) charging period, as extended by exclusions, is violated, § 3162(a)(1) requires the complaint charge to be dismissed or otherwise dropped. If the trial period is violated, § 3162(a)(2) requires dismissal of the indictment or information on a timely defense motion; failure to move before trial or a guilty or nolo plea waives that statutory dismissal right. In either setting, the statute gives factors for deciding dismissal with or without prejudice. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)

Preaccusation delay

The Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause applies only after a person becomes an accused through formal indictment or information or the actual restraints of arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge; it does not govern the preceding investigative interval. Statutes of limitation are the primary safeguard against stale preaccusation charges. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313–20, 322–25 (1971)

The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause has a limited role in preaccusation delay. Actual prejudice is generally necessary but not sufficient; the reasons for delay also matter, and good-faith investigative delay is not unconstitutional merely because the defense was somewhat prejudiced. Marion, 404 U.S. at 324–26; Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 789–96

Charging and trial venue

Article III requires a federal criminal trial in the state where the crime was committed, subject to Congress's rule for crimes outside any state; the Sixth Amendment requires a jury from the state and district where the crime was committed. Rule 18 implements the ordinary district rule and requires due regard to convenience and prompt administration when setting the place of trial within the district. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. Const. amend. VI; Fed. R. Crim. P. 18

Unless Congress expressly provides otherwise, § 3237(a) permits prosecution in any district where a federal offense begun in one district and completed in another, or committed in more than one district, was begun, continued, or completed; it also supplies a specific continuing-offense rule for mail, interstate or foreign transportation, and importation offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a)

When a conviction is reversed because trial occurred in the wrong venue or before a jury drawn from the wrong district, Smith holds that the Constitution permits retrial in the proper venue; the venue error does not itself require a judgment barring reprosecution. Smith v. United States, 599 U.S. 236, 240–47 (2023)

Nationwide decision path

flowchart TD
    A["Federal investigation"] --> B{"Complaint before indictment?"}
    B -->|"Yes"| C["Rule 3 sworn complaint"]
    C --> D["Rule 4 probable cause: warrant or requested summons"]
    D --> E["Rule 5 initial appearance and any Rule 5.1 hearing"]
    B -->|"No"| F["Grand-jury or information route"]
    E --> F
    F --> G{"Felony requiring indictment?"}
    G -->|"Yes; no valid waiver"| H["Rule 6 grand jury; 12 concur"]
    G -->|"Valid Rule 7(b) waiver"| I["Information"]
    G -->|"Misdemeanor"| J["Rule 58(b)(1) route"]
    H --> K["Rule 7 charging document"]
    I --> K
    J --> K
    K --> L["Check limitations and any superseding charge"]
    L --> M["Compute Speedy Trial Act clocks and exclusions"]
    M --> N["Verify constitutional, Rule 18, and offense-specific venue"]

Record-first checklist

1. Identify the exact offense, elements, penalty range, offense-completion date, and every potentially applicable offense-specific limitations and venue statute.
2. Obtain the complaint, supporting affidavit, warrant or summons, return, arrest and service dates, Rule 5 record, and any Rule 5.1 waiver or disposition.
3. For an out-of-district arrest, preserve the warrant copy and the court's same-person finding rather than assuming a freestanding identity-hearing procedure.
4. Obtain every original, sealed, superseding, and amended charging document, its public filing or return date, and any Rule 7(b) waiver.
5. Compute limitation and Speedy Trial Act clocks separately. For the Act, create a docket-based ledger of each potentially excluded period and every required finding.
6. Map each offense's conduct elements to districts, then apply Article III, the Sixth Amendment, Rule 18, § 3237, and any offense-specific venue provision.
7. Research controlling circuit authority for charging-document sufficiency, constructive amendment or variance, superseding-indictment timeliness, preaccusation-delay tests, venue waiver, proof, standard of review, and remedy.

Matters not yet verified in this module

• Lawfulness and remedy for any particular search, seizure, subpoena, surveillance method, interrogation, undercover operation, or investigative disclosure.
• Selective or vindictive prosecution, prosecutorial immunity, charging policy, and internal Department of Justice guidance.
• Case-specific grand-jury challenges, disclosure, misconduct, dismissal, harmless error, and privilege.
• Sufficiency of a particular count, duplicity, multiplicity, constructive amendment, variance, bill of particulars, severance, and waiver.
• The exact circuit test for whether a superseding indictment is timely, and any individual application of §§ 3288 or 3289.
• Offense-specific limitation periods, tolling, fugitivity, wartime suspension, DNA indictment application, and offense-completion disputes.
• Every Speedy Trial Act exclusion, Sixth Amendment postaccusation delay, Rule 48(b), local plan, and case-specific calculation.
• Circuit-specific preaccusation-delay formulation beyond Marion and Lovasco.
• Venue waiver, transfer, burden of proof, standard of review, harmlessness, and offense-specific venue applications.

Those issues remain open in data/coverage_matrix.yaml; this module verifies the nationwide organizing rules and their boundaries rather than pretending that every charging dispute has one generic answer.

Pretrial

Pretrial

Initial appearance, release or detention, arraignment, disclosure, motions, competency, and speedy-trial controls. This page is a verified navigation layer. The linked canonical modules, atomic claims, authority cards, and structured controls remain the legal source; this index does not create a rule from omission or shorthand.

Canonical modules

Stage use controls

• Start with the actual docket posture and controlling court, not the desired remedy.
• Calculate every deadline from its stated triggering event and current computation rule.
• Separate jurisdiction, venue, prerequisites, merits, burden, proof, remedy, review, and appealability.
• Use the circuit overlay for any circuit-sensitive proposition and stop at records marked not_verified.
• Preserve the operative filings, orders, transcripts, exhibits, agency record, and proof of filing or service.

Handoff to adjacent stages

Use the federal process decision trees to identify prerequisites, alternative vehicles, appellate routes, and postjudgment interactions. Generated diagrams are navigation aids only; linked canonical modules control.

Initial Appearance and Pretrial Release or Detention

Initial Appearance and Pretrial Release or Detention

Verification boundary

This module replaces the legacy pretrial chart with the nationwide Rule 5, Rule 5.1, and 18 U.S.C. § 3142 framework. It separates presentment delay, warrantless-arrest probable-cause review, and confession admissibility; they are related events with different legal tests. It does not decide a particular defendant's release, a district's local practice, a circuit-specific flight burden, review under § 3145, or whether counsel must be present at a particular proceeding beyond the attachment rule decided in Rothgery.

Three clocks that must not be merged

For an arrest within the United States, Rule 5(a)(1)(A) requires the arresting person to take the defendant without unnecessary delay before a magistrate judge, or a qualifying state or local judicial officer under Rule 5(c), unless a statute provides otherwise. The rule does not establish a 48-hour presentment threshold. Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a)(1)(A)

The 48-hour framework in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin concerns the Fourth Amendment requirement of a prompt judicial probable-cause determination after a warrantless arrest. A determination within 48 hours generally satisfies promptness, although an arrested person may prove unreasonable delay; after 48 hours the government must show a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56–57 (1991)

For a federal confession, 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) supplies a six-hour safe harbor against exclusion solely for presentment delay when the confession is voluntary. If the confession falls outside that window, allowing for reasonable transportation and distance, the court applies the McNabb–Mallory inquiry into whether the delay was unnecessary or unreasonable. Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 309–10, 322 (2009)

These are not interchangeable rules: Rule 5 asks whether presentment was unnecessarily delayed; McLaughlin addresses prompt probable-cause review of a warrantless arrest; and Corley addresses whether a federal confession may be excluded because of presentment delay.

Rule 5 initial appearance

After a warrantless arrest, a complaint satisfying Rule 4(a)'s probable-cause requirement must be promptly filed in the district where the offense allegedly occurred. Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(b)

Rule 5(c) determines the place and transfer procedure for the initial appearance. The ordinary location depends on whether the arrest occurred in the charging district, another district, or after extradition; the chart therefore cannot assume every arrest goes immediately before a magistrate in the charging district. Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(c)

In a felony case, Rule 5(d)(1) requires advice concerning: the complaint and any filed affidavit; retained or appointed counsel; circumstances for pretrial release; any preliminary-hearing right; the right not to make a statement and the possible use of a statement; and consular notification for a noncitizen. Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(d)(1)

The judge must allow a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel and must release or detain the defendant as statutes and rules provide. Rule 5 itself does not make Sixth Amendment attachment a statutory trigger for a detention hearing. Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(d)(2)–(3)

A preliminary hearing is conditional, not an unqualified right in every case. Rule 5.1 ordinarily requires one for a nonpetty offense, but lists exceptions including waiver, indictment, specified informations, and a consenting misdemeanor defendant; absent an extension, the outside date is 14 days after initial appearance for a defendant in custody and 21 days for a released defendant. Fed. R. Crim. P. 5.1(a), (c)

Sixth Amendment attachment is a separate question

Rothgery held that an initial appearance before a judicial officer at which the defendant learns the formal accusation and liberty is restricted initiates adversary judicial proceedings and triggers attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel; prosecutor awareness or participation is not required. Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 194–95, 213 (2008)

Attachment and critical-stage analysis are distinct. Rothgery did not hold that attachment itself creates a § 3142 detention hearing, nor did it decide the scope of counsel's required presence at every postattachment proceeding; § 3142(f), not attachment, defines when a detention hearing is held. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 212 & nn.15–17; 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)

Release and detention structure

Section 3142(a) supplies four possible pretrial orders: release on personal recognizance or unsecured appearance bond; release on conditions; temporary detention under subsection (d); or detention under subsection (e). 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a)

Section 3142(b) makes recognizance or unsecured-bond release the starting rule unless the judicial officer determines that it will not reasonably assure appearance or will endanger another person or the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b)

If subsection (b) is insufficient, subsection (c) requires the least restrictive further condition or combination that will reasonably assure appearance and safety. A financial condition may not be imposed if it results in pretrial detention. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)–(2)

The § 3142(f) hearing gate

On the government's motion, § 3142(f)(1) requires a detention hearing in a case involving: a crime of violence, § 1591 offense, or qualifying terrorism offense; an offense with a maximum of life imprisonment or death; a qualifying drug offense with a ten-year maximum; a qualifying felony after two described prior convictions; or another felony involving a minor victim, a firearm, destructive device or dangerous weapon, or § 2250 failure to register. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)

On the government's motion or the court's own motion, § 3142(f)(2) requires a hearing in a case involving a serious risk of flight or a serious risk that the person will obstruct or attempt to obstruct justice, or threaten, injure, or intimidate a prospective witness or juror. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)

A § 3142(f) category triggers a hearing, not mandatory detention. The hearing ordinarily occurs immediately at first appearance, subject to statutory continuances; the person has counsel and the specified opportunities to testify, present and cross-examine witnesses, and present information by proffer or otherwise. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)

Decision, burdens, and presumptions

After the subsection (f) hearing, § 3142(e)(1) requires detention only if the judicial officer finds that no condition or combination will reasonably assure the person's appearance and the safety of another person and the community. Subsection (e)(1) is the detention rule; it is not a rebuttable-presumption category. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1)

The facts supporting a detention finding based on inability to reasonably assure safety must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Section 3142(f) does not state the burden of proof for a flight-based detention finding, so this nationwide module does not assign one without controlling circuit authority. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)

Section 3142(e)(2) creates a safety-only rebuttable presumption in a subsection (f)(1) case only when the person has a described prior conviction, committed that prior offense while on pretrial release, and is within five years of the later of that conviction or release from imprisonment. It is not the ten-year-drug-offense presumption. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(2)

Section 3142(e)(3) creates a rebuttable presumption concerning both appearance and safety upon probable cause for the specifically listed drug, firearm, terrorism, trafficking, and minor-victim offenses. A § 924(c) offense appears in this subsection, but the complete statutory list and thresholds control. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)

Both statutory presumptions are subject to rebuttal. Their application does not itself produce an automatic detention order; the judicial officer must apply the statute's hearing, factors, and no-adequate-condition framework. The nationwide effect of rebuttal on the burdens of production and persuasion is not resolved here. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)–(g)

The § 3142(c) conditions menu includes third-party custody and restrictions on travel, associations, intoxicants, and controlled substances, among other options; it also permits any other reasonably necessary condition. The judicial officer must select conditions under the least-restrictive rule rather than treat the legacy chart's short list as mandatory or exhaustive. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)

Corrected decision path

flowchart TD
    A["Federal arrest or Rule 4 summons"] --> B{"Arrest?"}
    B -->|"Yes"| C["Rule 5: without unnecessary delay"]
    B -->|"Summons"| D["Rule 5(d) or (e) procedure"]
    C --> E{"Warrantless arrest?"}
    E -->|"Yes"| F["Prompt complaint and prompt judicial probable-cause determination"]
    E -->|"No"| G["Initial appearance under Rule 5(c)"]
    F --> G
    D --> G
    G --> H["Felony advisements; counsel consultation; any Rule 5.1 right"]
    H --> I["Choose among § 3142(a) orders"]
    I --> J{"Will recognizance or unsecured bond reasonably assure appearance and avoid danger?"}
    J -->|"Yes"| K["Release under § 3142(b)"]
    J -->|"No"| L{"§ 3142(f)(1) government motion or § 3142(f)(2) motion/court finding?"}
    L -->|"No"| M["Least restrictive conditions under § 3142(c), or evaluate § 3142(d) if applicable"]
    L -->|"Yes"| N["Detention hearing; apply any correct § 3142(e)(2) or (e)(3) presumption"]
    N --> O{"No conditions reasonably assure appearance and safety?"}
    O -->|"Yes, with required findings"| P["Detention order under § 3142(e) and (i)"]
    O -->|"No"| M

Record-first checklist

1. Identify the arrest authority, warrant status, arrest time, district of arrest, charging district, complaint and affidavit, and initial-appearance time.
2. Keep Rule 5 presentment, McLaughlin probable-cause timing, and Corley confession admissibility on separate timelines.
3. Record every Rule 5(d) advisement and the opportunity to consult counsel.
4. Determine whether Rule 5.1 requires a preliminary hearing and calculate the applicable custody or release deadline.
5. Start with § 3142(b), then test § 3142(c) and any § 3142(d) issue before reaching detention.
6. For detention, identify the exact § 3142(f) trigger, the authorized movant, any § 3142(e) presumption, the § 3142(g) evidence, and the required findings and order.
7. Research the controlling circuit and local rules for the flight burden, evidentiary practice, reopening, review under § 3145, and counsel-presence questions not decided by Rothgery.

Matters not yet verified in this module

• A nationwide burden of proof for flight-based detention; § 3142 states clear and convincing evidence only for the safety finding.
• Circuit-specific operation of a rebutted presumption, permissible hearsay or proffers, reopening, and review under § 3145.
• Whether a particular initial appearance or detention hearing is a critical stage requiring counsel's presence under the Sixth Amendment.
• Any individual presentment remedy, confession ruling, probable-cause violation, release condition, detention finding, or appellate remedy.
• District-specific forms, standing orders, filing practices, and calendars.

Those applications remain open in data/coverage_matrix.yaml; the module verifies the corrected nationwide structure, not every pretrial subject in the project specification.

Arraignment and Pretrial Disclosure

Arraignment and Pretrial Disclosure

Verification boundary

This module separates five sources that are often collapsed into “discovery”: Rule 16 party discovery, the constitutional Brady line, the Jencks Act, Rule 26.2 witness-statement production, and Rule 17 subpoenas. It supplies their nationwide text and Supreme Court boundaries. It does not set a universal Brady production date, decide whether a particular item is favorable or material, define the prosecution team for a specific investigation, resolve privilege or classified-information procedure, apply local discovery orders, or decide circuit-specific remedies and standards of review.

Arraignment under Rule 10

Rule 10 requires an arraignment in open court at which the court ensures that the defendant has the indictment or information, reads it or states the substance of the charge, and asks the defendant to plead. Fed. R. Crim. P. 10(a)

A defendant charged by indictment or misdemeanor information may waive presence at arraignment only through a written waiver signed by the defendant and defense counsel that affirms receipt of the charging document and a not-guilty plea, and only if the court accepts it. Fed. R. Crim. P. 10(b)

Rule 10(c) permits arraignment by video teleconference only with the defendant's consent. Fed. R. Crim. P. 10(c)

Rule 16 party discovery

Rule 16(a)(1) creates specified government-disclosure duties upon a defendant's request; it is not a general command to open every government file. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)–(2)

The statement provisions distinguish a relevant oral statement made in known-agent interrogation that the government intends to use at trial from the broader specified written, recorded, recorded-oral, and grand-jury statements covered by Rule 16(a)(1)(B). Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A)–(B)

On request and subject to the rule's possession, knowledge, materiality, intended-use, and ownership conditions, Rule 16(a)(1) also covers the defendant's prior record, documents and objects, examination and test reports, and expert-witness information. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(D)–(G)

For Rule 16 expert disclosures, the court by order or local rule must set a time sufficiently before trial to give the opposing side a fair opportunity to meet the evidence, and the current rule specifies the required opinions, bases, reasons, qualifications, prior publications, prior testimony, approval, signature, and supplementation information. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G), (b)(1)(C)

Rule 16(a)(2) ordinarily excludes internal government reports and memoranda and does not authorize discovery of prospective government-witness statements except as 18 U.S.C. § 3500 provides; Rule 16(a)(3) separately limits discovery of recorded grand-jury proceedings. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(2)–(3); 18 U.S.C. § 3500

The defendant's reciprocal document, report, and expert duties arise only under the conditions stated in Rule 16(b), including a qualifying defense request followed by government compliance or the expert-disclosure request specified in the rule. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(b)(1)

Rule 16(c) imposes a continuing duty to disclose newly discovered evidence or material before or during trial when it is subject to Rule 16 and the opposing party previously requested, or the court ordered, production. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(c)

For good cause, Rule 16(d)(1) permits a court to deny, restrict, or defer discovery, or grant other appropriate relief, including on an ex parte written showing whose complete text the court must preserve under seal if relief is granted. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(1)

For a Rule 16 violation, the court may order discovery on just terms, grant a continuance, prohibit use of undisclosed evidence, or enter another order just under the circumstances; the rule does not make one sanction automatic for every violation. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2)

No later than 14 days after arraignment, Rule 16.1(a) requires government and defense counsel to confer and try to agree on a timetable and procedures for Rule 16 disclosure; after that conference, either or both may ask the court to determine or modify disclosure arrangements. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16.1

Rule 45(a) supplies federal criminal time computation, and Rule 45(b)(1) permits extension before expiration for good cause or after expiration for excusable neglect; Rule 16.1 is not among Rule 45(b)(2)'s listed no-extension provisions. Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(a)–(b)

Constitutional disclosure is a separate analysis

Rule 16, the Jencks Act, and the Brady line are separate sources with different triggers and coverage, so an item may require independent classification under more than one source rather than treatment under a single generic “discovery” rule. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16; 18 U.S.C. § 3500; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86–88 (1963)

A true Brady violation has three components: evidence favorable to the accused, suppression by the government willfully or inadvertently, and resulting prejudice. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999); Brady, 373 U.S. at 87

Evidence may be favorable because it is exculpatory or because it impeaches a prosecution witness; impeachment evidence is not categorically outside the constitutional disclosure rule. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281–82; United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676–78 (1985)

The constitutional disclosure duty is not eliminated by the absence of a specific defense request: Bagley applies its materiality formulation to no-request, general-request, and specific-request nondisclosure. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682–83

The prosecution's good faith does not defeat a Brady claim, because suppression may be willful or inadvertent; prejudice and the other constitutional components remain required. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281–82

Suppressed favorable evidence is material under Bagley when there is a reasonable probability that disclosure would have produced a different result, meaning a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682

Kyles requires materiality to be assessed collectively, not item by item, and makes clear that the inquiry is not a sufficiency-of-the-remaining-evidence test or a constitutional open-file mandate. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434–37 (1995)

The individual prosecutor must learn of favorable evidence known to others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including police, but determining who falls within that case-specific group requires the actual investigative relationships and controlling law. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437–38

Giglio treats an undisclosed promise of nonprosecution to a key government witness as credibility evidence within the due-process rule when the witness's reliability may determine guilt or innocence; it does not require a new trial for every item that might have been useful to the defense. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153–55 (1972)

For the promise at issue in Giglio, the prosecutor's office was treated as the government entity, so a promise by one assistant was attributable to the government despite the trial prosecutor's lack of personal knowledge. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154

The distinct Napue rule forbids the government from knowingly using false testimony or allowing known false testimony to go uncorrected, including falsehoods bearing on witness credibility; the materiality question asks whether there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the jury's judgment. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269–72 (1959); Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153–54

The Supreme Court authorities above do not supply one calendar date for every constitutional disclosure. The governing discovery order, local rule, trial schedule, proposed use of the evidence, and controlling circuit timing law must be checked without confusing Bagley's post hoc materiality standard with a license to delay disclosure.

Jencks Act and Rule 26.2 witness statements

In a federal criminal prosecution, § 3500(a) bars subpoena, discovery, or inspection of a government or prospective government witness's statement in United States possession until that witness has testified on direct examination at trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a)

After a government witness testifies on direct, § 3500(b) requires the court, on the defendant's motion, to order production of a United States-possessed statement that relates to the testimony's subject matter and permits a reasonable recess for examination and preparation. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b)

If the government claims that part of a statement is unrelated to the testimony, § 3500(c) requires in camera inspection, excision of unrelated matter, delivery of the remainder, and preservation of withheld text for appellate review if the defendant objects. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(c)

If the United States elects not to obey a § 3500 production order, subsection (d) requires striking the witness's testimony and continuing trial unless the court determines that the interests of justice require a mistrial. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(d)

Section 3500(e) limits “statement” to a witness-signed or adopted writing, a substantially verbatim contemporaneous recording or transcription of the witness's oral statement, or the witness's grand-jury statement. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)

Rule 26.2(a) is reciprocal: after a nondefendant witness testifies on direct, the court must, on motion by a party who did not call the witness, order the calling side to produce a possessed statement relating to the testimony's subject matter. Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.2(a)

Rule 26.2 governs production at trial, at a Rule 12 suppression hearing, and in the additional proceedings specified by Rules 5.1, 8.1, 32, 32.1, 46, and 50; disobedience requires striking the witness's testimony, with a mistrial if a government attorney disobeys and justice requires it. Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.2(e), (g)

Rule 17 subpoenas

Rule 17(a) provides the form for a witness subpoena, and Rule 17(b) requires issuance on an indigent defendant's ex parte showing that the named witness is necessary to an adequate defense, with process costs and witness fees paid as for government witnesses. Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(a)–(b)

Current Rule 17(c) permits a subpoena to designate documents or objects for production, permits prompt quashing or modification if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive, and requires a court order plus ordinarily victim notice before a post-charge third-party subpoena for a victim's personal or confidential information. Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)

Current Rule 17(h) prohibits using Rule 17 to subpoena a witness or prospective witness's statement and directs the parties to Rule 26.2 instead. Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(h)

For pretrial production under current Rule 17(c), United States v. Nixon holds that the subpoena is not a general criminal-discovery device and requires the proponent to clear relevance, admissibility, and specificity hurdles, together with the case's additional good-faith, necessity, and reasonable-availability considerations. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 698–702 (1974)

A substantially revised Rule 17 is projected for December 1, 2027 after the Standing Committee approved final proposed amendments in June 2026 for submission to the Judicial Conference, but it is not current law and may still be delayed, changed, rejected, or withdrawn through the rulemaking process. U.S. Courts Rule 17 status record; Pending Rules and Forms Amendments

Proof and record checklist

Before applying any branch, collect the charging document and arraignment record; every discovery request and response; the district's local criminal rules and discovery order; the government's exhibit and witness notices; the allegedly suppressed item and evidence of who possessed it when; the relationship among prosecutors, agents, police, and other investigators; witness agreements, benefits, promises, payments, and correction history; the proposed use and admissibility of subpoenaed material; the exact witness statement and direct testimony; all production, protective, continuance, exclusion, mistrial, and preservation orders; and the governing circuit's timing, remedy, and standard-of-review cases.

Common failure points

• Treating Rule 16, Brady, § 3500, Rule 26.2, and Rule 17 as interchangeable.
• Calling every favorable nondisclosure a completed constitutional violation without proving suppression and prejudice.
• Applying Bagley item by item rather than cumulatively.
• Assuming the trial prosecutor's lack of personal knowledge ends the prosecution-team inquiry.
• Treating impeachment nondisclosure and known false testimony as the same materiality branch.
• Demanding Jencks Act statements before the statutory trigger without separately analyzing constitutional disclosure.
• Using Rule 17(c) as an unspecific document-discovery request.
• Applying the proposed 2027 Rule 17 text as if already effective.
• Missing the Rule 16.1 conference date, local deadlines, preservation objections, or a remedy-specific motion.

Open questions requiring narrower authority

The following remain outside this nationwide module: circuit-specific constitutional disclosure timing; circuit definitions of the prosecution team; treatment of evidence known to state, foreign, civil, intelligence, or separate investigative bodies; consequences of delayed but pre-use disclosure; preservation and waiver; classified-information and privilege procedure; grand-jury disclosure; electronic-data production protocols; local expert schedules; ex parte subpoena practice beyond current Rule 17(b); interlocutory review; and appellate standards for each sanction or constitutional disposition.

Primary authorities

• Fed. R. Crim. P. 10, 16, 16.1, 17, 26.2, and 45.
• 18 U.S.C. § 3500.
• Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
• Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
• Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
• United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
• Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
• Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999).
• United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).

Last verified: August 25, 2026.

Suppression, Severance, and Pretrial Evidentiary Motions

Suppression, Severance, and Pretrial Evidentiary Motions

Verification boundary

This module supplies the nationwide procedural framework and selected controlling Supreme Court limits. It does not decide whether a particular search, seizure, interrogation, joinder, or item of evidence was lawful; replace the district's motion deadline; resolve a disputed record; or supply circuit-specific burdens, hearing thresholds, standards for unaddressed evidentiary doctrines, conditional-plea requirements, or harmless-error applications.

Rule 12 motion procedure

Rule 12 permits a pretrial motion for a defense, objection, or request that can be decided without a trial on the merits, and Rule 47 governs the motion's form and supporting grounds. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(1), 47

A suppression request and a Rule 14 severance request must be raised before trial when the basis is then reasonably available and the motion can be decided without a trial on the merits. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(C)–(D)

At arraignment or as soon afterward as practicable, a defendant may request notice of the government's intent to use in its case-in-chief evidence discoverable under Rule 16 so the defendant has an opportunity to move to suppress; the government's voluntary notice provision is distinct. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(4)

The court may set, extend, or reset a pretrial-motion deadline; if it sets none, the deadline is the start of trial. A late Rule 12(b)(3) motion is untimely, but the court may consider it on a showing of good cause. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)

The court must decide every pretrial motion before trial unless good cause supports deferral, may not defer if doing so will adversely affect a party's appeal right, and must state essential factual findings on the record. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(d)

All suppression-hearing proceedings and oral findings and conclusions must be recorded, and Rule 26.2 applies at the hearing with a law-enforcement officer treated as a government witness. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(f), (h)

Rule 41 distinguishes a motion to return property, filed in the seizure district with evidence received on necessary factual issues, from a defendant's suppression motion, which is filed in the trial court as Rule 12 provides. Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g)–(h)

Suppression theories and exclusion limits

Fourth Amendment rights are personal: a defendant must show that the challenged search or seizure violated the defendant's own protected interest rather than rely solely on evidence obtained through a violation of someone else's rights. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–40 (1978)

For privacy-based search claims, Rakas directs the inquiry to whether the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched or thing invaded; mere presence or a target label is not enough. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140–50

A Franks evidentiary hearing requires a substantial preliminary showing that a warrant-affidavit false statement was made knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for truth and was necessary to probable cause; conclusory allegations or a mere desire to cross-examine do not suffice. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56, 170–72 (1978)

If the defendant proves the qualifying falsity by a preponderance at the Franks hearing and the affidavit without that material cannot establish probable cause, the warrant is void and the search fruits are excluded to the same extent as if probable cause had been absent on the affidavit's face. Franks, 438 U.S. at 156, 171–72

The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is a judicial remedy aimed at deterrence, not an automatic personal right to exclusion for every constitutional violation. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906–13 (1984)

Leon ordinarily permits use of evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a later-invalidated warrant, but identifies limits including a knowingly or recklessly misleading affidavit, abandonment of the judicial role, an affidavit so lacking in probable-cause indicia that reliance is unreasonable, and a facially deficient warrant. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922–23

Evidence is not excluded merely because it would not have come to light but for unlawful police action; the question is whether it was obtained by exploitation of the illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to purge the primary taint. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963)

Miranda addresses statements stemming from custodial interrogation and requires the specified warnings and a valid waiver before the prosecution may use such a statement in its case-in-chief, subject to later Supreme Court refinements and exceptions. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45, 467–79 (1966)

Dickerson holds that Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress could not supersede through 18 U.S.C. § 3501's voluntariness-only approach; voluntariness and Miranda compliance remain analytically distinct. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432, 437–44 (2000)

Search-and-seizure, Franks, Miranda, voluntariness, and Sixth Amendment statement claims have different elements and remedial limits. They must be classified independently before deciding whether a statement, physical evidence, derivative evidence, identification, or other item is excludable.

Motions in limine and evidentiary preservation

The Federal Rules do not create one universal criminal “motion in limine” standard; Rules 103 and 104 provide the core evidentiary-ruling and preliminary-question framework, while the particular evidence rule and controlling precedent supply the merits. Fed. R. Evid. 103–104

To claim erroneous admission, Rule 103 ordinarily requires a timely on-record objection or motion to strike stating the specific ground unless apparent; to claim erroneous exclusion, it ordinarily requires an offer of proof unless the substance was apparent. The ruling must affect a substantial right. Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)

Once the court definitively rules on the record before or at trial, Rule 103(b) does not require renewal of the objection or offer of proof; whether a pretrial ruling was definitive must be determined from the actual record. Fed. R. Evid. 103(b)

Under Luce, a defendant must testify to preserve appellate review of an in-limine ruling allowing impeachment by a prior conviction under Rule 609(a), because otherwise the reviewing court cannot know the testimony, whether impeachment occurred, or its effect. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41–43 (1984)

When a defendant preemptively introduces the conviction on direct examination, Ohler applies the general rule that a party introducing evidence cannot complain on appeal that the evidence was erroneously admitted. Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 755–60 (2000)

Severance

If joinder of offenses or defendants appears prejudicial, Rule 14 permits separate trials of counts, severance of defendants, or other relief justice requires; before ruling, the court may inspect in camera a defendant's statement the government intends to use. Fed. R. Crim. P. 14

Rule 14 does not require severance merely because codefendants present mutually antagonistic or mutually exclusive defenses. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 538–39 (1993)

Zafiro directs relief only when a joint trial creates a serious risk of compromising a specific trial right or preventing a reliable guilt-or-innocence judgment, and even then the remedy need not be severance because limiting instructions or other measures may suffice. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539–41

Interlocutory review and preservation

Before jeopardy and verdict, 18 U.S.C. § 3731 authorizes a government appeal from an order suppressing or excluding evidence or requiring return of property if the United States attorney certifies that the appeal is not for delay and the evidence is substantial proof of a material fact. 18 U.S.C. § 3731

A § 3731 appeal must be taken within 30 days and diligently prosecuted, remains subject to the Double Jeopardy Clause, and is governed by Congress's direction to construe the section liberally. 18 U.S.C. § 3731

Criminal defendants ordinarily obtain appellate review after final judgment; Abney recognizes immediate collateral-order review for a colorable denial of a motion to dismiss on Double Jeopardy grounds, not a general interlocutory route for accompanying suppression, severance, or indictment arguments. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656–63 (1977)

Preservation is issue-specific: Rule 12(c)(3) governs an untimely required pretrial motion, Rule 51 requires the requested action or a timely specific objection when the ruling is made, and Evidence Rule 103 governs evidentiary objections, offers of proof, and definitive rulings. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3), 51; Fed. R. Evid. 103

Rule 52 distinguishes harmless preserved error from plain error affecting substantial rights, but neither Rule 52 nor Evidence Rule 103(e) guarantees relief for an unpreserved claim; the governing elements and record still control. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52; Fed. R. Evid. 103(e)

On appeal after a suppression ruling, Ornelas requires independent review of ultimate reasonable-suspicion and probable-cause determinations, while historical facts receive clear-error review and due weight is given to inferences drawn by resident judges and local officers. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696–700 (1996)

The notice of appeal, plea, reservation of issues, trial record, renewed objections, offers of proof, and circuit doctrine must be checked before representing any pretrial ruling as reviewable or preserved.

Competency, Insanity Procedure, and Speedy Trial

Competency, Insanity Procedure, and Speedy Trial

Verification boundary

Competency concerns present ability to proceed; insanity concerns responsibility at the time of the charged act. The Speedy Trial Act supplies statutory clocks and exclusions; the Sixth Amendment supplies a separate postaccusation balancing test. This module does not diagnose a person, calculate a live docket without every entry, resolve dangerousness, authorize involuntary medication in a particular case, apply a district plan, or decide circuit-specific appellate and collateral-review questions.

Present competency

The constitutional competency test asks whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402–03 (1960)

From commencement of prosecution until sentencing, either side may move for a competency hearing, and the court must grant it or act sua sponte when reasonable cause exists to believe a present mental disease or defect may prevent understanding the proceedings or proper assistance in the defense. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a)

Before the hearing, the court may order a psychiatric or psychological examination and report under § 4247(b)–(c); at the hearing, § 4247(d) provides counsel plus opportunities to testify, present evidence, subpoena witnesses, and confront and cross-examine appearing witnesses. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241(b)–(c), 4247(d)

If the court finds present incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence, § 4241(d) requires commitment to the Attorney General for treatment in a suitable facility for a reasonable period not exceeding four months to determine whether there is a substantial probability of foreseeable restoration. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1)

An additional restoration period must be reasonable and requires a finding of a substantial probability of restoration within that period; it ends when capacity is restored or the charges are disposed of, whichever is earlier, and nonrestoration triggers § 4246 procedure rather than indefinite criminal commitment under § 4241. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(2)

For an examination under § 4241, § 4247(b) permits examination commitment for a reasonable period not exceeding 30 days and a facility-requested extension not exceeding 15 days on the required good-cause showing. 18 U.S.C. § 4247(b)

When a facility director certifies recovery, the court must hold a § 4247(d) hearing and order immediate discharge from hospitalization and set trial if it finds restored competency by a preponderance. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(e)

A competency finding neither prejudices a later insanity defense nor is admissible at the trial on the charged offense. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(f)

When evidence raises the constitutionally sufficient doubt about present competence, failure to conduct the required inquiry deprives the defendant of a fair trial; the issue cannot be treated as waived merely because defense counsel did not obtain the hearing. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384–86 (1966)

The duty to protect against trial of an incompetent defendant is continuing: the court must consider the full record, including prior history, behavior, counsel's representations, and developments during trial, rather than rely on one examination or courtroom observation alone. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171–81 (1975)

Involuntary medication solely to restore trial competency is permitted only in the rare case satisfying Sell's requirements: important governmental interests, substantial likelihood of restoration without side effects significantly impairing defense participation, necessity after less intrusive alternatives, and medical appropriateness. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179–83 (2003)

Before reaching a trial-competency medication order, a court ordinarily should consider whether forced medication is warranted on a different ground such as dangerousness, and Sell treats a qualifying medication order as immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine. Sell, 539 U.S. at 175–77, 182–83

Insanity defense and postverdict procedure

Federal insanity is an affirmative defense requiring proof that, because of a severe mental disease or defect at the time of the acts, the defendant could not appreciate their nature and quality or wrongfulness; the defendant bears clear-and-convincing proof, and mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute the statutory defense. 18 U.S.C. § 17

A defendant intending to assert insanity must give written government notice and file it by the pretrial-motion deadline or a later court-set time; absent notice the defense is unavailable, subject to the court's good-cause power to permit late notice and other appropriate relief. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.2(a)

Rule 12.2(b) separately requires pretrial notice of expert mental-condition evidence bearing on guilt or capital punishment; giving or omitting that notice is not the same as asserting the statutory insanity defense. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.2(b)

After insanity notice, the court must grant a government motion for an examination under § 4242; after other Rule 12.2(b) notice, it may order an examination under court-prescribed procedures. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.2(c)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 4242(a)

Statements made during a Rule 12.2 examination, expert testimony based on them, and their fruits ordinarily may not be used against the defendant except on a mental-condition issue the defendant has placed in issue as the rule specifies. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.2(c)(4)

Rule 12.2 permits exclusion of defense expert mental-condition evidence for failure to provide required expert notice, submit to an ordered examination, or make the required expert-report disclosure; it does not authorize exclusion of the defendant's own testimony merely for the notice failure. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.2(d)

Evidence of a Rule 12.2(a) or (b) intention later withdrawn is inadmissible against the person who gave the notice in a civil or criminal proceeding. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.2(e)

When insanity is put in issue by Rule 12.2 notice, § 4242(b) requires the jury, or the court in a bench trial, to return one of three specified findings: guilty, not guilty, or not guilty only by reason of insanity. 18 U.S.C. § 4242(b)

After a federal not-guilty-only-by-reason-of-insanity verdict, § 4243 requires commitment to Attorney General custody and a hearing no later than 40 days after the special verdict to determine whether release would create the statutory substantial risk. 18 U.S.C. § 4243(a), (c)

At the § 4243 hearing, the acquitted person bears clear-and-convincing proof for an offense involving bodily injury, serious property damage, or a substantial risk of either, and a preponderance burden for any other offense, to show release would not create the specified risk due to present mental disease or defect. 18 U.S.C. § 4243(d)

If the acquitted person does not carry the § 4243 burden, the statute requires Attorney General custody, state-placement efforts, and hospitalization until a state assumes responsibility or release or conditional release no longer creates the statutory risk; later discharge and conditional-release procedure remain governed by § 4243(f)–(g). 18 U.S.C. § 4243(e)–(g)

Federal juries ordinarily are not instructed about the commitment consequences of a not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity verdict because juries determine guilt rather than punishment or disposition; Shannon recognizes a limited corrective-instruction situation when a false impression about immediate release has been created. Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579–88 (1994)

Speedy Trial Act computation and remedy

The 30-day arrest-or-summons charging clock and the 70-day indictment-or-appearance trial clock are starting rules, not final calculations; every event must be classified under § 3161 and the complete docket. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), (c), (h)

Delay from filing a pretrial motion through the hearing or prompt disposition is automatically excluded under § 3161(h)(1)(D); Tinklenberg holds that the motion need not actually postpone trial to trigger that exclusion. United States v. Tinklenberg, 563 U.S. 647, 650, 655–60 (2011)

Time granted to prepare pretrial motions is not automatically excluded under § 3161(h)(1); Bloate holds that it may be excluded only through a properly supported ends-of-justice continuance under the applicable provision. Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196, 199–204, 213–14 (2010)

A defendant cannot prospectively waive the Speedy Trial Act “for all time,” because the Act protects the public interest as well as the defendant and requires delay to fit a statutory exclusion. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 500–03 (2006)

An ends-of-justice continuance excludes time only when the court weighs the statutory interests and states its reasons on the record; Zedner requires express findings at least by the ruling on a dismissal motion and rejects harmless-error substitution for missing findings. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7); Zedner, 547 U.S. at 506–09

Section 3161(h) separately addresses proceedings concerning the defendant, competency or physical inability, interlocutory appeals, essential-witness unavailability, treatment of other charges, advisement periods, codefendant delay, and ends-of-justice continuances; labels on docket entries cannot replace element-by-element classification. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)

For a trial-clock violation, a timely pretrial or pre-plea defense motion requires dismissal, but dismissal may be with or without prejudice; Taylor holds there is no presumption for either result and requires reasoned consideration of the statutory factors and relevant prejudice. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2); United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 332–43 (1988)

Failure to seek statutory trial-clock dismissal before trial or entry of a guilty or nolo plea waives the § 3162(a)(2) dismissal right; that retrospective rule does not validate a blanket prospective waiver. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2)

Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right

A reasonably available constitutional speedy-trial objection that can be decided without a merits trial must be raised by pretrial motion under Rule 12(b)(3)(A)(iii), subject to the motion deadline and good-cause rule. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(A)(iii), (c)

The Sixth Amendment inquiry balances length of delay, reason for delay, the defendant's assertion of the right, and prejudice; none is a necessary or sufficient condition by itself, and the length must first be presumptively prejudicial enough to trigger full analysis. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530–33 (1972)

Doggett holds that sufficiently excessive postindictment government negligence can support presumptive prejudice even without specifically demonstrable trial prejudice, but the presumption's weight depends on the delay and remains part of the full Barker balance. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651–58 (1992)

The Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause protects the interval from accusation through conviction and does not govern sentencing delay; Betterman left the different due-process question open rather than importing Barker automatically. Betterman v. Montana, 578 U.S. 437, 439–48 (2016)

The Speedy Trial Act and Sixth Amendment are independent: compliance with one does not by itself resolve the other, because their triggers, exclusions or factors, preservation rules, and remedies differ. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3162; Barker, 407 U.S. at 522–33

Because a completed Sixth Amendment speedy-trial violation cannot be cured by holding the delayed trial, dismissal of the charge is the required remedy; the severe consequence is one reason the Barker inquiry must be applied carefully to the full record. Barker, 407 U.S. at 522

No live Speedy Trial Act or Sixth Amendment conclusion should be made without the arrest, complaint, indictment, appearance, plea, motion, competency, continuance, codefendant, interlocutory-appeal, trial, and dismissal-motion record.

Plea and Trial

Plea and Trial

Plea agreements, Rule 11, jury and bench trial, verdict, Rule 29, mistrial, juror issues, and Rule 33. This page is a verified navigation layer. The linked canonical modules, atomic claims, authority cards, and structured controls remain the legal source; this index does not create a rule from omission or shorthand.

Canonical modules

Stage use controls

• Start with the actual docket posture and controlling court, not the desired remedy.
• Calculate every deadline from its stated triggering event and current computation rule.
• Separate jurisdiction, venue, prerequisites, merits, burden, proof, remedy, review, and appealability.
• Use the circuit overlay for any circuit-sensitive proposition and stop at records marked not_verified.
• Preserve the operative filings, orders, transcripts, exhibits, agency record, and proof of filing or service.

Handoff to adjacent stages

Use the federal process decision trees to identify prerequisites, alternative vehicles, appellate routes, and postjudgment interactions. Generated diagrams are navigation aids only; linked canonical modules control.

Plea Negotiations, Plea Agreements, and Rule 11

Plea Negotiations, Plea Agreements, and Rule 11

Verification boundary

This module supplies the nationwide federal framework and controlling Supreme Court limits. It does not determine whether a particular offer existed, construe a particular agreement or waiver, establish the defendant's understanding, decide whether counsel performed deficiently, select a breach remedy, calculate prejudice, or resolve circuit-specific enforcement, contract-construction, plain-error, factual-basis, withdrawal, or collateral-review questions. The signed agreement, offer history, plea and sentencing transcripts, charging papers, docket, and controlling circuit law remain indispensable.

Negotiation and counsel

The Constitution does not create a right to receive a plea offer, but once the prosecution makes a formal offer the Sixth Amendment governs defense counsel's performance in advising about it. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144–48 (2012)

An unexecuted plea proposal, standing alone, is an executory arrangement without constitutional significance; a defendant has no federal constitutional right to specific performance of an offer withdrawn before the guilty plea was entered. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507–11 (1984)

Defense counsel has a general duty to communicate formal prosecution offers that may be favorable to the accused. Frye, 566 U.S. at 145–47

Prejudice from a formal offer that lapsed or was rejected through deficient performance requires reasonable probabilities that the defendant would have accepted it, it would have been entered without prosecutorial cancellation or judicial refusal where those actors had discretion, and the result would have been more favorable. Frye, 566 U.S. at 147–49

The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance applies when counsel advises a defendant whether to accept a plea offer, even if the defendant later receives a fair trial. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162–68 (2012)

When deficient advice causes rejection followed by trial, prejudice requires reasonable probabilities that the defendant would have accepted, the prosecution would not have withdrawn for intervening reasons, the court would have accepted, and the offer would have produced a less severe conviction, sentence, or both. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 163–64

The remedy for proven lost-offer ineffective assistance must neutralize the constitutional injury without creating a windfall; in Lafler the proper first step was reoffering, after which the trial court retained bounded discretion over the conviction and sentence. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 170–75

The Constitution does not require the government to disclose material impeachment evidence before entering a plea agreement, and Ruiz likewise rejected a categorical constitutional right to pre-bargaining affirmative-defense information on the agreement before it. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628–33 (2002)

Plea choices and conditional pleas

Rule 11 permits pleas of not guilty, guilty, and—only with court consent—nolo contendere; a court considering nolo contendere must consider the parties' views and the public interest in effective justice. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(1), (3)

A conditional guilty or nolo plea requires both government consent and court approval, must reserve in writing review of a specified adverse pretrial ruling, and permits withdrawal if the defendant prevails on appeal. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2)

Rule 11(a)(2) is not the exclusive route for every post-plea claim: a guilty plea by itself did not bar Class from directly challenging the constitutionality of the statute of conviction where the claim did not contradict the indictment, plea terms, or admitted facts and challenged the government's power to convict. Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174, 180–86 (2018)

Class does not convert an unconditional plea into a general reservation of pretrial rulings: the claim's substance, the plea and agreement, admitted facts, preservation, and any written Rule 11(a)(2) reservation must be classified separately. Class, 583 U.S. at 181–87; Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2)

Colloquy, understanding, voluntariness, and factual basis

Before accepting a guilty or nolo plea, the court must address the defendant personally in open court and determine that the defendant understands the matters Rule 11(b)(1) enumerates. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)

The required colloquy includes the nature of each charge, possible perjury use of sworn answers, the right to counsel, and the right to plead not guilty or persist in that plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(A)–(D)

The court must explain the trial rights to a jury, to confront and cross-examine, to protection from compelled self-incrimination, to testify and present evidence, and to compel witnesses, and that a guilty or nolo plea waives those trial rights. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(C), (E)–(F)

Rule 11 requires advice about maximum punishment, mandatory minimum, applicable forfeiture, restitution authority, the special assessment, and the court's duty to calculate and consider the advisory Guidelines and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G)–(M)

If the agreement contains a provision waiving the right to appeal or collaterally attack the sentence, the court must determine that the defendant understands its terms; this colloquy requirement does not itself decide the provision's scope or enforceability. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N)

The court must warn a noncitizen that conviction may result in removal, denial of citizenship, and denial of future admission to the United States. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(O)

Before accepting the plea, the court must determine that it is voluntary and did not result from force, threats, or promises outside the plea agreement. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2)

A guilty plea must be a voluntary and intelligent choice made with sufficient awareness of relevant circumstances and likely direct consequences; a plea is not involuntary merely because it was motivated by a lawful prospect of a lesser penalty than after trial. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747–58 (1970)

Before entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must determine that a factual basis exists; Rule 11(b)(3) is a federal procedural command distinct from proof at trial and from every constitutional claim concerning innocence or offense elements. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3)

Defense counsel must advise a noncitizen about immigration consequences: when removal law is clear, correct advice is required; when it is unclear, counsel must at least advise that the charge may carry adverse immigration consequences. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366–74 (2010)

For ineffective assistance that allegedly caused an accepted guilty plea, Hill applies both Strickland prongs and ordinarily requires a reasonable probability that, absent counsel's error, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56–60 (1985)

The accepted-plea prejudice inquiry is not defeated categorically by a weak trial defense; it compares the consequences and asks what this defendant rationally would have done, using contemporaneous evidence rather than post hoc assertion alone. Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357, 364–71 (2017)

Agreements, acceptance, and breach

The government and defense may discuss a plea agreement, but the court must not participate in those discussions. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)

Rule 11(c)(1)(A) permits government promises not to bring or to dismiss other charges; Rule 11(c)(1)(B) permits a sentencing recommendation or nonopposition that does not bind the court; and Rule 11(c)(1)(C) permits agreement that a specified sentence, range, Guidelines provision, policy statement, or sentencing factor is appropriate and binds the court once accepted. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)

The parties must disclose the plea agreement in open court when the plea is offered unless good cause supports in-camera disclosure. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(2)

For a Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or (C) agreement the court may accept, reject, or defer until reviewing the presentence report; for a (B) agreement it must advise that the defendant cannot withdraw merely because the court does not follow the recommendation or request. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(3)

Acceptance of a Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or (C) agreement makes the agreed disposition binding, while rejection requires on-record notice, an opportunity to withdraw, and a warning that a persisting plea may produce a less favorable disposition. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(4)–(5)

Acceptance of the guilty plea and acceptance of the plea agreement are distinct judicial acts; deferring the latter does not make an already accepted plea freely retractable. United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 674–80 (1997); Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(3), (d)

When a guilty plea rests in significant part on a prosecution promise that induced it, the promise must be fulfilled; an inadvertent breach by a different prosecutor is not immaterial. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261–63 (1971)

For the proven breach in Santobello, the state court—not the defendant—was to choose between specific performance through resentencing before a different judge and permission to withdraw the plea. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262–63

An unpreserved claim that the government breached a plea agreement receives ordinary Rule 52(b) plain-error review. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 133–43 (2009)

A later government breach does not retroactively render a knowing and voluntary plea unknowing or involuntary; breach and the available remedy are analytically distinct from plea validity at entry. Puckett, 556 U.S. at 137–39

Plea-discussion evidence and waivers

Against the defendant who made the plea or participated in discussions, Evidence Rule 410 generally excludes a later-withdrawn guilty plea, a nolo plea, qualifying Rule 11 plea-proceeding statements, and qualifying statements to a prosecuting attorney during plea discussions that produced no guilty plea or a later-withdrawn plea. Fed. R. Evid. 410(a)

Rule 410 permits a qualifying plea-discussion statement when fairness requires considering it with another statement introduced from the same discussion, and in a perjury or false-statement prosecution if the defendant made it under oath, on the record, and with counsel present. Fed. R. Evid. 410(b)

Absent an affirmative indication that the agreement was unknowing or involuntary, Mezzanatto enforced a defendant's agreement allowing impeachment use of plea-discussion statements; its holding does not by itself validate every broader case-in-chief or rebuttal waiver. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 200–10 (1995)

An appellate or collateral-review waiver is an express agreement term, not a synonym for every consequence of pleading guilty; its text, colloquy, validity, scope, exceptions, and controlling circuit law must be examined claim by claim. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N); Garza v. Idaho, 586 U.S. 232, 238–44 (2019)

Because no appeal waiver bars all possible appellate claims, counsel who disregards a defendant's express instruction to file a notice of appeal performs deficiently, and the Flores-Ortega presumption of prejudice applies despite the waiver. Garza, 586 U.S. at 238–49

A counseled, voluntary, intelligent guilty plea ordinarily forecloses independent collateral inquiry into antecedent constitutional deprivations and focuses the attack on the plea's voluntary and intelligent character and counsel's advice. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 261–69 (1973)

The ordinary Tollett rule and the power-to-convict claim recognized in Class are different from an express appellate waiver; none should be treated as an automatic rule that all claims survive or that all claims disappear. Class, 583 U.S. at 180–87; Tollett, 411 U.S. at 266–67

Withdrawal, record, review, and collateral limits

Before the court accepts a guilty or nolo plea, the defendant may withdraw it for any reason or no reason. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(1)

After acceptance but before sentence, withdrawal is permitted if the court rejects a Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or (C) agreement or the defendant shows a fair and just reason; a mere change of mind is not a free-withdrawal entitlement. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(5), (d)(2); Hyde, 520 U.S. at 674–80

After sentence, a guilty or nolo plea may not be withdrawn; it may be set aside only on direct appeal or collateral attack. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)

The plea proceedings must be recorded by a court reporter or suitable recording device and, for a guilty or nolo plea, the record must include the Rule 11 inquiries and advice and the plea-agreement disclosure. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(g)

A Rule 11 variance is harmless if it does not affect substantial rights; an unpreserved Rule 11 claim is reviewed under Rule 52(b) on the whole record, and the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(h), 52; United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58–59, 62–75 (2002); United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 76, 80–85 (2004)

Judicial participation in plea discussions violates Rule 11(c)(1), but Davila rejects automatic vacatur and requires the Rule 11(h) prejudice inquiry on the full record. United States v. Davila, 569 U.S. 597, 602–13 (2013)

A formal Rule 11 violation that is neither constitutional nor jurisdictional does not alone support § 2255 relief; collateral relief requires the kind of fundamental defect or exceptional circumstance cognizable under the collateral standard. United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 783–85 (1979)

Application checklist

1. Preserve every written offer, expiration, rejection, counteroffer, and communication record.
2. Obtain the charging papers, signed agreement, plea petition, Rule 11 transcript, sentencing transcript, judgment, and docket.
3. Identify the plea type and whether plea acceptance and agreement acceptance occurred on different dates.
4. Classify each promise under Rule 11(c)(1)(A), (B), or (C), including mixed agreements.
5. Compare the colloquy to every applicable Rule 11(b)(1) item, voluntariness, and factual basis without treating a variance as automatic relief.
6. Parse each appellate, collateral-review, evidence-use, and discovery waiver by its actual words and controlling circuit law.
7. Separate offer-stage ineffective assistance, accepted-plea ineffective assistance, prosecution breach, judicial participation, withdrawal, direct review, and collateral review; each has different elements and remedies.
8. Confirm preservation and apply the correct harmless-error, plain-error, ineffective-assistance, or collateral standard.

Open items requiring individualized or circuit research

• Whether a particular communication was a formal offer or protected plea discussion.
• Agreement-construction rules, government-breach burdens, materiality, and circuit-specific remedies.
• Enforceability, scope, exceptions, and miscarriage-of-justice doctrines for appellate and collateral-review waivers.
• Circuit factual-basis methodology, withdrawal factors, review standards, and treatment of plea-discussion waivers beyond Mezzanatto's impeachment holding.
• Offense elements, immigration classification, sentencing exposure, Guidelines consequences, restitution, forfeiture, supervised release, and collateral consequences in the actual case.
• Any pending Rule 11 amendment is nonbinding unless and until it takes effect; the current rule text controls this module.

Federal Jury and Bench Trial

Federal Jury and Bench Trial

Verification boundary

This module states the current nationwide constitutional, statutory, and Criminal Rules framework for entitlement to a jury, waiver, jury composition and selection, bench findings, evidence in open court, presence, instructions, burden of proof, and verdict unanimity. It does not decide offense elements, local jury plans, individual jury-selection facts, evidentiary rulings, circuit-specific preservation applications, or harmlessness.

Entitlement to a jury and waiver

No offense carrying an authorized prison term greater than six months may be treated as petty for Sixth Amendment jury-trial purposes. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68–74 (1970)

An offense with a maximum authorized prison term of six months or less is presumed petty, but additional statutory penalties can overcome that presumption when they are so severe that they clearly reflect a legislative judgment that the offense is serious. Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541–43 (1989)

When a jury trial is required, Rule 23 permits a bench trial only if the defendant waives a jury in writing, the government consents, and the court approves; the Constitution does not give a defendant an absolute right to insist on a bench trial. Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(a); Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34–37 (1965)

Jury size and bench findings

A federal criminal jury ordinarily consists of twelve jurors; before verdict the parties may stipulate in writing, with court approval, to fewer, and after deliberations begin the court may permit eleven jurors to return a verdict if it finds good cause to excuse a juror. Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b)

In a bench trial the court must return a guilty-or-not-guilty finding and, if a party requests before the finding, must state specific findings of fact in open court or in a written decision or opinion. Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(c)

Jury pool and selection

The Jury Selection and Service Act declares a federal policy of random selection from a fair cross section of the community and gives all qualified citizens an opportunity to be considered for service and an obligation to serve when summoned. 28 U.S.C. § 1861

No citizen may be excluded from federal grand- or petit-jury service because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status. 28 U.S.C. § 1862

A criminal defendant's Jury Selection and Service Act challenge must ordinarily be made before voir dire begins or within seven days after the defendant discovered or could have discovered the ground with diligence, whichever is earlier, and must be supported as § 1867(d) requires; § 1867 supplies the exclusive statutory means to challenge noncompliance with the Act's jury-selection provisions. 28 U.S.C. § 1867(a), (d), (e)

A prima facie Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section claim requires a distinctive group, representation in venires that is not fair and reasonable relative to the community, and underrepresentation caused by systematic exclusion in the selection process; the right does not guarantee that the seated petit jury mirrors the community. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 363–67 (1979)

Under Rule 24(a), the court may examine prospective jurors itself or permit attorney examination; if the court conducts the examination, it must permit further proper questions or itself ask proper additional questions requested by the parties. Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(a)

Equal protection forbids a prosecutor from exercising peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors on account of race or on the assumption that jurors of the defendant's race cannot be impartial. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89, 96–98 (1986)

Intentional discrimination on the basis of sex in jury selection through peremptory challenges violates equal protection. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129, 140–43 (1994)

Rule 24(b) fixes the current allocation of peremptory challenges by offense category, while Rule 24(c) permits up to six alternate jurors and requires any retained alternate to remain insulated from deliberations unless substituted; a post-deliberation substitution requires the jury to begin deliberations anew. Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(b)–(c)

Trial conduct, burden, instructions, and verdict

Witness testimony in a federal criminal trial must be taken in open court unless a statute or the Criminal Rules provide otherwise. Fed. R. Crim. P. 26

Rule 43 ordinarily requires the defendant's presence at every trial stage, including jury impanelment and return of the verdict, subject to the rule's specified exceptions and waiver provisions; voluntary absence during trial is a waiver only when the defendant was initially present. Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a), (b)

Due process requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the charged crime. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)

Rule 30 permits written instruction requests, requires the court to disclose its proposed action before closing arguments, and requires a party to object before deliberations by stating the matter and grounds distinctly; an unpreserved instructional claim is reviewable only under Rule 52(b). Fed. R. Crim. P. 30, 52(b)

A federal jury verdict must be unanimous and returned in open court. Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(a)

Application checklist

1. Identify every charged offense and its maximum authorized prison term and additional statutory penalties.
2. Preserve any written jury waiver, government consent, court approval, and timing of the waiver colloquy.
3. Obtain the district's jury plan, source-list records available under governing law, voir-dire transcript, strike lists, stated explanations, and rulings.
4. Calendar any § 1867 challenge before voir dire or the earlier statutory discovery deadline and prepare the required sworn factual submission.
5. Record jury size, alternates, any excusal, the finding of good cause, and any instruction to restart deliberations.
6. Preserve instruction requests and make a distinct on-record objection before deliberations.
7. For a bench trial, request specific findings before the general finding if they are needed.

Open items requiring individualized or circuit research

• The district jury plan, access to jury-selection records, local voir-dire practice, and any local filing requirement.
• The complete comparative-juror and strike record for a Batson or J.E.B. claim and the controlling circuit's review rules.
• Offense elements, affirmative defenses, evidentiary rulings, instruction formulations, preservation, harmlessness, and plain-error application.
• Whether a particular absence, remote appearance, jury-size change, alternate substitution, or bench waiver was valid on the actual record.

Rule 29, Mistrial, Verdict, and Juror Misconduct

Rule 29, Mistrial, Verdict, and Juror Misconduct

Verification boundary

This module verifies current Rules 26.3, 29, 31, and 45; the nationwide constitutional sufficiency and retrial rules; the mistrial framework; verdict return and polling; and the federal no-impeachment rule and constitutional racial-bias exception. It does not decide the charged elements, evidence, whether excusable neglect exists, local juror-contact rules, circuit-specific misconduct procedures, or appellate jurisdiction over a particular order.

Judgment of acquittal under Rule 29

After the government closes its evidence or after all evidence closes, the court must enter a judgment of acquittal on a properly challenged offense if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction, and it may consider acquittal on its own. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a)

When the court reserves decision on a Rule 29 motion made before deliberations or before discharge in a bench trial, it must decide the reserved motion on the evidence as it stood when the ruling was reserved. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(b)

A postverdict Rule 29 motion may be made within fourteen days after a guilty verdict or after jury discharge, whichever is later, and no pre-submission Rule 29 motion is required. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)(1), (3)

Current Rule 45(b)(1) permits a pre-deadline extension for good cause and a post-deadline extension for excusable neglect; its current categorical no-extension provision applies to Rule 35, not Rule 29. Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(b)

Former-rule cases treating a late Rule 29 motion as categorically unavailable must not substitute for the current text. The exact motion date, trigger, extension request, excusable-neglect record, and court order control.

The constitutional sufficiency question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found every essential element beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979)

Sufficiency is measured against the elements of the charged crime, not against an erroneously heightened jury instruction, and the reviewing court does not reweigh the evidence or assess witness credibility. Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237, 243–44 (2016)

When a reviewing court determines that trial evidence was legally insufficient, the Double Jeopardy Clause requires a judgment of acquittal and bars a second trial; reversal for ordinary trial error does not carry the same retrial bar. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 14–18 (1978)

If the court grants postverdict Rule 29 relief, it must conditionally decide any new-trial motion and state its reasons; the conditional ruling does not affect finality of the acquittal judgment. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(d)

Mistrial and retrial

Before ordering a mistrial, the court must give each defendant and the government an opportunity to comment on the propriety of the order, to consent or object, and to suggest alternatives. Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.3

A genuinely deadlocked jury may be discharged and the defendant retried when manifest necessity exists or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824)

Manifest necessity requires a high degree of necessity and sound trial-court discretion, but neither the phrase “manifest necessity” nor an express recital of every alternative is a talismanic prerequisite when the record shows careful deliberation. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505–16 (1978)

When the defendant requests a mistrial, retrial is barred for prosecutorial or governmental misconduct only when the conduct was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673–79 (1982)

If the jury cannot agree on all counts, it may return verdicts on counts on which it has agreed, and the court may declare a mistrial on the unresolved counts; those counts may be retried. Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(b)

Verdict return, polling, and acquittal classification

A federal jury verdict must be unanimous and returned in open court, and Rule 31 permits partial verdicts in the circumstances it identifies. Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(a)–(b)

After a verdict is returned but before the jury is discharged, the court must poll the jurors individually on a party's request and may do so on its own; if the poll shows no unanimity, the court may direct further deliberations or declare a mistrial and discharge the jury. Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(d)

A substantive ruling that the prosecution failed to prove criminal liability is an acquittal for double-jeopardy purposes even when the court mistakenly required proof of an element the offense does not contain; the ruling's label and legal error do not convert it into ordinary trial error. Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. 313, 318–30 (2013)

Juror misconduct and the no-impeachment rule

During an inquiry into verdict validity, Evidence Rule 606(b) generally bars juror testimony or affidavits about deliberation statements or incidents, the effect of anything on a juror's vote, and a juror's mental processes. Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)(1)

Rule 606(b) permits juror evidence about whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury, an outside influence was improperly brought to bear, or a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict form. Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)(2)

Jurors' voluntary alcohol and drug use during trial is not an “outside influence” under the federal no-impeachment rule; Tanner relied on trial safeguards and did not authorize juror testimony about that internal misconduct to impeach the verdict. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 117–27 (1987)

The Sixth Amendment requires an exception to the no-impeachment rule when a juror makes a clear statement showing reliance on racial stereotypes or animus to convict and the statement tends to show that racial animus was a significant motivating factor in the vote to convict. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 580 U.S. 206, 225–26 (2017)

Application checklist

1. Identify each charged element and the proof admitted when the Rule 29 ruling was made or reserved.
2. Record every Rule 29 motion, reservation, verdict, jury-discharge time, extension request, and ruling.
3. Keep legal sufficiency separate from a circuit-specific Rule 33 weight-of-evidence inquiry.
4. Before mistrial, preserve the proposed basis, each party's position, alternatives, findings, and the full record of jury deadlock or prejudice.
5. Determine who requested or consented to mistrial and, if misconduct is asserted, develop evidence of the prosecutor's objective intent without inferring the Kennedy element from mere overreaching.
6. Request a verdict poll after return and before discharge when appropriate and preserve the response of each juror.
7. For misconduct, classify the offered proof under Rule 606(b), preserve admissible nonjuror evidence, and check local rules before contacting jurors.
8. Distinguish an acquittal based on criminal-liability insufficiency from a new-trial order or trial-error reversal before assessing appeal or retrial consequences.

Open items requiring individualized or circuit research

• Charged elements, evidentiary record, preservation, Rule 29 extension facts, and controlling circuit treatment of excusable neglect.
• Circuit standards for a Rule 33 weight-of-evidence or misconduct motion, hearing procedures, prejudice, and appellate review.
• Local rules, ethics requirements, and court permission governing postverdict juror contact.
• Whether a particular ruling is an acquittal, dismissal, mistrial, new-trial order, or trial-error ruling, and the resulting appellate jurisdiction.
• Harmlessness, plain error, structural-error questions, and remedies outside the bounded holdings stated here.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 — New Trial

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 — New Trial

Verification boundary

This module verifies the nationwide structure of Rule 33: subsection (a), the two separate tracks in subsection (b), Rule 45 time computation and extension, the effect of a pending appeal stated in Rule 33(b)(1), and the Supreme Court's classification of the deadline. Circuit-specific merits tests remain open and must not be inferred from this module.

Controlling concept and available relief

On the defendant's motion, a district court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial when the interest of justice requires it. Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a)

This authorization in subsection (a) is distinct from subsection (b)'s filing rules. “Interest of justice” supplies the general remedial standard; it is not a third filing track.

After a nonjury trial, the court may take additional testimony and enter a new judgment. Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a)

Who may invoke it and proper proceeding

Rule 33 operates as a motion in the federal criminal proceeding and is decided by the district court that conducted the trial. Fed. R. Crim. P. 1(a)(1), 33

Rule 33 itself contains no administrative-exhaustion or certificate-of-appealability procedure. This observation about the rule's text does not decide whether a different remedy is available or whether another doctrine applies to the underlying issue.

A court may not use Rule 33 to order a new trial on its own initiative after the applicable motion period has expired. United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 473–76 (1947)

Track one: newly discovered evidence

A motion grounded on newly discovered evidence must be filed within three years after the verdict or finding of guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(1)

If an appeal is pending, the district court may not grant a newly-discovered-evidence motion until the appellate court remands the case. Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(1)

The rule bars a grant while the appeal is pending; it does not say that the motion cannot be filed. Avoid calling this restriction jurisdictional. Any request for an indicative ruling or remand must also be checked against current Rules 12.1 and 37 and the controlling circuit's practice before use.

The phrase “newly discovered evidence” determines access to this track, but the rule does not define a nationwide elements test. The controlling circuit's published cases must supply the tests for diligence, cumulative or impeachment evidence, materiality, probable effect, recantation, and false-testimony theories.

Track two: every other ground

A Rule 33 motion based on any ground other than newly discovered evidence must be filed within fourteen days after the verdict or finding of guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(2)

Both Rule 33 filing periods run from the verdict or finding of guilty, not from sentencing, entry of judgment, or completion of an appeal. Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)

The legacy draft assigns categories such as trial error, jury misconduct, prosecutorial misconduct, and weight of evidence to this track. Those classifications and their merits standards remain unverified until the controlling circuit authorities are reconciled.

Computing and extending time

For a Rule 33 period stated in days, Rule 45 excludes the triggering day, counts every intervening day, and carries the deadline to the next non-weekend, non-holiday day when the last day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(a)(1)

Rule 45(b)(1) permits an extension on a timely motion for good cause and permits a post-deadline extension when the failure to act resulted from excusable neglect; Rule 45(b)(2)'s current exception applies to Rule 35, not Rule 33. Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(b)

The legacy draft's categorical “barred” label is therefore removed. Whether a late filing can proceed depends on a supported excusable-neglect determination under current Rule 45 and controlling precedent. Local filing rules and court orders still require separate review.

Rule 33's filing deadline is a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule: a properly raised timeliness objection must be enforced, but the objection can be forfeited. Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 13, 15–19 (2005) (per curiam)

Eberhart used the former numerical deadline and former Rule 45 text. Cite the case for the jurisdiction/forfeiture classification, but cite the current rules for filing periods and extensions.

Procedural checklist

1. Record the exact verdict or guilty-finding date and obtain the docket entry.
2. Identify the actual ground for relief before selecting the three-year or fourteen-day track.
3. Compute the period under Rule 45 and check local electronic-filing rules, holidays, and any inaccessibility order.
4. If late, develop the excusable-neglect record rather than treating lateness as a jurisdictional defect.
5. If an appeal is pending and the ground is newly discovered evidence, distinguish filing from granting and research the circuit's indicative-ruling/remand procedure.
6. Research the controlling circuit's current published merits test for the precise ground.
7. Preserve the evidence, discovery chronology, diligence proof, trial record, and requested relief.

Decision path

flowchart TD
    A["Defendant seeks a new trial"] --> B{"Grounded on newly discovered evidence?"}
    B -->|"Yes"| C["Three years from verdict or guilty finding"]
    B -->|"No"| D["Fourteen days from verdict or guilty finding"]
    C --> E{"Appeal pending?"}
    E -->|"Yes"| F["Court may not grant until appellate remand"]
    E -->|"No"| G["Apply controlling circuit merits test"]
    D --> G
    C --> H{"Filed late?"}
    D --> H
    H -->|"Yes"| I["Analyze Rule 45 excusable neglect; not jurisdictional"]
    H -->|"No"| G

Matters not yet verified in this module

• Circuit-specific newly-discovered-evidence and recantation tests.
• Standards for weight-of-evidence, trial-error, and misconduct grounds.
• Hearing and counsel standards.
• Appellate review and government-appeal rules.
• Interaction with a notice of appeal, Rule 37, Appellate Rule 12.1, and collateral-review finality in specific procedural postures.
• Eleventh Circuit application and district local rules.

Those matters remain not_started or researching in data/coverage_matrix.yaml; this module does not claim they are complete.

Sentencing

Sentencing

Presentence procedure, Guidelines, statutory sentencing, monetary penalties, forfeiture, judgment, and initial supervision. This page is a verified navigation layer. The linked canonical modules, atomic claims, authority cards, and structured controls remain the legal source; this index does not create a rule from omission or shorthand.

Canonical modules

Stage use controls

• Start with the actual docket posture and controlling court, not the desired remedy.
• Calculate every deadline from its stated triggering event and current computation rule.
• Separate jurisdiction, venue, prerequisites, merits, burden, proof, remedy, review, and appealability.
• Use the circuit overlay for any circuit-sensitive proposition and stop at records marked not_verified.
• Preserve the operative filings, orders, transcripts, exhibits, agency record, and proof of filing or service.

Handoff to adjacent stages

Use the federal process decision trees to identify prerequisites, alternative vehicles, appellate routes, and postjudgment interactions. Generated diagrams are navigation aids only; linked canonical modules control.

Presentence Investigation, Guidelines, and Sentencing Hearing

Presentence Investigation, Guidelines, and Sentencing Hearing

Verification boundary

This module verifies current nationwide Rule 32 procedure, the general statutory sentencing framework, the 2025 Guidelines calculation sequence, the advisory-Guidelines system, constitutional statutory-range rules, and bounded preservation principles. It does not calculate an offense-specific range or penalty, resolve disputed facts, choose a sentence, construe a plea agreement, or supply circuit-specific burdens, departures, preservation applications, or reasonableness outcomes.

Presentence investigation and disclosure

The court must impose sentence without unnecessary delay and may change Rule 32's time limits for good cause. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)

A probation officer must conduct a presentence investigation and submit a report unless a statute supplies an exception or the court finds that the record contains enough information to exercise sentencing authority meaningfully and explains that finding on the record. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 3552(a)

The probation officer may interview the defendant only after giving defense counsel notice and a reasonable opportunity to attend, and counsel must be present if the defendant so requests. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(2)

Unless the defendant waives the minimum period, the probation officer must provide the presentence report to the defendant, defense counsel, and government at least thirty-five days before sentencing; § 3552(d)'s ten-day statutory floor does not shorten the current Rule 32 period. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(e)(2); 18 U.S.C. § 3552(d)

Within fourteen days after receiving the presentence report, the parties must state in writing any objection to material information, sentencing ranges, or policy statements in or omitted from the report, unless the court changes the time for good cause. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(f), (b)(2)

At least seven days before sentencing, the probation officer must submit the report and an addendum identifying unresolved objections, grounds for those objections, and the officer's comments, unless the court changes the period for good cause. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(g), (b)(2)

Sentencing-hearing procedure and preservation

Before imposing sentence, the court must verify that the defendant and defense counsel read and discussed the presentence report and any addendum. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(1)(A)

The court must allow the parties' attorneys to comment on probation determinations and other sentencing matters and, for each disputed portion of the report or controverted matter, must rule on the dispute or determine that a ruling is unnecessary because it will not affect sentencing or will not be considered; the written determinations must accompany copies of the report made available to the Bureau of Prisons. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(1)(C), (i)(3)(B)–(C)

Before sentence, the court must address the defendant personally and permit the defendant to speak or present information in mitigation; permitting counsel to speak does not replace the defendant's personal allocution. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii)

The court must also allow defense counsel and the government an opportunity to speak and must address any victim of a qualifying violent or sexual offense who is present and permit the victim to be reasonably heard. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)

For good cause, the court may allow a new Rule 32 objection at any time before sentence is imposed, but that discretion does not make a specific timely objection unnecessary when the ground is known. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(1)(D), 51(b), 52(b)

If the court contemplates a Guidelines departure on a ground not identified in the presentence report or a party's prehearing submission, it must give reasonable notice specifying that ground. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(h)

Rule 32(h)'s notice command applies to Guidelines departures, not to a variance selected under § 3553(a); Irizarry therefore rejected a categorical Rule 32(h) notice requirement for variances. Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 713–16 (2008)

Statutory sentencing framework and reasons

Section 3553(a) requires a sentence sufficient but not greater than necessary to serve its listed purposes after consideration of the offense and defendant, the permitted purposes, available sentences, current Guidelines and policy statements, unwarranted disparities, and victim restitution. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

At sentencing the court must state its reasons in open court; § 3553(c) adds point-within-range reasons when the range exceeds twenty-four months and particularized reasons for a different kind of sentence or a sentence outside the range. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)

Booker rendered the federal Guidelines advisory by severing and excising § 3553(b)(1) and § 3742(e), while requiring the sentencing court to calculate and consider the Guidelines with the other § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245, 259–65 (2005)

Guidelines calculation, departures, and variances

The 2025 Guidelines require a sequenced calculation: select the offense guideline, determine the base level and specific characteristics, apply Chapter Three adjustments, address multiple counts, apply acceptance of responsibility, determine criminal-history category, and then determine the range and sentencing options before considering departures and the remaining § 3553(a) factors. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 (Nov. 1, 2025)

The court ordinarily uses one Guidelines Manual in effect on the sentencing date, but the Ex Post Facto Clause forbids using a later manual that creates a significant risk of a higher sentence than the manual in effect when the offense was committed. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11; Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 533, 544–50 (2013)

A departure is an adjustment authorized within the Guidelines system; a variance is a sentence selected outside the advisory range through the independent § 3553(a) analysis, and the two should be identified separately in the record. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 commentary; Booker, 543 U.S. at 259–65

The court must begin with a correct Guidelines calculation, permit arguments, consider § 3553(a), avoid clearly erroneous facts, explain the sentence, and justify any variance; appellate review of every sentence is for abuse of discretion, without a proportional mathematical rule or extraordinary-circumstances requirement. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–51 (2007)

An appellate court may apply a nonbinding presumption of reasonableness to a properly calculated within-Guidelines sentence, but the sentencing court may not presume that the Guidelines sentence is reasonable. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347–51 (2007)

Because the Guidelines are advisory, a court may conclude that the crack-cocaine guideline produces a sentence greater than necessary even in an ordinary case; Kimbrough permits a variance based on that policy disagreement within statutory limits. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101–10 (2007)

At a full resentencing after a sentence has been set aside, the court may consider evidence of the defendant's postsentencing rehabilitation and may use it to support a downward variance. Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 481, 490–93 (2011)

A court may discuss treatment and recommend programs, but it may not impose or lengthen imprisonment to promote rehabilitation. Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 326–35 (2011)

Statutory-range facts and mandatory-minimum routes

Other than the prior-conviction exception preserved in Apprendi, a fact that increases the statutory maximum must be admitted by the defendant or submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476, 490 (2000)

A fact that increases a statutory mandatory minimum is an element that must be submitted to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt, unless admitted through a valid plea. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103, 111–17 (2013)

On a government motion, § 3553(e) authorizes a sentence below a statutory minimum to reflect substantial assistance; the motion and assistance-based authority do not convert § 3553(a) alone into power to disregard the floor. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)

Section 3553(f) permits sentencing without regard to a covered drug-offense minimum when all five statutory criteria are met without a government motion; under Pulsifer, any one of § 3553(f)(1)(A), (B), or (C)'s listed criminal-history features disqualifies the defendant. Section 3553(f)(1)(A) excludes criminal-history points resulting from one-point offenses, not only a single one-point offense; satisfying the safety valve removes the statutory floor but does not make the advisory Guidelines mandatory. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124, 132–53 (2024)

Appellate-error and preservation boundaries

When an unpreserved Guidelines error produces the wrong range, the error ordinarily shows a reasonable probability of a different outcome and thus affects substantial rights without additional evidence, though the record can show otherwise. Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189, 198–204 (2016)

An unpreserved Guidelines miscalculation satisfying the first three plain-error requirements ordinarily seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings because it risks unnecessary loss of liberty. Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. 129, 137–45 (2018)

By advocating a particular shorter sentence, a defendant preserves a claim that a longer sentence is substantively unreasonable, but Holguin-Hernandez does not dispense with a specific objection needed to preserve a distinct procedural error. Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 589 U.S. 169, 173–75 (2020); Fed. R. Crim. P. 51(b), 52(b)

Application checklist

1. Obtain the indictment, verdict or plea, agreement, PSR and addenda, objections, sentencing submissions, transcript, Statement of Reasons, judgment, and docket.
2. Identify every statute of conviction, offense class, maximum, minimum, consecutive term, supervised-release term, fine, restitution, forfeiture, and assessment.
3. Use one correct Guidelines Manual, document any ex post facto comparison, and reproduce every § 1B1.1 step and disputed fact.
4. File specific written PSR objections within fourteen days and renew or clarify unresolved legal and factual issues at sentencing.
5. Separate a Guidelines departure from a § 3553(a) variance and request the sentence and reasons expressly.
6. Preserve allocution, disputed-fact rulings, departure notice, statutory-range facts, the selected range, and the court's reasons.

Open items requiring individualized or circuit research

• Offense elements, statutory penalties, guideline selection, relevant conduct, enhancements, grouping, acceptance, criminal history, departures, safety-valve proof, and plea stipulations.
• Evidentiary reliability and burdens for disputed sentencing facts beyond the nationwide Rule 32 commands.
• The controlling circuit's procedural-preservation rules, review components, departure law, variance methodology, and explanation requirements.
• Whether a later proceeding is a full resentencing or a limited modification and which § 3553(a) factors its authorizing statute permits.

Monetary Penalties, Restitution, and Criminal Forfeiture

Monetary Penalties, Restitution, and Criminal Forfeiture

Verification boundary

This module verifies general nationwide fine, special-assessment, restitution, and criminal-forfeiture structure. It does not establish that a particular offense triggers restitution or forfeiture, identify a victim or property nexus, calculate loss or proceeds, determine ownership, select a payment schedule, or resolve offense-specific statutes, plea terms, limitations, enforcement, remission, or circuit doctrines.

Fines and special assessments

Section 3571 authorizes a fine and generally sets the maximum as the greatest of the offense-specific amount, the alternative gain-or-loss amount when usable, or the class-based amount, subject to the statute's specific lower-fine exception. 18 U.S.C. § 3571

In deciding whether, how much, and how to impose a fine, the court must consider § 3553(a) and § 3572(a)'s additional factors; if restitution is ordered, payment to victims takes priority over payment of the fine. 18 U.S.C. § 3572(a), (b)

The Apprendi rule applies to criminal fines, so a fact necessary to raise the statutory maximum fine must be admitted or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Southern Union Co. v. United States, 567 U.S. 343, 346, 350–60 (2012)

Section 3013 requires a separate assessment for every conviction against the United States: for an individual, $5 for an infraction or Class C misdemeanor, $10 for a Class B misdemeanor, $25 for a Class A misdemeanor, and $100 for a felony; for a nonindividual, the corresponding amounts are $25, $50, $125, and $400. 18 U.S.C. § 3013(a)

Restitution authority and procedure

Section 3663 authorizes discretionary restitution for its covered convictions and allows agreed restitution through a plea, while § 3663A mandates restitution for its covered offense categories; the actual statute of conviction and victim definition must be checked before treating restitution as mandatory or available. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a); 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a), (c)

For the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, a victim is a person directly and proximately harmed by the offense of conviction, with the statutory scheme, conspiracy, or pattern expansion when that feature is an offense element. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2)

For mandatory restitution governed by § 3664, the court determines the full loss amount without considering the defendant's economic circumstances, then considers resources, projected income, and obligations when setting the manner and schedule of payment. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)

Restitution disputes are decided by a preponderance: the government bears loss amount, the defendant bears resources and dependent needs, and the court assigns other matters as justice requires. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e)

If victim losses are not ascertainable ten days before sentencing, the government or probation must notify the court and the court must set a final-loss date no later than ninety days after sentencing; a victim later discovering additional losses has sixty days from discovery to seek amendment for good cause. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5)

Missing § 3664(d)(5)'s ninety-day date does not eliminate restitution power when the sentencing court made clear before the deadline that restitution would be ordered and left only the amount open. Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605, 608, 611–12 (2010)

When multiple defendants contributed to one victim's loss, § 3664(h) permits full liability for each or apportionment reflecting contribution and economic circumstances; the statute does not impose one universal allocation. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(h)

A restitution sentence is a final judgment despite § 3664(o)'s enumerated correction, appeal, amendment, adjustment, and resentencing routes; later modification requires one of those authorized routes rather than general equitable power. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(o)

The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act's “investigation” and “proceedings” expense language covers government investigations and criminal proceedings, not a victim's private investigation or separate civil or bankruptcy proceeding. Lagos v. United States, 584 U.S. 577, 580–85 (2018)

Criminal forfeiture

A criminal forfeiture judgment requires notice in the indictment or information that the government will seek forfeiture as part of the sentence, but the charging paper need not identify the property or the amount of a money judgment. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)

As soon as practical after guilt is established, the court must determine the required property nexus or money judgment under the governing forfeiture statute, using evidence already in the record and any additional relevant and reliable evidence the parties submit. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)

In a jury case, Rule 32.2 gives either party a right—if requested before deliberations—to have the jury decide whether the government proved the required nexus for specific property, even though Libretti holds that criminal forfeiture itself is not constitutionally protected by the Sixth Amendment jury right. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(5); Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 48–49 (1995)

Unless doing so is impractical, the court must enter a preliminary forfeiture order sufficiently before sentencing to permit revision; the order becomes final as to the defendant at sentencing, must be announced or otherwise made known at sentencing, and must be included in the judgment. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(2), (4)

Failure to include forfeiture in the judgment may be corrected at any time under Rule 36, but only when the court failed to include an already ordered forfeiture; Rule 36 does not create an unentered substantive forfeiture judgment. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(4)(B), 36

Third-party interests are adjudicated in Rule 32.2(c)'s ancillary proceeding, where no party has a jury right; the defendant cannot use that proceeding to assert a third party's ownership interest. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c)

Section 982 mandates criminal forfeiture only for the offenses and property categories it specifies and incorporates procedural provisions from 21 U.S.C. § 853; an offense-specific nexus must be established rather than inferred from conviction alone. 18 U.S.C. § 982

Application checklist

1. Separate the fine, special assessment, restitution, and forfeiture; each has a different source, trigger, calculation, and amendment route.
2. Identify the statute of conviction, offense date, victim definition, causal boundary, covered losses, forfeiture provision, and property category.
3. Preserve loss evidence, offsets, insurance, resources, dependents, payment schedule, government notice, and every deadline.
4. Request a forfeiture jury determination before deliberations when specific property nexus will be disputed.
5. Compare the oral sentence, preliminary forfeiture order, final order, restitution findings, Statement of Reasons, and written judgment.

Open items requiring individualized or circuit research

• Offense-specific restitution and forfeiture statutes, plea expansions, proximate cause, loss methodologies, substitute assets, money judgments, tracing, and statutes of limitation.
• Victim and third-party standing, ownership, notice, ancillary petitions, enforcement, offsets, liens, default, remission, and collection.
• Review standards, preservation, harmlessness, delegation of payment schedules, joint liability after later payments, and finality of the actual judgment.

Supervised Release, Judgment, and Sentence Correction

Supervised Release, Judgment, and Sentence Correction

Verification boundary

This module verifies initial imposition and conditions of supervised release, judgment entry, immediate Rule 35(a) correction, Rule 36 clerical correction, appeal advice, and bounded issue preservation. It does not cover modification, early termination, revocation, delayed revocation, tolling, reentry practice, or an individual sentence-modification route, which require their own modules and records.

Initial supervised-release term

When imposing imprisonment for a felony or misdemeanor, the court may include supervised release after imprisonment and must include it when another statute requires it or for a first domestic-violence conviction as § 3561(b) defines; § 3583(a) does not impose a general mandate based solely on an imprisonment term exceeding one year. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a)

Unless another statute provides otherwise, the maximum supervised-release term is five years for a Class A or B felony, three years for a Class C or D felony, and one year for a Class E felony or a nonpetty misdemeanor. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)

In selecting the initial supervised-release term and conditions, § 3583(c) incorporates § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)–(D), and (a)(4)–(7), but not § 3553(a)(2)(A)'s retributive purposes. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c)

Section 3583(d) imposes its listed mandatory conditions, including no new crime, no unlawful controlled-substance possession, authorized DNA collection, and required sex-offender registration, while allowing qualifying discretionary conditions drawn from § 3563(b) and other appropriate conditions. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)

A discretionary supervised-release condition must be reasonably related to the incorporated sentencing factors, involve no greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary for deterrence, public protection, and effective treatment, and be consistent with Sentencing Commission policy statements. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)

Although treatment needs may inform supervised-release conditions, the court may not impose or lengthen imprisonment to promote rehabilitation. Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 326–35 (2011)

Judgment and appeal advice

The judgment of conviction must set out the plea, jury verdict or court findings, adjudication, and sentence; the judge must sign it and the clerk must enter it. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(k)(1)

After sentencing, Rule 32(j) requires the court to advise a defendant who went to trial of the right to appeal and advise any defendant of a right to appeal the sentence, subject to the rule's exceptions, and to advise about applying for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(j)

Immediate correction and clerical error

Within fourteen days after the oral announcement of sentence, Rule 35(a) permits correction only of an arithmetical, technical, or other clear error; the narrow period is not a general opportunity to reconsider the sentence. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a), (c)

Rule 35(b) permits a post-sentencing reduction only on a government substantial-assistance motion and under its timing and information conditions; it is distinct from § 3553(e) authority at the original sentencing. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b)

After any appropriate notice, Rule 36 permits correction at any time of a clerical error in a judgment, order, or record or an error arising from oversight or omission, but it does not authorize a substantive resentencing. Fed. R. Crim. P. 36

A term of imprisonment is a final judgment and may be modified only through an express route listed in § 3582(c) or another applicable statute or rule; § 3553(a) alone does not create sentence-modification jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b)–(c)

Preservation checklist

A party preserves a sentencing issue by informing the court of the requested action or objection and grounds when the ruling is made or sought; requesting a shorter sentence preserves substantive unreasonableness, but a distinct procedural error ordinarily requires a specific objection. Fed. R. Crim. P. 51(b), 52(b); Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 589 U.S. 169, 173–75 (2020)

Application checklist

1. Identify the statute of conviction, offense class, any offense-specific supervised-release term, and every mandatory or proposed discretionary condition.
2. Compare oral pronouncement, written judgment, Statement of Reasons, forfeiture and restitution orders, and docket entry.
3. Calendar Rule 35(a) from the oral announcement of sentence, not entry of judgment.
4. Classify a claimed mistake as clear sentencing error, government substantial assistance, clerical omission, appeal issue, or a separate statutory modification route before filing.
5. Make specific contemporaneous objections to disputed calculations, facts, procedures, conditions, and reasons, while expressly requesting the desired sentence.

Open items requiring individualized or circuit research

• Offense-specific supervised-release terms, mandatory minima, oral-pronouncement doctrine, vagueness, delegation, occupational and technology restrictions, and appellate review of particular conditions.
• Modification, early termination, tolling, revocation, delayed jurisdiction, Chapter Seven, and reentry practice.
• Whether an actual discrepancy is clerical or substantive and which court has authority while an appeal is pending.

Direct Review

Direct Review

Notice, appellate jurisdiction, record, briefing, standards of review, rehearing, mandate, certiorari, and finality. This page is a verified navigation layer. The linked canonical modules, atomic claims, authority cards, and structured controls remain the legal source; this index does not create a rule from omission or shorthand.

Canonical modules

Stage use controls

• Start with the actual docket posture and controlling court, not the desired remedy.
• Calculate every deadline from its stated triggering event and current computation rule.
• Separate jurisdiction, venue, prerequisites, merits, burden, proof, remedy, review, and appealability.
• Use the circuit overlay for any circuit-sensitive proposition and stop at records marked not_verified.
• Preserve the operative filings, orders, transcripts, exhibits, agency record, and proof of filing or service.

Handoff to adjacent stages

Use the federal process decision trees to identify prerequisites, alternative vehicles, appellate routes, and postjudgment interactions. Generated diagrams are navigation aids only; linked canonical modules control.

Criminal Appeal Notice, Jurisdiction, Waivers, and Record

Criminal Appeal Notice, Jurisdiction, Waivers, and Record

Verification boundary

This module verifies current nationwide notice-of-appeal rules, general criminal finality and appellate-jurisdiction statutes, narrow Supreme Court finality decisions, bounded waiver rules, and the Federal Rules governing the record. It does not decide whether a particular order is appealable, calculate a deadline without the docket and all deadline-affecting events, construe a particular waiver, identify every statutory interlocutory route, or replace circuit and local filing rules.

Notice and filing

An appeal as of right is taken by filing a notice of appeal with the district clerk within Rule 4's time; filing the notice, not filing a merits brief in the court of appeals, begins the appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 3(a)(1), 4(b)

A defendant in a criminal case ordinarily must file within fourteen days after the later of entry of the judgment or order appealed from or the government's filing of a notice of appeal; the exact docket entry and any later government notice must be checked. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)

When the government may appeal in a criminal case, its Rule 4(b) notice period ordinarily is thirty days after the later of entry of the judgment or order appealed from or the defendant's notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(B)

A defendant's notice filed after the court announces a decision, sentence, or order but before entry of the judgment or order is treated as filed on the entry date and after entry. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(2)

For a defendant, a timely Rule 29 motion, Rule 34 motion, or Rule 33 motion extends the notice trigger to the later entry of the judgment or the order disposing of the last such motion, but a new-evidence Rule 33 motion has that effect only if made no later than fourteen days after judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(3)(A)

A Rule 35(a) sentence-correction motion does not suspend the time to appeal the judgment of conviction, and a district court may correct under Rule 35(a) despite a filed notice; the two clocks therefore must be tracked separately. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(5)

Upon a finding of excusable neglect or good cause, the district court may extend a criminal notice period for no more than thirty days from expiration of the original period, before or after expiration and with or without motion and notice; that possible extension is not part of the ordinary filing period. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(4)

An institutional inmate may obtain Rule 4(c)'s filing date by timely depositing the notice in the institution's internal mail system and supplying the rule's declaration, notarized statement, or other qualifying evidence; a legal-mail system must be used when one is available. Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)

If a notice is mistakenly filed in the court of appeals, the circuit clerk must note the receipt date, send it to the district clerk, and it is considered filed in the district court on the date the circuit clerk received it. Fed. R. App. P. 4(d)

When restitution is deferred and a later amended judgment fixes the amount, a defendant wishing to challenge that order must file a notice from it; if no notice is filed and the government timely objects, the mandatory claim-processing rule bars review of that restitution order. Manrique v. United States, 581 U.S. 116, 120–25 (2017)

Final judgment and statutory appellate authority

In a federal criminal case, final judgment ordinarily means the sentence, and the judgment is appealable even when execution of sentence is suspended. Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212–13 (1937)

Section 1291 gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction over appeals from final decisions of the district courts except where direct Supreme Court review is authorized; identifying a criminal sentence as ordinarily final does not make every later or interlocutory order appealable. 28 U.S.C. § 1291

The final-judgment rule is applied with particular stringency in criminal cases, and the collateral-order doctrine covers only a narrow class; Flanagan held that a pretrial order disqualifying defense counsel was not immediately appealable. Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263–70 (1984)

A pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss on double-jeopardy grounds is immediately appealable to the extent it rejects a colorable Double Jeopardy Clause claim because the asserted right includes avoiding the second trial itself. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659–62 (1977)

Government criminal appeals depend on 18 U.S.C. § 3731's covered order, certification, thirty-day, diligent-prosecution, and Double Jeopardy limits; the statute does not grant the defendant a reciprocal interlocutory route. 18 U.S.C. § 3731

Section 3742 separately specifies the defendant's and government's grounds to appeal an otherwise final sentence and the appellate court's disposition authority; a disagreement with sentence alone is not a substitute for a statutory ground. 18 U.S.C. § 3742

Guilty pleas and express appeal waivers

A guilty plea or appeal waiver does not mean that no notice may be filed or that every issue is necessarily barred: Garza applies presumed prejudice when counsel disregards an express instruction to appeal despite a waiver, while Class holds that an ordinary guilty plea alone did not waive the identified constitutional attack on the statute of conviction. The text, scope, validity, exceptions, government invocation, and controlling circuit law for an express waiver still must be analyzed. Garza v. Idaho, 586 U.S. 232, 238–49 (2019); Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174, 181–85 (2018)

Record on appeal

The Rule 10 record consists of the original district-court papers and exhibits, any transcript, and a certified copy of the docket entries; appellate briefing is tied to that record rather than an opportunity to create an entirely new evidentiary record. Fed. R. App. P. 10(a)

Within fourteen days after filing the notice, or entry of an order disposing of the last timely motion specified in Rule 4(a)(4)(A), an appellant must order the needed transcript portions and make satisfactory payment arrangements or file the prescribed certificate that no transcript will be ordered; issue-specific transcript and statement duties then apply. Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)

When proceedings were not recorded or a transcript is unavailable, Rule 10(c) provides a statement procedure, and Rule 10(d) permits an agreed statement; Rule 11 then governs assembly, completion, retention, and transmission of the record, subject to circuit plans, local rules, and court orders. Fed. R. App. P. 10(c)–(d), 11

Review Standards, Briefing, Oral Argument, and Anders Procedure

Review Standards, Briefing, Oral Argument, and Anders Procedure

Verification boundary

This module verifies nationwide error standards at the level stated by the Federal Rules and controlling Supreme Court opinions, the constitutional minimum for an Anders withdrawal, and current national briefing and oral-argument rules. It does not assign a standard to an unidentified issue, decide preservation or prejudice on a record, supply a circuit's waiver doctrine, or replace local forms, schedules, record-excerpt rules, and Anders procedures.

Preservation and selection of the governing standard

There is no single standard of review for every criminal appeal: the claimed error, legal or factual question, procedural posture, requested relief, and whether a timely and sufficiently specific position was presented under Rule 51 must be identified before selecting de novo, clear-error, abuse-of-discretion, harmless-error, plain-error, waiver, or another governing rule. Fed. R. Crim. P. 51, 52

Rule 52(a) directs courts to disregard an error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights, but the substantive harmlessness inquiry and allocation of burden depend on the type of error and controlling authority. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a)

For a preserved federal constitutional trial error subject to harmless-error review, Chapman requires the beneficiary of the error to prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt; structural errors and distinct postures require separate analysis. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22–24 (1967)

For preserved nonconstitutional error governed by the federal harmless-error statute, reversal is required when the reviewing court, after examining the whole record, is left in grave doubt whether the error had substantial influence on the result. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764–65 (1946)

Most constitutional errors are subject to harmless-error analysis; only a limited class of structural defects affects the framework of the trial and defies ordinary harmlessness review, and Neder held that omission of an element from jury instructions was not categorically structural. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7–15 (1999)

Rule 52(b) plain-error review requires an error that was not affirmatively waived, that is plain, and that affects substantial rights; even then, correction is discretionary and ordinarily requires an error seriously affecting the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731–37 (1993)

For Rule 52(b), an error is assessed for plainness at the time of appellate review even when the law was unsettled at the time of the district-court ruling. Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266, 268–79 (2013)

Under the ordinary Rule 52(b) formulation, the appellant bears the burden to show that an unpreserved error affected substantial rights, usually meaning prejudice to the outcome; specialized presumptions and issue-specific applications require their own authority. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734–35

Satisfaction of the first three plain-error elements does not compel relief: the appellate court must separately decide whether to exercise its remedial discretion under the fourth element. Olano, 507 U.S. at 735–37

Anders procedure and counsel's issue selection

When appointed counsel conscientiously concludes that a first appeal as of right is wholly frivolous, Anders requires a request to withdraw accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal, with a copy furnished to the client and time for the client to raise points; local rules govern additional filing details. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967)

The appellate court must independently examine the record to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous; if it finds any arguable nonfrivolous issue, it must provide counsel to brief the appeal before deciding the merits. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80–85 (1988)

The Anders threshold is whether the appeal is wholly frivolous, not whether success is unlikely; a legal point arguable on its merits is enough to require adversarial representation under the procedure. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Penson, 488 U.S. at 83–85

Appointed appellate counsel has no constitutional duty to raise every nonfrivolous issue requested by the defendant and may exercise professional judgment in selecting the strongest issues; that issue-selection rule does not permit counsel to abandon a wholly frivolous appeal without the required procedure. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751–54 (1983)

Briefs and oral argument

Rule 28(a) prescribes the principal components of an appellant's brief, including required disclosures where applicable, tables, jurisdiction, issues, the case statement, summary, argument with record and authority citations and the applicable standard of review, conclusion, and required compliance certificate; local rules may add or refine requirements. Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)

An appellee's brief generally follows Rule 28(a) except for specified matters the appellee may omit if satisfied with the appellant's statements, and a reply is limited to responding to the appellee's brief; the court's order and local rules control the actual filing. Fed. R. App. P. 28(b), (c)

Absent a different rule or court order, Rule 31(a) gives the appellant forty days after the record is filed, the appellee thirty days after service of the appellant's brief, and the appellant twenty-one days after service of the appellee's brief for a reply, which ordinarily must be filed at least seven days before argument. Fed. R. App. P. 31(a)

Rule 32 governs brief form, type-volume or page limits, and certificates, but electronic filing specifications, paper-copy requirements, record excerpts, appendices, and forms may be changed or supplemented by current local rules and court orders. Fed. R. App. P. 32

Oral argument is allowed unless a three-judge panel unanimously concludes after examining the briefs and record that the appeal is frivolous, the dispositive issue is authoritatively decided, or the facts and arguments are adequately presented and argument would not significantly aid decision. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)

The national rules do not establish one universal certificate-of-interested-persons form, docket-opening deadline, record-excerpt package, or oral-argument practice for all circuits; the current circuit rules, clerk instructions, scheduling orders, and case docket must be checked rather than carrying an Eleventh Circuit example nationwide. Fed. R. App. P. 28, 31, 32, 34

Rehearing, Mandate, Certiorari, and Direct-Review Finality

Rehearing, Mandate, Certiorari, and Direct-Review Finality

Verification boundary

This module verifies current national rehearing and mandate rules, the Supreme Court's Rules effective March 16, 2026 for certiorari timing and basic filing, and bounded Supreme Court finality decisions. It does not predict rehearing or certiorari, calculate a deadline without the actual judgment and rehearing history, decide a lower court's jurisdiction during mandate proceedings, or assign one meaning of finality to every statute and doctrine.

Panel rehearing and rehearing en banc

Current Rule 40 places panel rehearing and rehearing en banc in one rule: a party may seek panel rehearing, rehearing en banc, or both in one document unless a local rule provides otherwise, while en banc rehearing remains not favored. Fed. R. App. P. 40

A petition for panel rehearing must state with particularity each point of law or fact the petitioner believes the court overlooked or misapprehended and must argue in support; it is not an unrestricted second merits brief. Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(2)

Rehearing en banc ordinarily requires that the proceeding conflict with a Supreme Court or circuit decision and consideration by the full court is needed for uniformity, or that the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance. Fed. R. App. P. 40(b)(2)

In a criminal case, a rehearing petition ordinarily must be filed within fourteen days after entry of judgment, but a local rule or court order may shorten or extend that time and Rule 40 supplies a longer government period in specified cases. Fed. R. App. P. 40(d)(1)

No response to a rehearing petition is permitted unless the court requests one, and granting rehearing does not itself create a right to oral argument; the order granting rehearing governs the next procedure. Fed. R. App. P. 40(e)

Mandate

Unless the court shortens or extends the time, the mandate issues seven days after the time to seek rehearing expires or seven days after denial of a timely rehearing petition, petition for rehearing en banc, or motion to stay mandate, whichever is later; the mandate is effective when issued. Fed. R. App. P. 41(b), (c)

A motion to stay the mandate pending certiorari must show that the petition would present a substantial question and that there is good cause for a stay; a stay ordinarily may not exceed ninety days unless extended for good cause or a timely certiorari filing is shown. Fed. R. App. P. 41(d)

Petition for a writ of certiorari

A petition for certiorari seeking review of a court-of-appeals judgment ordinarily is due within ninety days after entry of the judgment, not issuance of the mandate; the actual judgment date and every rehearing event must be verified. Sup. Ct. R. 13.1, 13.3 (effective Mar. 16, 2026)

If a rehearing petition is timely filed, or the lower court appropriately entertains an untimely petition or considers rehearing on its own, the certiorari period for all parties runs from denial of rehearing or, if rehearing is granted, entry of the later judgment. Sup. Ct. R. 13.3

For good cause, a Justice may extend the certiorari filing time for no more than sixty days; an application ordinarily must be submitted at least ten days before the due date absent extraordinary circumstances, and an extension is not automatic. Sup. Ct. R. 13.5

Certiorari is discretionary and granted only for compelling reasons such as important conflicts or important unresolved federal questions; claimed factual error or misapplication of a properly stated rule rarely warrants review. Sup. Ct. R. 10

Rules 12 and 14 govern docketing and petition contents and appendices, while Rule 39 governs in-forma-pauperis filings; the current Clerk's guidance, copy rules, forms, lower-court orders, and filing status must be checked rather than assuming one package for every petitioner. Sup. Ct. R. 12, 14, 39

Finality is context specific

“Finality” is not one universal date: the relevant statute or doctrine must be identified, and appellate judgment, rehearing, mandate, certiorari time, certiorari disposition, and any later amended judgment must not be treated as interchangeable events. Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527–32 (2003); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n.6, 328 (1987)

For § 2255(f)(1), when the court of appeals affirms and no certiorari petition is filed, Clay holds that the conviction becomes final when the time for seeking certiorari expires, not when the appellate mandate issues. Clay, 537 U.S. at 527–32

For direct-review retroactivity, Griffith treats a case as pending on direct review until the judgment of conviction is rendered, appeal availability is exhausted, and certiorari time has elapsed or certiorari has been denied, and applies a new constitutional rule to all cases not yet final. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 321 n.6, 328

Issuance of the court-of-appeals mandate does not start Supreme Court Rule 13's certiorari period and did not mark § 2255(f)(1) finality in Clay; mandate timing, certiorari timing, and collateral limitations therefore require separate calculations. Fed. R. App. P. 41; Sup. Ct. R. 13.3; Clay, 537 U.S. at 527–32

Post-Conviction

Post-Conviction

Sections 2255, 2244, and 2241, successive classification, extraordinary writs, and executive clemency. This page is a verified navigation layer. The linked canonical modules, atomic claims, authority cards, and structured controls remain the legal source; this index does not create a rule from omission or shorthand.

Canonical modules

Stage use controls

• Start with the actual docket posture and controlling court, not the desired remedy.
• Calculate every deadline from its stated triggering event and current computation rule.
• Separate jurisdiction, venue, prerequisites, merits, burden, proof, remedy, review, and appealability.
• Use the circuit overlay for any circuit-sensitive proposition and stop at records marked not_verified.
• Preserve the operative filings, orders, transcripts, exhibits, agency record, and proof of filing or service.

Handoff to adjacent stages

Use the federal process decision trees to identify prerequisites, alternative vehicles, appellate routes, and postjudgment interactions. Generated diagrams are navigation aids only; linked canonical modules control.

Initial Section 2255 Motion, Filing, and Limitations

Initial § 2255 Motion, Filing, and Limitations

Verification boundary

This module states the nationwide statutory and national-rule framework for an initial § 2255 motion and separates the four limitation triggers. It does not calculate a deadline without the actual judgment, appellate docket, asserted right, impediment, supporting facts, prison-mail facts, amendments, and controlling circuit law. Holland, McQuiggin, Mayle, and Day arose under § 2254 or § 2244; their direct holdings and any § 2255 application are kept distinct.

Remedy, custody, and court

A prisoner claiming the right to release under a sentence of a federal court may move the court that imposed the sentence for § 2255 relief; the statute does not direct an initial motion to the district of present confinement. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a)

Section 2255(a) identifies four statutory grounds: a sentence imposed in violation of the Constitution or federal law, lack of jurisdiction to impose it, a sentence above the maximum authorized by law, or a sentence otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a)

If § 2255(b)'s merits conditions are met, the court must vacate and set aside the judgment and select the appropriate statutory relief: discharge, resentencing, a new trial, or correction of sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b)

Section 2255(e) ordinarily makes the sentencing-court remedy exclusive for a federal prisoner attacking detention under the sentence, subject to the saving-clause boundary addressed separately; inability to satisfy § 2255's gatekeeping provisions does not by itself establish that the remedy is inadequate or ineffective. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)

Motion and filing requirements

Rule 2 requires the motion to specify every ground available, state supporting facts, identify requested relief, be legible, and be signed under penalty of perjury; it must substantially follow the prescribed or local form. Rule 2(b), Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings

A movant seeking relief from judgments of more than one court must file a separate motion for each judgment. Rule 2(d), Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings

The clerk must file a § 2255 motion and enter it on the criminal docket of the case in which the challenged judgment was entered, then serve a copy on the United States attorney for that district. Rule 3(b), Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings

For an inmate using an institution's legal-mail system, Rule 3(d) treats the motion as timely if deposited in that system on or before the last filing day with prepaid first-class postage and the specified declaration, notarized statement, or other permitted proof. Rule 3(d), Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings

Rule 3 does not create a separate filing period: it expressly sends timeliness to § 2255, so form acceptance, docketing, and the § 2255(f) calculation remain separate questions. Rule 3(a), Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings; 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)

The four statutory limitation triggers

Section 2255(f) supplies one year from the latest applicable date among four separately worded triggers; a movant must identify and prove the trigger actually relied on rather than treating all four as extensions of finality. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)

Under § 2255(f)(1), when the court of appeals affirms and no certiorari petition is filed, finality occurs when the time for seeking certiorari expires, not when the appellate mandate issues. Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527–32 (2003)

Clay did not decide the § 2255(f)(1) finality date when no direct appeal is taken; that question requires the actual docket, current appellate rules, and controlling circuit authority rather than an invented nationwide Supreme Court rule. Clay, 537 U.S. at 524–25 & n.3

Section 2255(f)(2) starts on removal of a governmental impediment only when the impediment violated the Constitution or federal law and actually prevented the movant from making the motion. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(2)

Section 2255(f)(3) applies only to a right newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3)

When § 2255(f)(3) applies, the year runs from the date the Supreme Court initially recognized the asserted right, not from a later decision establishing retroactivity. Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357–60 (2005)

Section 2255(f)(4) runs from when the facts supporting the claim could have been discovered through due diligence; it is a facts trigger, not a general restart whenever a court later changes or clarifies law. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(4)

A state-court order vacating a predicate conviction can qualify as a fact under § 2255(f)(4), but Johnson required due diligence in seeking that order after the federal judgment and measured the renewed period from notice of the vacatur. Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 302–11 (2005)

Equitable tolling, innocence, amendment, and court-raised timeliness

Holland holds that § 2244(d)'s state-habeas limitation is subject to equitable tolling; it did not directly decide § 2255(f), so a federal movant must identify controlling-circuit authority applying equitable tolling to § 2255. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645–49 (2010)

Under Holland's standard, the litigant must show diligent pursuit and an extraordinary circumstance that stood in the way and prevented timely filing; ordinary case labels do not replace the required causal and fact-specific analysis. Holland, 560 U.S. at 649–54

McQuiggin recognizes a demanding actual-innocence gateway through § 2244(d)'s state-prisoner time bar, not a freestanding innocence claim and not a direct nationwide holding about § 2255(f); § 2255 use therefore requires controlling-circuit authority and the actual evidence. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386–401 (2013)

Where compatible Civil Rule 15 applies through § 2255 Rule 12, an otherwise late amendment relates back only when the new claim shares a common core of operative facts with a timely claim; arising from the same trial, conviction, or sentence is not enough. Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 656–64 (2005)

Day permits a habeas court to consider a nonjurisdictional time bar not correctly raised by the State only after fair notice and an opportunity to respond and without overriding a deliberate waiver; because Day concerned § 2254 and § 2244(d), a § 2255 court must also apply controlling-circuit law and the government's actual position. Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205–11 (2006)

Deadline checklist

1. Obtain the criminal judgment and every later amended judgment.
2. Obtain the complete direct-review docket, including mandate, rehearing, certiorari, and notice dates.
3. Determine which § 2255(f) trigger supports each claim and whether different claims rely on different facts or rights.
4. For (f)(3), identify the Supreme Court decision, date of initial recognition, asserted right, and authority making it retroactive.
5. For (f)(4), identify each supporting fact, when it existed, when it could have been discovered, and diligence steps.
6. Preserve institution-mail proof under Rule 3(d).
7. Compare every amendment with the timely pleading's operative facts under Rule 15 and controlling circuit law.
8. Research equitable tolling, innocence, sua-sponte timeliness, and no-direct-appeal finality in the controlling circuit.

Matters requiring record- or circuit-specific work

• The exact finality date when no direct appeal was filed.
• Whether a particular obstacle was extraordinary and causally prevented filing.
• Whether McQuiggin opens a § 2255 time bar in the controlling circuit and whether any sentencing-innocence theory qualifies.
• Whether the government's conduct is forfeiture, error, or deliberate waiver under the applicable court's precedent.
• Local forms, filing mechanics, amendment practice, sealing, and page limits.

Section 2255 Cognizability, Default, Actual Innocence, and Ineffective Assistance

§ 2255 Cognizability, Default, Innocence, and Ineffective Assistance

Verification boundary

This module supplies nationwide Supreme Court baselines. It does not decide whether a specific claim is constitutional, jurisdictional, defaulted, waived, previously decided, factually innocent, prejudicial, or supported by an adequate record. Relitigation rules, collateral waivers, nonconstitutional sentencing errors, and innocence of enhancements contain important circuit-specific branches.

Cognizable error

Section 2255 reaches federal constitutional and statutory violations, lack of sentencing jurisdiction, a sentence above the legal maximum, and other grounds satisfying the statute's collateral-attack standard; the label attached to a claim does not establish cognizability. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a)–(b)

A nonconstitutional violation of a criminal rule is not automatically cognizable: Hill required a jurisdictional or constitutional error, a fundamental defect inherently resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice, or an omission inconsistent with rudimentary demands of fair procedure. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428–30 (1962)

Davis allowed a federal statutory claim based on an intervening substantive-law change where the conviction and punishment were for conduct the law did not make criminal; the decision does not make every later statutory interpretation collaterally cognizable. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 342–47 (1974)

A sentencing judge's disappointed expectation about later executive administration of a lawful sentence was not a § 2255 defect in Addonizio; collateral relief requires an error of the fundamental character recognized by the statute and cases, not merely a later outcome different from an unexpressed expectation. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184–90 (1979)

Procedural default and innocence gateways

Collateral review does not simply import direct-review plain error: for a trial error defaulted by failure to object and appeal, Frady required cause and actual prejudice. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164–70 (1982)

Frady's actual-prejudice inquiry requires more than a possibility of prejudice and evaluates the error's effect in the complete proceeding; the exact cause rule and claim-specific prejudice standard still require controlling authority and record application. Frady, 456 U.S. at 167–72

A defendant who failed to challenge the constitutional validity of a guilty plea on direct review procedurally defaulted that claim in Bousley and had to establish cause and actual prejudice or actual innocence. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621–24 (1998)

The Bousley gateway requires factual innocence, not merely legal insufficiency; it opens review of an underlying constitutional claim rather than supplying a freestanding merits claim. Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623–24

When a plea bargain caused the government to forgo more serious charges, Bousley permits the government to present any admissible evidence of guilt and requires the movant's innocence showing to extend to those forgone charges. Bousley, 523 U.S. at 624

The Schlup miscarriage-of-justice gateway requires new reliable evidence and a showing that, considering all the evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324–32 (1995)

McQuiggin applied the Schlup standard through § 2244(d)'s time bar and held that unexplained delay bears on evidentiary reliability even though diligence is not a separate threshold; the holding arose on the state-habeas track. McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 386–401

Neither McQuiggin nor Bousley establishes a universal gateway for innocence of a Guidelines calculation, sentencing factor, or noncapital enhancement; that proposition must be researched in the controlling circuit and tied to the precise bar asserted. McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 392–95; Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623–24

Ineffective assistance

An ineffective-assistance claim may be brought first in a § 2255 motion even if the defendant could have raised it on direct appeal; failure to raise it on direct review does not itself procedurally default the claim. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 503–09 (2003)

Strickland deficiency asks whether counsel's acts or omissions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and the circumstances as they existed then. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–91 (1984)

Ordinary Strickland prejudice requires a reasonable probability that, but for the deficient performance, the result would have been different—a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome, not proof by a preponderance that the outcome certainly would have changed. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693–96

A court may reject an ineffective-assistance claim on either Strickland component without deciding the other. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697

Judicial review of counsel is highly deferential, avoids hindsight, and presumes reasonable professional assistance, but the presumption does not replace examination of the identified conduct, record, and available alternatives. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689–91

Cronic presumes prejudice only in narrow circumstances such as complete denial of counsel at a critical stage or an entire failure to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing; poor performance at specific points ordinarily remains a Strickland claim. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658–67 (1984)

For deficient advice leading to an accepted guilty plea, Hill asks whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56–60 (1985)

Lee requires a case-specific assessment of whether rejecting the plea would have been rational and relies on contemporaneous evidence rather than post hoc assertions; strong evidence of guilt does not categorically foreclose plea prejudice where the consequence driving the decision was deportation. Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357, 364–71 (2017)

For a favorable plea offer that lapsed because counsel failed to communicate it, Frye requires a reasonable probability the defendant would have accepted it, the prosecution would not have withdrawn it, the court would have accepted it, and the result would have been less severe. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 145–49 (2012)

For deficient advice causing rejection of a plea followed by a less favorable conviction or sentence, Lafler requires the specified probabilities concerning acceptance, nonwithdrawal, court acceptance, and a less severe result, followed by a remedy neutralizing the constitutional injury without granting a windfall. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 163–75 (2012)

Counsel performs deficiently by disregarding a defendant's express instruction to file an appeal; absent a clear instruction, Flores-Ortega applies a circumstance-specific duty to consult and requires prejudice tied to a reasonable probability the defendant would have appealed. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477–86 (2000)

When deficient failure to file a requested notice forfeits an appeal, prejudice is presumed even if the defendant signed an appeal waiver because no waiver forecloses every possible appellate claim. Garza v. Idaho, 586 U.S. 232, 242–50 (2019)

There is no minimum amount of additional imprisonment required for Strickland prejudice from a sentencing error; any increased prison time has Sixth Amendment significance, although deficiency and causation still must be proven. Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 202–04 (2001)

An express collateral-attack waiver must be analyzed from its actual text, knowing-and-voluntary record, government invocation, claimed exception, requested remedy, and controlling-circuit law; neither § 2255 nor Garza supplies a single nationwide list of all enforceable or nonwaivable § 2255 claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2255; Garza, 586 U.S. at 238–50

Claim-analysis checklist

1. Identify the exact legal right, error, record event, and requested remedy.
2. Separate cognizability from timeliness, waiver, default, prior adjudication, and merits.
3. For default, identify where and how the claim could have been raised and the asserted cause.
4. For innocence, inventory all reliable evidence, including admissible government evidence and forgone charges.
5. For ineffective assistance, identify each challenged act or omission, the information then available, professional norms, and the posture-specific counterfactual.
6. Do not merge plea, appeal, trial, sentencing, and Cronic prejudice rules.

Matters requiring circuit-specific work

• Relitigation of claims decided on direct appeal and exceptions for intervening law.
• Cognizability of advisory-Guidelines and other nonconstitutional sentencing errors.
• Collateral-waiver construction and recognized exceptions.
• Sentencing-innocence gateways.
• Burdens of proof, evidentiary presumptions, and remedies beyond the nationwide rules stated here.

Section 2255 Screening, Hearing, Appeal, and Postjudgment Motions

§ 2255 Screening, Hearing, Appeal, and Postjudgment Motions

Verification boundary

This module states national screening, response, discovery, record, hearing, counsel, remedy, certificate, notice, and postjudgment rules. It does not decide disputed facts, local schedules, appealability of every interlocutory order, standards of review for every issue, or the circuit-specific application of state-habeas holdings to § 2255.

Screening, response, discovery, and record

Rule 4 requires prompt examination by the sentencing judge or an assigned judge and dismissal when the motion, attached exhibits, and prior record plainly show no entitlement to relief; otherwise the judge must order the United States attorney to respond or take other action. Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings

Before recharacterizing a pro se filing as the litigant's first § 2255 motion, a federal court must notify the litigant, warn about later second-or-successive restrictions, and allow withdrawal or amendment; without those protections, the recharacterized filing does not count as the first motion for applying those later restrictions. Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 381–84 (2003)

The government need not answer unless ordered; when ordered, Rule 5 requires it to address the allegations and specified prior-remedy matters, and the court may require relevant transcripts and briefs. Rule 5(a)–(c), Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings

The movant may submit a reply to the government's answer within a time fixed by the judge, unless a local rule supplies the time. Rule 5(d), Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings

Discovery is not automatic: Rule 6 requires good cause, reasons for the request, and proposed discovery, and requires appointment of financially eligible counsel when needed for effective discovery. Rule 6, Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings

Rule 7 permits expansion of the record with relevant materials and requires a party opposing added material to have an opportunity to admit or deny its correctness. Rule 7, Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings

Evidentiary hearing, counsel, and relief

Section 2255(b) requires notice, a prompt hearing, factual findings, and legal conclusions unless the motion and case files and records conclusively show no entitlement to relief; Rule 8 requires the judge to determine the hearing question after reviewing the answer, transcripts, record, and submitted materials. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b); Rule 8(a)

Specific, detailed factual allegations about off-record plea promises could not be resolved solely against the movant through the judge's personal recollection in Machibroda; the Court did not hold that every allegation requires a full courtroom hearing. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493–96 (1962)

Plea-hearing declarations carry a strong presumption of verity, but they are not invariably insurmountable; a sufficiently specific collateral allegation and the full record determine whether summary dismissal or further proceedings are proper. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73–82 (1977)

If an evidentiary hearing is warranted, Rule 8(c) requires appointment of counsel for a financially eligible movant; outside mandatory rule-based circumstances, counsel is not automatically guaranteed by this rule. Rule 8(c), Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings

The remedy must match the established defect: § 2255(b) authorizes discharge, resentencing, a new trial, or correction of sentence after vacatur, but it does not make every listed remedy available for every successful claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b)

Certificate of appealability and notice

A prisoner may not appeal the final order in a § 2255 proceeding without a certificate of appealability from a circuit justice or judge, and the certificate requires a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B), (c)(2); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)

When entering a final order adverse to the movant, the district court must issue or deny a certificate and, if issuing one, state the specific issue or issues satisfying § 2253(c)(2). Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings

For a merits denial, Slack asks whether reasonable jurists could debate the district court's resolution of the constitutional claim or conclude the issue deserves encouragement to proceed further. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483–84 (2000)

For a procedural dismissal without reaching the constitutional claim, Slack requires both a debatable valid constitutional claim and a debatable correctness of the procedural ruling. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484–85

The certificate inquiry is a threshold debatability assessment, not full merits adjudication; a court may not first decide the merits against the applicant and then deny a certificate because the applicant lost that merits determination. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336–42 (2003); Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 115–23 (2017)

Section 2253(c)(1)'s certificate requirement is jurisdictional, but Gonzalez v. Thaler holds that a certificate's failure to specify a constitutional issue as § 2253(c)(3) directs is mandatory but nonjurisdictional. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 142–49 (2012)

Rule 11(b) makes Appellate Rule 4(a) govern a § 2255 appeal; because the United States is a party, Rule 4(a)(1)(B)'s ordinary notice period is 60 days after entry of the appealed judgment or order, subject to the rule's exact entry, tolling, inmate, extension, and reopening provisions. Rule 11(b), Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings; Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)

A timely notice of appeal remains necessary even when the district court denies a certificate; the notice can be treated as a request for a certificate under Appellate Rule 22(b)(2), but the certificate process does not replace notice filing. Rule 11(b), Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings; Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(2)

Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) identifies the timely district-court motions that reset the appeal period for all parties; classification, timeliness, and disposition of the actual postjudgment filing must be established before calculating the notice deadline. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)

Rules 59 and 60 after a habeas judgment

Civil Rule 59(e) requires a motion to alter or amend a judgment within 28 days after judgment entry, and Civil Rule 6(b)(2) bars extending that deadline. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), 6(b)(2)

Banister holds that a timely Rule 59(e) motion in a first habeas proceeding is part of that proceeding rather than a second or successive application, while emphasizing Rule 59(e)'s narrow corrective function and strict 28-day limit. Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 508–19 (2020)

Under Gonzalez v. Crosby, a Rule 60 motion that adds a merits ground or attacks the federal court's merits resolution functions as a successive habeas claim, while a motion attacking a defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceeding may be a true Rule 60 motion; Gonzalez arose under § 2254, so § 2255 application must follow controlling-circuit law. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 530–36 (2005)

Civil Rule 60(b)(1) includes a judge's legal error under Kemp, and a motion under Rule 60(b)(1), (2), or (3) must be made within one year after judgment entry as well as within a reasonable time. Kemp v. United States, 596 U.S. 528, 533–39 (2022); Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1)

Rule 60(b)(6) requires extraordinary circumstances and a motion within a reasonable time; it cannot be used to evade the one-year limits on clauses (1) through (3) or habeas successive-application controls. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), (c)(1); Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535–38

Civil and Criminal Rules may be applied to § 2255 proceedings only to the extent they are not inconsistent with a statute or the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings. Rule 12, Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings

A motion to reconsider the district court's certificate ruling does not extend the time to appeal. Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings

Procedure checklist

1. Determine whether Rule 4 permits summary dismissal or requires a response.
2. If the filing was labeled differently, apply Castro before treating it as a first § 2255 motion.
3. Identify what factual disputes remain after the answer, reply, transcripts, and expanded record.
4. Apply § 2255(b), Rule 8, Machibroda, and Blackledge to the actual allegations and record.
5. Match any relief to the proven violation and the governing remedial rule.
6. Obtain the final order and the district court's certificate ruling.
7. Independently calculate the notice deadline from entry and every Rule 4(a)(4) event.
8. Classify every Rule 59 or Rule 60 filing by timing and substance before treating it as ordinary civil postjudgment litigation.

Matters requiring circuit- or record-specific work

• Standards of review for particular rulings and the appealability of interlocutory collateral orders.
• When a paper hearing, affidavit process, or live evidentiary hearing is required.
• Rule 60 classification, mixed motions, transfer versus dismissal, and certificate requirements on postjudgment appeals.
• Local response, reply, discovery, hearing, sealing, and certificate procedures.

Later Section 2255 Filings — Classification and Authorization

Later § 2255 Filings — Classification and Authorization

Verification boundary

“Second or successive” is a legal classification, not a count of papers. Most Supreme Court classification decisions arose under § 2254 and § 2244(b); this module identifies their exact holdings and does not silently convert every state-prisoner application into a complete § 2255 rule. Before classifying a federal filing, controlling circuit precedent remains necessary for prior untimeliness dismissals, voluntary withdrawals, mixed Rule 60 motions, limited sentence modifications, transfer, and other unresolved postures.

Classify before applying the gate

The statutory phrase “second or successive” is not self-defining and does not cover every application filed second in time; classification depends on the judgment, claim, ripeness, and prior disposition. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 943–47 (2007); Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 331–38 (2010)

Classification requires every challenged federal judgment, every prior § 2255 filing and disposition, any intervening judgment, the precise proposed claims, and the timing and substance of postjudgment papers; a docket count alone is insufficient. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h); Magwood, 561 U.S. at 331–42

In Burton, a later § 2254 petition challenging the same state judgment was successive, and filing it without court-of-appeals authorization left the district court without jurisdiction to entertain it. Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 152–57 (2007)

For a filing legally classified as a second or successive § 2255 motion, § 2255(h) requires court-of-appeals panel certification before the district court may consider it. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)

New judgment and later-ripening claims

The first habeas application challenging a new state-court judgment entered after a conditional writ and resentencing was not second or successive in Magwood. Magwood, 561 U.S. at 323–42

Magwood treated the application as challenging the new judgment even though the alleged sentencing error had also occurred in the earlier judgment; the Court rejected a claim-by-claim rule for that first challenge to the new judgment. Magwood, 561 U.S. at 330–42

Magwood expressly did not decide whether a petitioner resentenced under a new judgment may use the first application against that judgment to challenge an undisturbed conviction component; that issue cannot be presented as a settled nationwide Supreme Court holding. Magwood, 561 U.S. at 342

Whether a Rule 35 correction, Rule 36 correction, § 3582 reduction, First Step Act reduction, partial resentencing, or amended judgment creates a new judgment for successive-filing purposes is not answered categorically by Magwood; the actual order and controlling circuit law are required. Magwood, 561 U.S. at 323–42

Panetti held that a state prisoner's Ford incompetency-to-be-executed claim filed when it first became ripe after an execution date was set was not a second or successive application. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 943–47

A Ford claim presented in an earlier state habeas application, dismissed as premature, and re-presented when ripe was treated in Martinez-Villareal as part of the first application rather than a second or successive application. Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 643–45 (1998)

When the first federal habeas petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust without adjudicating any claim, Slack treated the later petition as not second or successive. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 485–89 (2000)

The effect of other prior dispositions—including untimeliness, procedural default, voluntary withdrawal, lack of jurisdiction, defective form, or partial merits adjudication—must be researched under controlling circuit law; Slack's no-merits exhaustion holding and Burton's same-judgment holding do not supply one universal answer for all dismissals. Slack, 529 U.S. at 485–89; Burton, 549 U.S. at 152–57

Recharacterization and postjudgment motions

An unwarned recharacterization cannot count as a first § 2255 motion for later second-or-successive restrictions; Castro requires notice, warning, and an opportunity to withdraw or amend. Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 381–84 (2003)

A timely Rule 59(e) motion in a first habeas proceeding is part of that proceeding and is not a second or successive application. Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 508–19 (2020)

A purported Rule 60 motion that asserts a new merits ground or attacks the federal court's merits resolution functions as a successive habeas claim, while a motion attacking a defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceeding may be a true Rule 60 motion. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 530–36 (2005)

Mixed postjudgment papers must be classified claim by claim and under controlling-circuit procedure; a “Rule 60” caption cannot authorize district-court merits review of a successive § 2255 claim. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 530–36 & n.4; Rule 9, Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings

Section 2255(h) substantive gates

Section 2255(h)(1) requires newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed with the evidence as a whole, would establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1)

Section 2255(h)(2) requires a new rule of constitutional law, previously unavailable, that the Supreme Court has made retroactive to cases on collateral review. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2)

A new statutory-interpretation rule is not a new rule of constitutional law and therefore does not satisfy § 2255(h)(2); any separate saving-clause question must be analyzed under § 2255(e) and the current saving-clause module. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), (h)(2)

For the parallel language in § 2244(b)(2)(A), Tyler holds that only the Supreme Court can make a new rule retroactive and that the Court must do so through a holding; § 2255(h)(2) uses the same “made retroactive” formulation. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 662–68 (2001)

Tyler permits multiple Supreme Court holdings to make a rule retroactive only when those holdings necessarily dictate retroactivity; lower-court belief that a rule should apply retroactively is insufficient. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 666; id. at 668–69 (O'Connor, J., concurring)

New substantive rules generally apply retroactively because they alter the range of conduct or class of persons the law punishes; rules regulating only the manner of determining culpability are procedural. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351–55 (2004)

New constitutional rules of criminal procedure generally do not apply retroactively on federal collateral review, and Edwards v. Vannoy eliminated the theoretical watershed-procedure exception. Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U.S. 255, 265–72 (2021)

Authorization procedure and unauthorized filings

Before filing a legally second or successive § 2255 motion in district court, the movant must seek certification from the appropriate court of appeals as provided in § 2244. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3)(A), 2255(h)

Section 2244(b)(3)(B) assigns the authorization motion to a three-judge court-of-appeals panel. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(B)

The panel applies a prima facie showing at the authorization stage, using § 2255(h)'s federal-prisoner substantive gate rather than substituting § 2244(b)(2)'s state-prisoner wording. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3)(C), 2255(h)

Section 2244(b)(3)(D) directs a grant or denial within 30 days after filing; this module does not call the command jurisdictional, promise decision by that date, or invent a remedy for noncompliance. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(D)

Authorization permits the proposed filing but is not a merits judgment or a grant of § 2255 relief; the district court must still apply the governing procedural bars, § 2255 standards, and claim-specific merits law. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3)(C), 2255(b), (h)

Section 2244(b)(4)'s express postauthorization dismissal command applies to authorized state-prisoner claims under § 2244(b); it should not be silently treated as identical federal § 2255 text, particularly after Bowe rejected automatic incorporation of other § 2244(b) provisions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(4); Bowe v. United States, 607 U.S. 13, 32–38 (2026)

The district court cannot adjudicate the merits of an unauthorized filing that is legally a second or successive motion; whether to dismiss, transfer, sever a true Rule 60 component, or allow withdrawal must follow controlling circuit procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h); Burton, 549 U.S. at 152–57

Section 1631 permits transfer when a civil action or appeal was filed in a court lacking jurisdiction, the receiving court could have heard it when filed, and transfer is in the interest of justice; the statute does not make transfer automatic for every unauthorized § 2255 filing. 28 U.S.C. § 1631

Review after the panel decision

Section 2244(b)(3)(E) does not bar Supreme Court certiorari review of a federal prisoner's unsuccessful request to file a successive § 2255 motion. Bowe, 607 U.S. at 19–32

Section 2244(b)(1)'s automatic previously-presented-claim bar does not apply to federal § 2255(h) motions. Bowe, 607 U.S. at 32–38

Bowe did not decide whether § 2244(b)(3)(E)'s rehearing bar applies to a federal-prisoner authorization decision; current circuit rules and precedent must be checked. Bowe, 607 U.S. at 29–30

Authorization forms, claim limits, attachments, word limits, electronic or paper filing, rehearing practice, and service requirements are circuit-specific and must be taken from the appropriate court of appeals' current rules and forms. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3), 2255(h)

Related § 2244 provisions that remain on the state-judgment track

Section 2244(a) states a federal-custody anti-relitigation rule for a habeas application whose detention legality a federal judge has already determined, but it expressly says “except as provided in section 2255”; it is not a substitute for § 2255(h)'s later-motion framework. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a)

Section 2244(c) concerns the admissibility, when the federal habeas judge directs, of specified records from prior proceedings involving a person held under a state-court judgment; it does not establish the federal-prisoner authorization gate. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(c)

Section 2244(b)(1) requires dismissal of a claim presented in a second or successive § 2254 application when that claim appeared in a prior application; Bowe holds that this state-track text is not imported into § 2255(h). 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1); Bowe, 607 U.S. at 32–38

For a new claim in a second or successive § 2254 application, § 2244(b)(2) requires either a previously unavailable Supreme-Court-made-retroactive new constitutional rule or a factual predicate previously undiscoverable through due diligence plus clear-and-convincing proof that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found guilt. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)

Section 2244(d)(1) supplies a one-year limitations period and four latest-of triggers for applications by persons held under state-court judgments; it is not § 2255(f)'s federal-prisoner clock. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)

Section 2244(d)(2) excludes from that state-track one-year period the time during which a properly filed state postconviction or other collateral-review application concerning the pertinent judgment or claim is pending; § 2255 contains no identical provision. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Section 2244(b)(3) does not state a freestanding deadline by which a federal prisoner must first seek § 2255(h) authorization, but claim-specific timing—including § 2255(f), Dodd's rule for § 2255(f)(3), availability, and current circuit procedure—can still make prompt filing decisive. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3), 2255(f), (h); Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357–60 (2005)

Classification and authorization checklist

1. Obtain every original and amended judgment and identify what changed.
2. Inventory every earlier collateral filing, its label, claims, warnings, and exact disposition.
3. Classify Rule 59 and Rule 60 papers by timing and substance.
4. Identify whether the proposed claim existed and was ripe during the first proceeding.
5. Apply Magwood, Panetti, Martinez-Villareal, Slack, Castro, Banister, and Gonzalez only within their exact postures.
6. If legally successive, identify the precise § 2255(h)(1) or (h)(2) gate and supporting record.
7. Use the current circuit form and rules; do not file merits papers first in district court.
8. After a panel decision, preserve Bowe's certiorari holding and its unresolved federal rehearing issue.

Matters requiring controlling-circuit work

• Whether a particular limited sentence change creates a new judgment.
• Treatment of challenges to undisturbed components after resentencing.
• Prior untimeliness, default, withdrawal, jurisdictional, and mixed dispositions.
• Mixed Rule 60 handling, certificate requirements, and transfer versus dismissal.
• Prima facie formulations, evidence rules, filing forms, panel claim scope, rehearing, and treatment of the 30-day command.

28 U.S.C. §§ 2244 and 2255(h) — Successive-Application Gatekeeping

28 U.S.C. §§ 2244 and 2255(h) — Successive-Application Gatekeeping

Verification boundary

This module verifies the nationwide statutory division between state-prisoner applications and federal-prisoner motions, the text of the authorization procedure, the separate substantive gates, and the two holdings in Bowe v. United States. It does not decide whether a particular later filing is “second or successive,” whether a proposed claim satisfies a statutory gate, or which rehearing practice a particular circuit follows.

Keep the state and federal tracks separate

Sections 2244(b)(1) and (b)(2) apply by their terms to second or successive habeas applications under § 2254, and § 2244(d) applies to applications by persons in custody pursuant to state-court judgments. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), (b)(2), (d)

Section 2244(d)'s one-year limitation and statutory tolling provisions govern the state-judgment track described there; they are not the limitation provisions for a federal prisoner's § 2255 motion. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)

The state-prisoner substantive gates in § 2244(b)(2) and the federal-prisoner gates in § 2255(h) are not identically worded, so a federal § 2255(h) analysis must use § 2255(h)'s substantive requirements rather than silently substituting § 2244(b)(2). 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(2), 2255(h)

Section 2244(b)(3) authorization procedure

Before a second or successive § 2254 application is filed in district court, the applicant must move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider it. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A)

The court of appeals must assign the authorization motion to a three-judge panel. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(B)

The panel may authorize filing only if it determines that the applicant has made a prima facie showing that the application satisfies § 2244(b)'s requirements. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C)

Section 2244(b)(3)(D) directs the court of appeals to grant or deny authorization not later than thirty days after the motion is filed. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(D)

This module records the statutory command but does not label it jurisdictional, establish a remedy for noncompliance, or assume every circuit treats it as enforceable. Those questions require controlling-circuit research.

For the state-prisoner authorization decision governed directly by § 2244(b)(3), subsection (E) says the grant or denial is not appealable and may not be the subject of rehearing or certiorari. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E)

After the court of appeals authorizes a state-prisoner claim, the district court must dismiss that authorized claim unless the applicant shows that it satisfies § 2244(b)'s requirements. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(4)

Subsection (b)(4) is a post-authorization screen of an authorized claim. It does not say, as the legacy draft stated, that its specific command is to dismiss every claim the court of appeals did not authorize.

Federal-prisoner gate under § 2255(h)

A second or successive § 2255 motion must be certified as provided in § 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain either qualifying newly discovered evidence under § 2255(h)(1) or a qualifying new rule of constitutional law under § 2255(h)(2). 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)

Whether a later filing is “second or successive,” whether evidence is qualifying, and whether the Supreme Court has made a new constitutional rule retroactive are separate questions not resolved by this structural module.

Bowe v. United States

Section 2244(b)(3)(E) does not bar Supreme Court certiorari review of a federal prisoner's request to file a successive § 2255 motion. Bowe v. United States, 607 U.S. 13, 19–32 (2026)

Section 2244(b)(1)'s previously-presented-claim bar does not apply to successive motions filed by federal prisoners under § 2255(h). Bowe, 607 U.S. at 32–38

The Supreme Court vacated and remanded for the Eleventh Circuit to decide Bowe's authorization request under the correct standard; the Supreme Court did not itself authorize his successive motion. Bowe, 607 U.S. at 38

Bowe distinguished § 2244(b)(3)(E)'s rehearing language from its certiorari language and did not decide whether that rehearing bar applies to federal-prisoner authorization decisions. Bowe, 607 U.S. at 29–30

The legacy statement that a federal authorization denial “remains non-rehearable” therefore is not preserved as a Bowe holding. Circuit-specific rehearing rules and precedent must be checked before stating the answer for a particular court of appeals.

Procedural checklist

1. Identify whether the custody and underlying judgment are state or federal.
2. Obtain every earlier § 2254 application or § 2255 motion and every disposition.
3. Research whether the proposed filing is legally “second or successive”; do not equate that term with merely second in time.
4. If authorization is required, apply the correct substantive gate—§ 2244(b)(2) for the state track or § 2255(h) for the federal track.
5. Use the appropriate court of appeals' current authorization form, filing rules, and controlling cases.
6. Treat the thirty-day text as a command to the court, not as a promised decision date or a demonstrated remedy.
7. For a federal denial, preserve the distinction among ordinary appeal, rehearing, and Supreme Court certiorari after Bowe.
8. If authorization is granted, expect independent district-court review; authorization is not a merits judgment.

Decision path

flowchart TD
    A["Proposed later collateral filing"] --> B{"State § 2254 or federal § 2255?"}
    B -->|"State"| C{"Legally second or successive?"}
    B -->|"Federal"| D{"Legally second or successive?"}
    C -->|"Yes"| E["Apply § 2244(b)(1)-(2); seek § 2244(b)(3) authorization"]
    D -->|"Yes"| F["Apply § 2255(h); seek panel certification as provided in § 2244"]
    E --> G["Three-judge panel; prima facie screen"]
    F --> G
    G --> H{"Authorization outcome"}
    H -->|"Granted"| I["District court independently applies governing requirements"]
    H -->|"Federal denial"| J["Bowe preserves Supreme Court certiorari; rehearing question requires circuit research"]
    H -->|"State denial"| K["Apply § 2244(b)(3)(E)"]

Matters not yet verified in this module

• The Supreme Court and circuit doctrines defining “second or successive,” including new-judgment, ripeness, Rule 60, and recharacterization issues.
• Circuit-specific prima facie standards, authorization forms, rehearing practice, and treatment of the thirty-day command.
• The merits of either statutory substantive gate, retroactivity doctrine, limitations rules under § 2255(f), and certificates of appealability.
• District-court transfer-versus-dismissal practice for unauthorized filings.

Those matters remain open in data/coverage_matrix.yaml; this module does not represent the full § 2244 or § 2255 field as complete.

28 U.S.C. § 2241 — Filing, Custodian, District, and Administrative Exhaustion

28 U.S.C. § 2241 — Filing, Custodian, District, and Administrative Exhaustion

Verification boundary

This module verifies the nationwide statutory filing rules, the Supreme Court's default rule for a core challenge to present physical custody, and the current text of the Bureau of Prisons Administrative Remedy Program. Exhaustion doctrine, waiver and excuse, the consequence of a defect, transfer, substitution, execution-claim cognizability, and the merits remain circuit- and record-specific where stated.

Start with the statute and the custody posture

Section 2241(a) authorizes the Supreme Court, its Justices, district courts, and circuit judges to grant writs of habeas corpus “within their respective jurisdictions”; the quoted limitation is central to identifying the court that can act on the custodian. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a)

Section 2241(b) permits the Supreme Court, a Justice, or a circuit judge to decline an application and transfer it to the district court having jurisdiction; it does not supply a general transfer rule for every district-court filing defect. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(b)

Section 2241(c) lists five custody categories, including custody under or by color of United States authority, commitment for trial before a federal court, and custody violating the Constitution or federal law or treaties. A federal post-conviction petition must fit the statutory text; the existence of federal custody alone does not establish that a particular execution claim is cognizable or meritorious. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)

Section 2241(d) creates concurrent filing districts and a discretionary transfer rule for a person in custody under a state-court judgment in a State containing multiple federal judicial districts. It is not the source of the ordinary federal-prisoner district-of-confinement rule. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d)

Section 2241(e) addresses specified alien enemy-combatant detention and transfer decisions. Its specialized text should not be treated as a general limitation on an ordinary federal sentence-execution petition, and constitutional applications outside this module require their own authority. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)

The application and local filing package

Section 2242 requires a written application signed and verified by the person seeking relief or someone acting on that person's behalf; it must allege the facts concerning detention, identify by whom the person is detained, and, if known, state the custodian's authority. 28 U.S.C. § 2242

Section 2242 permits amendment or supplementation as provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions, but that permission does not resolve relation back, exhaustion, respondent, transfer, successive-application, or local-rule questions. 28 U.S.C. § 2242

AO 242 is the federal judiciary's national petition form for § 2241 and asks for the conviction or detention information, grounds, facts, administrative-remedy history, requested relief, and a declaration under penalty of perjury. The filing district's current local rules and form instructions still control the required package. AO 242; 28 U.S.C. § 2242

Section 1914(a) sets a five-dollar filing fee for an application for a writ of habeas corpus. Whether prepayment is excused and which financial declaration or trust-account materials are required must be checked under the filing court's current procedures. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)

Rule 1(b) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases permits a district court to apply any or all of those rules to a habeas petition not covered by Rule 1(a). Their application to a § 2241 case is therefore authorized but not automatically identical in every court. Rule 1(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases

Core physical custody: respondent and district

For a core challenge to present physical custody in the United States, Rumsfeld v. Padilla makes the default proper respondent the immediate custodian—ordinarily the warden of the facility—not the Attorney General or another remote supervisory official. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434–36 (2004)

For that same core present-physical-custody petition, the court issuing the writ must have jurisdiction over the immediate custodian; the default filing location is therefore the district of confinement. Padilla, 542 U.S. at 442–47

Padilla expressly distinguished the habeas statute's immediate-custodian and territorial rules from federal subject-matter jurisdiction. A defect should not be labeled a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction without controlling authority for that characterization and posture. Padilla, 542 U.S. at 434 n.7

Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court permitted an Alabama prisoner challenging a Kentucky detainer to proceed in Kentucky because the writ acted on the Kentucky custodian responsible for the future custody. Padilla treats Braden as a non-core-custody case, not an exception that permits every physically confined prisoner to sue a remote official. Braden, 410 U.S. 484, 494–500 (1973); Padilla, 542 U.S. at 438–39

The immediate-custodian and district-of-confinement rules are defaults for core present physical custody, not universal answers for detainers, future custody, military detention, immigration detention, prisoners held abroad, or a person not physically confined. Identify the custody being challenged before choosing the respondent and district. Padilla, 542 U.S. at 435–40 & nn.8–9; Braden, 410 U.S. at 494–500

When habeas jurisdiction was properly acquired at filing, a later physical transfer did not defeat it in Ex parte Endo because a respondent within the original district remained able to effect release. That holding does not decide every modern substitution, personal-jurisdiction, transfer, or remedy question. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 304–07 (1944)

Record the institution, named custodian, and district on the filing date and notify the court of a later transfer. Whether the original court retains the case, substitutes a respondent, transfers it, or dismisses it requires the actual custody chain and controlling circuit procedure; neither Padilla nor Endo creates a universal automatic outcome. Padilla, 542 U.S. at 441; Endo, 323 U.S. at 304–07

Classify the claim before using the filing rule

Section 2241 remains the ordinary habeas vehicle for challenges to detention other than a federal prisoner's collateral attack on the validity of the sentence, including qualifying claims about how a sentence is carried out. A federal collateral attack on the sentence ordinarily belongs under § 2255 and cannot be relabeled an “execution” claim to avoid that statute. Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465, 473–78 (2023); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)

Classification turns on the substance of the challenged custody and requested relief, not the caption. Sentence computation, credit application, disciplinary loss of time, designation, placement, and prerelease disputes can present execution issues, but each still requires a federal custody injury, a cognizable substantive rule, exhaustion analysis, and an available habeas remedy. Jones, 599 U.S. at 475–78; 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)

Section 2241 contains no one-year limitations period comparable to § 2255(f) or § 2244(d). That statutory absence should be stated narrowly; it does not establish that every delayed § 2241 claim remains live or timely under every underlying statute, equitable doctrine, administrative deadline, or circuit rule. 28 U.S.C. § 2241

Neither § 2241 nor 28 C.F.R. Part 542 states a nationwide judicial exhaustion prerequisite for a federal prisoner's § 2241 petition. Courts apply exhaustion doctrine through controlling precedent, so its characterization, waiver, excuse, and consequence must be verified in the governing circuit rather than inferred from the administrative regulation alone. 28 U.S.C. § 2241; 28 C.F.R. pt. 542, subpt. B

As a bounded circuit example, the Ninth Circuit in Ward v. Chavez described § 2241 exhaustion as prudential rather than jurisdictional and subject to waiver when pursuing administrative remedies would be futile. That Ninth Circuit holding is not a nationwide permission to bypass the BOP process. Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012)

Before filing, check the controlling circuit's current exhaustion rule and any claim-specific statutory exhaustion provision. If excuse or waiver is asserted, prove the concrete facts supporting the circuit's test; inconvenience, an expected adverse result, or an incomplete record should not be converted into a presumed nationwide exception. Ward, 678 F.3d at 1045–46; 28 C.F.R. pt. 542, subpt. B

Current BOP Administrative Remedy Program

Except for the regulatory exceptions, § 542.13 requires an inmate first to present the issue informally to staff. CCC inmates need not attempt informal resolution, and the regulation permits specified bypasses or discretionary waiver. 28 C.F.R. § 542.13

Section 542.14(a) sets a 20-calendar-day period, measured from the date on which the basis for the request occurred, to complete informal resolution and submit the BP-9; subsection (b) permits an extension when the inmate demonstrates a valid reason for delay. 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(a)–(b)

Section 542.14(d) supplies special initial-filing routes for sensitive issues, DHO appeals, Control Unit and controlled-housing-status appeals, and certain decisions not originating with the Warden. The correct initial office therefore depends on the decision being challenged. 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(d)

Under § 542.15(a), a dissatisfied inmate generally files a BP-10 with the Regional Director within 20 calendar days after the Warden signed the response, then a BP-11 with General Counsel within 30 calendar days after the Regional Director signed the response; General Counsel is the final administrative appeal, and valid-delay extensions may be allowed. 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a)

An administrative appeal must state the reason for appeal, include the required prior filings and responses, and may not raise an issue omitted below. Preserve the submission, exhibits, receipt, rejection notice, response, envelope or transmission proof, remedy number, and every operative date. 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(b)

Section 542.17 requires a written rejection notice explaining the defect; if the defect is correctable, the notice must provide a reasonable period to cure. A rejection without an opportunity to cure may be appealed to the next level under subsection (c). 28 C.F.R. § 542.17

For an accepted filing, § 542.18 sets response periods of 20 calendar days for the Warden or CCM, 30 for the Regional Director, and 40 for General Counsel, with one written extension of 20, 30, and 20 days respectively; an emergency threatening immediate health or welfare has a three-calendar-day Warden response rule. 28 C.F.R. § 542.18

If no response arrives within the allotted period, including a notified extension, § 542.18 permits the inmate to treat the absence as a denial at that level. Confirm that the submission was accepted and calculate the actual response period before relying on silence. 28 C.F.R. § 542.18

Completing the regulatory chain does not itself prove judicial exhaustion of a materially different claim. Compare the same operative issue and requested correction across each administrative level and the petition, then apply the controlling circuit's rules on fair presentation, procedural default, waiver, and excuse. 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.14(c), 542.15(b); Ward, 678 F.3d at 1045–46

Pretrial, immigration, military, state-process, and other non-federal-post-conviction uses of § 2241 have different custody, statutory-channel, exhaustion, abstention, respondent, and remedy questions. This federal sentence-execution map must not be applied to those postures without independent authority. 28 U.S.C. § 2241; Jones, 599 U.S. at 474–78

A filing-ready review therefore requires the present custody and challenged decision, execution-versus-validity classification, correct respondent and district at filing, current local form and fee rules, a complete administrative record or a supported circuit-law basis for noncompletion, a live redressable injury, and claim-specific substantive authority. No single label or checklist item substitutes for those separate findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2241; Padilla, 542 U.S. at 434–47; 28 C.F.R. pt. 542, subpt. B

Decision path

flowchart TD
    A["Identify the custody, challenged decision, and requested relief"] --> B{"Attack on sentence validity or on execution/other detention?"}
    B -->|"Validity"| C["Route first to § 2255 and then test § 2255(e) separately"]
    B -->|"Execution or other detention"| D{"Core present physical custody?"}
    D -->|"Yes"| E["Name immediate custodian and file in district of confinement"]
    D -->|"No"| F["Research the posture-specific respondent and district"]
    E --> G{"BOP issue governed by Part 542?"}
    G -->|"Yes"| H["Preserve informal, BP-9, BP-10, BP-11, rejection, and timing record"]
    G -->|"No"| I["Identify the applicable administrative channel"]
    H --> J["Apply controlling-circuit exhaustion doctrine"]
    I --> J
    F --> J
    J --> K["Verify live custody injury, substantive entitlement, and available habeas relief"]

Matters requiring record- and circuit-specific verification

• The actual institution, custodian, district, transfer history, and local form package.
• Whether a non-core custody exception applies.
• Whether a respondent or territorial defect results in substitution, transfer, or dismissal.
• Whether the particular claim is an execution claim and is cognizable in habeas.
• The governing circuit's exhaustion characterization, excuse, waiver, default, and remedy rules.
• Any claim-specific administrative path outside 28 C.F.R. Part 542.
• The underlying merits, standard of review, redressability, and relief.

28 U.S.C. § 2241 — Section 2255(e) Saving Clause, Custody, and Mootness

28 U.S.C. § 2241 — Section 2255(e) Saving Clause, Custody, and Mootness

Verification boundary

This module states the current nationwide saving-clause rule after Jones v. Hendrix and the Supreme Court's filing-time custody and mootness distinctions. It does not create new saving-clause categories, decide an individual execution claim, or treat custody, Article III injury, cognizability, merits, and relief as interchangeable.

Section 2255 is the ordinary federal collateral vehicle

Section 2255(a) directs a federal prisoner in custody under sentence to move the court that imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct it on the grounds specified there. Congress designed that motion as the ordinary substitute for a federal prisoner's habeas attack on the sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465, 473–76 (2023)

Section 2255(e) bars a habeas application by a prisoner authorized to seek § 2255 relief unless “the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” This is the saving clause; its text concerns the adequacy or effectiveness of the remedial vehicle. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)

Jones v. Hendrix holds that § 2255(e) does not permit a prisoner to use § 2241 to assert an intervening favorable interpretation of a criminal statute as an end run around § 2255(h)'s limits on second or successive motions. Jones, 599 U.S. at 471–80

The result in Jones does not change merely because binding circuit precedent foreclosed the statutory argument at trial, on appeal, and during the first § 2255 proceeding. The saving clause does not guarantee an opportunity to take advantage of every later change in statutory interpretation. Jones, 599 U.S. at 477–80

An inability to satisfy either § 2255(h) gate does not make the § 2255 remedy inadequate or ineffective. The later filing must instead be classified and tested under § 2255(h) and the governing authorization rules. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h); Jones, 599 U.S. at 477–80

A prior adverse § 2255 decision, procedural default, expiration of § 2255(f), adverse precedent, or a preference for the district of confinement does not by itself make the motion remedy inadequate or ineffective. Those circumstances concern a claim's availability, timing, or outcome rather than the saving clause's remedial-vehicle inquiry. Jones, 599 U.S. at 477–80, 480 n.3

The saving clause tests whether § 2255's motion mechanism is inadequate or ineffective to test detention, not whether the sentencing court's earlier legal answer was correct. Treating an unsuccessful result as an inadequate remedy would erase the limits Congress placed in § 2255. Jones, 599 U.S. at 478–80

What Jones preserved—and what it did not invent

Jones states that the saving clause preserves § 2241 when unusual circumstances make it impossible or impracticable to seek relief in the sentencing court, as well as for challenges to detention other than collateral attacks on a sentence. Jones, 599 U.S. at 474, 478

The Court identified dissolution of the sentencing court as the clearest historical example of practical unavailability and referred to circumstances such as inability to access necessary records as an example in the pre-§ 2255 regime. These examples do not establish a broad equitable override of § 2255(h). Jones, 599 U.S. at 474–75

Challenges to the execution of a sentence or to detention other than a collateral attack on the sentence can remain within § 2241 without using § 2255(e) as a workaround. The substance of the custody claim—not the prisoner's choice of label—controls that classification. Jones, 599 U.S. at 475–78; 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)

Jones does not announce a nationwide category for every prisoner described as unable, through no fault, to file a first § 2255 motion. Any claimed impossible-or-impracticable circumstance must be tied to the remedial mechanism and supported by current controlling authority, not inferred from fairness or the likely result. Jones, 599 U.S. at 474–80

Saving-clause availability is a gateway distinct from cognizability, procedural defenses, proof, merits, and remedy. Passing one question does not establish another, and failure at the gateway does not authorize a merits ruling under a hypothetical § 2255 standard. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); Jones, 599 U.S. at 477–80

If § 2255(e) actually permits a § 2241 petition and the claim challenges present physical custody, the § 2241 immediate-custodian and district-of-confinement defaults still apply. The saving clause does not relocate the § 2241 petition to the sentencing court. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434–47 (2004); Jones, 599 U.S. at 473–78

Sections 2241 and 2255 do not make a successful saving-clause petition automatically use § 2255's merits standard or remedial menu. The underlying right, procedural posture, governing circuit law, and scope of habeas relief must be separately established. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c), 2255(b), (e)

Custody is measured at filing

Habeas and § 2255 require qualifying custody under the challenged detention or sentence when the application or motion is filed. Custody and Article III mootness are separate inquiries and must not be collapsed into a single “jurisdiction” label. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c), 2255(a); Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490–92 (1989)

Physical imprisonment is not the only custody. Jones v. Cunningham held that parole restrictions imposed significant restraints on liberty sufficient for habeas custody. A different form of nonphysical restraint must be compared with the controlling statute and case law rather than assumed equivalent. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240–43 (1963)

Once a sentence has fully expired, the possibility that its conviction will produce collateral consequences does not by itself satisfy the custody requirement for a petition attacking that expired conviction. Maleng, 490 U.S. at 491–92

Maleng separately construed a pro se petition as attacking a current sentence enhanced by an allegedly invalid prior conviction. That construction does not place the person “in custody” under the fully expired prior conviction or automatically make the enhancement challenge cognizable. Maleng, 490 U.S. at 493–94

Later events and mootness

When custody existed at filing, later release does not retroactively destroy the federal court's power acquired over the habeas application. In Carafas v. LaVallee, the petitioner's sentence expired while the case was pending, but the filing-time custody requirement remained satisfied. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238–40 (1968)

Carafas also held that the challenge to a criminal conviction was not moot because concrete civil disabilities and collateral consequences survived the sentence. That conviction rule does not mean collateral consequences are presumed for every administrative, disciplinary, placement, credit, or revocation decision. Carafas, 391 U.S. at 237–40

In Spencer v. Kemna, expiration of the parole-revocation term mooted the revocation challenge because the asserted later injuries were not concrete continuing consequences and the Court declined to presume collateral consequences for a parole revocation as it does for a criminal conviction. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7–16 (1998)

For an execution-of-sentence claim, ask whether a live injury remains and whether the court can still grant effective custody relief after recalculation, restoration, transfer, release, or sentence completion. Neither release nor administrative correction is automatically dispositive without that claim-and-remedy comparison. Carafas, 391 U.S. at 237–40; Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7–18

A transfer to another institution generally changes the physical custodian but does not by itself prove that the challenged custody injury disappeared. Respondent substitution, territorial authority, retention or transfer of the case, redressability, and any change in the challenged decision remain separate questions. Padilla, 542 U.S. at 434–47; Carafas, 391 U.S. at 237–40

Later release can leave a conviction challenge live under Carafas while mooting a completed administrative or revocation challenge under Spencer. Identify the exact challenged act, continuing restraint or collateral injury, requested relief, and the court's ability to redress it; do not use a categorical “release equals moot” or “collateral consequences always save the case” rule. Carafas, 391 U.S. at 237–40; Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7–18

If no qualifying custody existed at filing, routing to coram nobis is a separate extraordinary-writ inquiry, not an automatic remedy. The issuing court, continuing consequences, delay, fundamental-error standard, and circuit test remain to be verified in the dedicated extraordinary-writ module. Maleng, 490 U.S. at 490–94

A court-of-appeals denial of authorization under § 2255(h) does not independently make § 2255 inadequate or ineffective. The saving clause must satisfy its own post-Jones test and cannot operate as rehearing of the failed authorization showing. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), (h); Jones, 599 U.S. at 477–80

COA classification and the permissible custody remedy are addressed separately in the § 2241 appeal-and-relief module. Saving-clause availability alone neither requires a COA nor promises vacatur, resentencing, credits, placement, or release. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2255(e)

The complete router asks in order: custody at filing; validity attack versus execution or other detention; availability and classification under § 2255; the exact § 2255(e) gateway after Jones; correct § 2241 respondent and district; exhaustion; live redressable injury; merits; and relief. Skipping an earlier gate makes the later conclusion unreliable. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2255; Jones, 599 U.S. at 473–80; Maleng, 490 U.S. at 490–94

Decision path

flowchart TD
    A["Federal custody claim"] --> B{"Qualifying custody existed at filing?"}
    B -->|"No"| C["§ 2241 and § 2255 custody gates fail; research extraordinary writ separately"]
    B -->|"Yes"| D{"Collateral attack on validity of federal sentence?"}
    D -->|"No"| E["Route as execution or other-detention § 2241 claim"]
    D -->|"Yes"| F["Use § 2255 in sentencing court unless § 2255(e) applies"]
    F --> G{"Only obstacle is § 2255(h), timing, default, adverse precedent, or prior loss?"}
    G -->|"Yes"| H["Not inadequate or ineffective under Jones"]
    G -->|"No"| I{"Impossible or impracticable remedial vehicle under supported authority?"}
    I -->|"No"| H
    I -->|"Yes"| J["Proceed to § 2241 district, respondent, exhaustion, merits, and remedy gates"]
    E --> J
    J --> K{"Later event removed every redressable injury?"}
    K -->|"Yes"| L["Moot unless a supported exception or continuing injury exists"]
    K -->|"No"| M["Resolve remaining procedural and merits questions"]

Matters requiring record- and circuit-specific verification

• The challenged judgment, every prior § 2255 filing and disposition, and any authorization history.
• The exact intervening authority and whether the claim is statutory or constitutional.
• Any asserted impossible-or-impracticable circumstance and controlling post-Jones authority.
• The precise custody at filing, later custody changes, and continuing restraints.
• Whether an execution, disciplinary, placement, credit, or revocation injury remains redressable.
• The correct respondent, district, exhaustion doctrine, merits standard, and relief.
• Coram nobis or another extraordinary remedy after custody has fully ended.

28 U.S.C. § 2241 — Appeal, Certificate of Appealability, and Relief

28 U.S.C. § 2241 — Appeal, Certificate of Appealability, and Relief

Verification boundary

This module verifies the nationwide statutory COA classification and the basic remedial boundary for a final § 2241 order. It does not decide whether a petition satisfies § 2255(e), whether an execution claim is cognizable, whether administrative remedies were exhausted, or whether venue, respondent, custody, transfer, mootness, or a particular requested remedy is proper in a specific circuit and record.

Start with the source of the detention

Section 2253(a) makes a final order in a district-court habeas proceeding subject to review in the court of appeals for that circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a)

Section 2253(c)(1) requires a certificate of appealability only for a final habeas order in which the detention complained of arises from process issued by a state court, or for a final order in a § 2255 proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)

The filing label alone does not answer the COA question. Identify the process from which the complained-of detention arises.

A federal-process § 2241 appeal that is not a § 2255 proceeding falls outside both categories in § 2253(c)(1), so § 2253 does not require a COA for that appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)

The same classification applies when a federal prisoner invokes § 2255(e)'s saving clause: the character of the underlying challenge does not convert the § 2241 proceeding into a § 2255 proceeding for § 2253(c). In Bruce v. Warden Lewisburg USP, a precedential saving-clause appeal, the Third Circuit held that § 2253(c)'s COA requirements do not apply to an appeal from denial of a § 2241 petition. Bruce v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 868 F.3d 170, 177 n.3 (3d Cir. 2017)

When the detention complained of arises from state-court process, § 2253(c)(1)(A) requires a COA to appeal the final habeas order even if the petition was filed under § 2241. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A)

Appellate Rule 22 does not change the statutory categories

Appellate Rule 22(b)(1) tracks § 2253(c): it requires a COA for state-process habeas and § 2255 proceedings. Rule 22(b)(3) separately says that a state, the United States, or their representative does not need a COA when that government actor appeals; subsection (b)(3) is not the source of the no-COA rule for a federal prisoner's § 2241 appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)

The absence of a COA requirement does not perfect an appeal. Rule 3 requires a notice of appeal filed with the district clerk, and Rule 4(a)(1) supplies a thirty-day default and a sixty-day period when a listed United States party, officer, or employee is a party; the actual parties and posture must be checked before calendaring. Fed. R. App. P. 3(a)(1), 4(a)(1)

The remedy must answer unlawful custody

Section 2241(c)(3) extends the writ to custody that violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, and § 2243 directs the court to dispose of the matter as law and justice require. Sections 2241(c)(3) and 2243 authorize custody-focused habeas relief; they do not independently create a substantive entitlement to credits, release, placement, or another benefit. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 2243

For a state prisoner challenging the fact or duration of physical confinement and seeking immediate or speedier release, Preiser v. Rodriguez identifies habeas—not § 1983—as the sole federal remedy. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489–500 (1973)

For state-prisoner § 1983 claims, Wilkinson v. Dotson holds that a procedural challenge lies outside habeas's core when success would not necessarily spell immediate or speedier release, as where success produces only a new discretionary parole review. That § 1983 holding does not itself establish a damages or injunctive cause of action against federal actors. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81–82 (2005)

Section 2255(b) expressly authorizes the sentencing court to vacate and set aside the judgment and then discharge, resentence, grant a new trial, or correct the sentence. Section 2243 instead uses the instruction to dispose of the habeas matter as law and justice require. A successful saving-clause § 2241 petition therefore should not be described automatically as “functioning like” § 2255 with the same remedial menu; the particular relief requires claim-specific and controlling-circuit authority. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2243, 2255(b)

When the Bureau retains statutory discretion but used an unlawful decision process, the habeas remedy may be lawful reconsideration rather than an order awarding the discretionary placement. In Rodriguez v. Copenhaver, the Ninth Circuit directed the Bureau to reconsider a nunc pro tunc designation request without relying on the improper letter; it did not order the designation itself. Rodriguez v. Copenhaver, 823 F.3d 1238, 1243 (9th Cir. 2016)

The available execution-of-sentence remedy consequently depends on the underlying statute, the proven entitlement, and whether the decisionmaker retains discretion. Recalculation, restoration, release, or reconsideration cannot be promised as interchangeable outcomes merely because the pleading invokes § 2241. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2243; Rodriguez, 823 F.3d at 1243

Decision path

flowchart TD
    A["Final order in a habeas proceeding"] --> B{"Detention arises from state-court process?"}
    B -->|"Yes"| C["COA required under § 2253(c)(1)(A)"]
    B -->|"No"| D{"Proceeding under § 2255?"}
    D -->|"Yes"| E["COA required under § 2253(c)(1)(B)"]
    D -->|"No — federal § 2241"| F["No statutory COA requirement"]
    F --> G["File notice of appeal and satisfy Rules 3 and 4"]
    C --> G
    E --> G
    H["Requested § 2241 relief"] --> I{"Substantive law creates a custody entitlement?"}
    I -->|"No or not proved"| J["No habeas award merely from § 2241"]
    I -->|"Yes"| K{"Agency retains discretion?"}
    K -->|"Yes"| L["Correct-law reconsideration may be the remedy"]
    K -->|"No"| M["Tailor custody relief to the proven entitlement"]

Matters not yet verified in this module

• Saving-clause availability after Jones v. Hendrix for any particular claim.
• Circuit-specific cognizability, exhaustion, waiver, standard of review, and remedy rules.
• Immediate-custodian, district-of-confinement, substitution, transfer, and dismissal mechanics.
• Mootness after transfer, release, recalculation, or other changed circumstances.
• A particular notice-of-appeal deadline, postjudgment motion interaction, stay, release pending appeal, or local appellate rule.
• Entitlement to a specific credit calculation, placement, designation, disciplinary restoration, prerelease transfer, supervised-release transfer, vacatur, or release.

Those items remain open in data/coverage_matrix.yaml; this bounded correction does not validate the legacy § 2241 framework as a whole.

Extraordinary Writs — Coram Nobis, Audita Querela, and Mandamus

Extraordinary Writs — Coram Nobis, Audita Querela, and Mandamus

This module classifies three different extraordinary-writ routes. The All Writs Act is auxiliary: it preserves writ authority in aid of an existing jurisdiction, but it does not create a general jurisdictional escape hatch from a governing statute, rule, appeal, or § 2255 limitation.

All Writs Act boundary

The All Writs Act authorizes the Supreme Court and courts established by Act of Congress to issue writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)

The words “in aid of” matter: the Act supplies instruments for a jurisdiction the court otherwise possesses; it is not an independent grant of subject-matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a); Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. U.S. Marshals Service, 474 U.S. 34, 41–43 (1985)

A requested writ must therefore be tied to the issuing court’s existing or potential jurisdiction and to relief the court has legal authority to effect; the All Writs Act is not a general roving commission to supervise another actor. Pennsylvania Bureau, 474 U.S. at 41–43

The All Writs Act cannot be used to evade or displace a specific statute or rule that governs the requested relief. Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 428–29 (1996)

Coram nobis

United States v. Morgan recognizes federal coram nobis authority under § 1651 after the person has fully served the federal sentence, when the consequences of the conviction remain and the demanding writ conditions are met. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 506–13 (1954)

A federal coram nobis request is a step in the original criminal case, not a new civil habeas action, so the court that entered the federal conviction is the relevant filing court. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 505 n.4, 506–07

Section 2255 did not supersede coram nobis, but § 2255 ordinarily supplies the statutory collateral vehicle while the person remains in qualifying custody under the federal judgment. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 510–11; 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a)

Continuation of the litigation through coram nobis is allowed only under circumstances compelling action to achieve justice; ordinary disagreement with a final judgment is insufficient. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 511

The petitioner must show that no other remedy was available for the asserted error. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512

The petitioner also must give sound reasons for failing to seek appropriate earlier relief; what satisfies that requirement depends on the record and controlling circuit law. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512

The alleged error must be of the most fundamental character, not merely an ordinary correctable issue that was or could have been handled through the regular review process. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512–13

Earlier proceedings are presumed correct and the coram nobis petitioner bears the burden of overcoming that presumption. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512

Morgan treated the record-supported denial of counsel in that case as a fundamental defect, but it did not make every constitutional allegation automatically eligible for coram nobis relief. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 509–13

Morgan supplies controlling minimum boundaries, not a universal numbered four-part formulation; current circuit precedent must be checked for the circuit’s elements, treatment of delay, prejudice, waiver, and remedy. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 511–13

Morgan relied on continuing consequences to explain why post-sentence relief could matter, but the required type and proof of collateral consequences must be taken from controlling circuit law rather than assumed nationwide. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512–13

The end of custody does not make coram nobis an automatic fallback: the petitioner must still identify the challenged federal conviction, a live legally cognizable consequence, a fundamental error, lack of another remedy, sound reasons for delay, and all circuit requirements. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 511–13; Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490–94 (1989)

The certificate-of-appealability gate in § 2253(c)(1) covers state-process habeas and § 2255 proceedings, not a federal coram nobis appeal, which Morgan treats as a continuation of the criminal case. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Morgan, 346 U.S. at 505 n.4

Before routing to coram nobis, determine whether qualifying custody under the challenged federal judgment existed at filing; incarceration and supervised release can support § 2255, while collateral consequences of a fully expired sentence alone do not satisfy the habeas custody requirement. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); Maleng, 490 U.S. at 490–94

United States v. Denedo confirms in the military-justice setting that coram nobis is a continuation of the original proceeding and must be in aid of an existing jurisdiction; its military jurisdiction analysis should not be converted into a freestanding district-court merits test. United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 911–17 (2009); 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)

Audita querela

The common-law writ of audita querela historically addressed a judgment correct when rendered that later became infirm because of a defense or discharge arising after judgment. Carrington v. United States, 503 F.3d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 2007)

The Ninth Circuit treats surviving common-law writs as gap fillers under the All Writs Act, not alternatives to an existing statutory post-conviction vehicle. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a); Carrington, 503 F.3d at 890

In the Ninth Circuit, audita querela is unavailable when the claim is cognizable under § 2255; this is a labeled Ninth Circuit rule, not a claim that every circuit uses identical wording. Carrington, 503 F.3d at 890

The statutory restrictions on second-or-successive § 2255 motions do not themselves create the remedial gap needed for audita querela in the Ninth Circuit. Carrington, 503 F.3d at 890

The nonretroactivity of a later legal development likewise did not create an audita-querela gap in Carrington. Carrington, 503 F.3d at 890

No Supreme Court authority reviewed here establishes a nationwide criminal audita-querela elements test; availability, cognizability, any genuine statutory gap, and the requested relief require current controlling circuit authority, while the All Writs Act cannot displace an applicable statute or rule. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a); Carlisle, 517 U.S. at 428–29; Carrington, 503 F.3d at 890

Mandamus

A court-of-appeals petition seeking mandamus or prohibition directed to a district judge invokes the appellate court’s All Writs Act authority and follows Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 21. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a); Fed. R. App. P. 21

Section 1361 separately gives district courts original jurisdiction over an action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or an agency to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff. 28 U.S.C. § 1361

District-court mandamus under § 1361 requires exhaustion of other available avenues and a clear nondiscretionary duty; it does not authorize a court to direct how an officer exercises lawful discretion. 28 U.S.C. § 1361; Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616–17 (1984)

Appellate mandamus requires that the petitioner have no other adequate means to obtain the requested relief. Cheney v. U.S. District Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380–81 (2004)

The petitioner also must show a clear and indisputable right to issuance of the writ. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 381

Even when the first two mandamus conditions are shown, the issuing court must independently be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 381

Mandamus is not a substitute for an available appeal, and that boundary is especially important for interlocutory intervention in criminal cases. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380–81; Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 96–98 (1967)

Rule 21 requires a petition filed with the circuit clerk, service on all parties, a copy provided to the trial-court judge, a statement of the issues and necessary facts, reasons the writ should issue, and essential record parts; the appellate court may deny the petition without an answer or order an answer and set further proceedings. Fed. R. App. P. 21(a)–(b)

Rule 21 creates no automatic evidentiary hearing and states no universal notice-of-appeal-style filing period; docket facts, prejudice from delay, local circuit rules, fees, emergency procedures, and any equitable timeliness doctrine must be checked immediately. Fed. R. App. P. 21; Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380–81

Classification path

flowchart TD
    A["Requested extraordinary relief"] --> B{"Attack on federal conviction after qualifying custody ended?"}
    B -->|"Yes"| C["Apply Morgan coram nobis boundaries and controlling circuit law in convicting court"]
    B -->|"No"| D{"Later defense said to make judgment infirm?"}
    D -->|"Yes"| E["Check whether statute or rule supplies a vehicle; then circuit-specific audita querela law"]
    D -->|"No"| F{"Compel court or federal officer to perform a duty?"}
    F -->|"Appellate supervision"| G["§ 1651 + FRAP 21 + Cheney"]
    F -->|"District action against federal officer"| H["§ 1361 + clear nondiscretionary duty + other avenues exhausted"]
    F -->|"No"| I["No extraordinary-writ route identified by these facts"]

Required record and local-law checks

• The exact judgment, requested relief, custody and supervision history, and present collateral consequence.
• Every earlier appeal and collateral filing, the reason an ordinary vehicle is unavailable, and the explanation for delay.
• Current circuit law on coram nobis elements, consequences, waiver, diligence, harmlessness, and remedy.
• Current circuit law recognizing or rejecting audita querela for the exact claim.
• The duty or district-court act sought, other adequate remedies, docket history, and whether the requested result is discretionary.
• Current appellate and local rules, filing fee or in-forma-pauperis procedure, service, emergency relief, and record requirements.

Executive Clemency — Pardon, Commutation, Reprieve, and Remission

Executive Clemency — Pardon, Commutation, Reprieve, and Remission

Presidential clemency is executive relief, not judicial error correction. This module separates the constitutional power, the Department of Justice’s advisory application process, and the legal effect of a particular presidential grant.

Constitutional authority and scope

Article II authorizes the President to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1

The federal clemency power reaches federal offenses, not state convictions; a person seeking relief from a state conviction must use that jurisdiction’s clemency authority. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; 28 C.F.R. § 1.4

Federal executive clemency includes pardon, commutation of sentence, reprieve, and remission of a fine or forfeiture; the requested form must be identified because each has different functions and effects. 28 C.F.R. §§ 1.1–1.3; DOJ, Frequently Asked Questions

Clemency is an executive process rather than a motion asking a federal court to vacate, correct, or reduce a judgment under judicial remedial authority. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; 28 C.F.R. pt. 1

The Department of Justice clemency regulations are advisory only: they create no enforceable rights in applicants and do not restrict the President’s constitutional authority. 28 C.F.R. § 1.11

The President may grant or deny clemency without a Department of Justice recommendation, and compliance with the Department’s application process is not a constitutional limit on presidential action. DOJ, Frequently Asked Questions; 28 C.F.R. § 1.11

The Office of the Pardon Attorney process covers qualifying federal and specified District of Columbia Code offenses; territorial and state offenses must be directed to the separately responsible official. 28 C.F.R. § 1.4; DOJ, Frequently Asked Questions

Current Department of Justice process

A formal petition is addressed to the President, submitted to the Pardon Attorney on the current form, and should identify the requested relief and supply the required conviction, sentence, and supporting information; military-offense petitions use the regulation’s specified route. 28 C.F.R. § 1.1; DOJ, Apply for Clemency

The pardon regulation states an advisory waiting guideline of at least five years after release from confinement or, if no confinement was imposed, after conviction. 28 C.F.R. § 1.2

The same regulation states that a pardon petition generally should not be submitted while the petitioner is on probation, parole, or supervised release. 28 C.F.R. § 1.2

The five-year rule is a Department guideline, not a jurisdictional bar: the current Pardon Attorney FAQ states that appropriate applications may be accepted before completion of sentence even though the usual pardon form and regulatory guideline focus on post-completion applicants. 28 C.F.R. §§ 1.2, 1.11; DOJ, Frequently Asked Questions

The commutation regulation states that a petition ordinarily should not be filed while other judicial or administrative relief is available absent exceptional circumstances; it does not impose a one-year-served eligibility rule. 28 C.F.R. § 1.3

The ordinary advisory path is application or update, Department review and any investigation, Department recommendation, and presidential decision; it is not a guaranteed fixed sequence of FBI, credit-report, prosecutor, and sentencing-judge steps in every case. DOJ, How the Clemency Process Works; 28 C.F.R. § 1.6

The Attorney General may conduct the investigation considered necessary and appropriate, and the FBI, United States Attorney, or sentencing judge may be consulted in some matters; none is an automatic step in every application. 28 C.F.R. § 1.6; DOJ, How the Clemency Process Works

The ordinary clemency application process is written and provides no applicant hearing. DOJ, Frequently Asked Questions

Victim notification or contact is conditional under the governing regulation, not a universal mandatory step for every application. 28 C.F.R. § 1.6

The Attorney General’s role is advisory; the final constitutional decision belongs to the President, and a grant is communicated and governed through the presidential warrant or other grant instrument. 28 C.F.R. §§ 1.6–1.8, 1.11; DOJ, How the Clemency Process Works

An application can remain pending across an administration and there is no guaranteed decision date; current status and any request for supplemental information should be checked through the Office of the Pardon Attorney. DOJ, Frequently Asked Questions

Department clemency files and deliberations are generally restricted as the regulation provides, while the Department publishes specified identifying information about grants and denials; applicants should not assume either total secrecy or public access to internal recommendations. 28 C.F.R. § 1.5; DOJ, Frequently Asked Questions

A denial ordinarily closes the Department’s pending matter, and the Department generally does not provide an applicant-specific reason unless a public statement supplies one. 28 C.F.R. § 1.8; DOJ, Frequently Asked Questions

A pending clemency request is not a universal bar to a direct appeal or collateral filing, and it does not by itself stay or toll a court deadline; each judicial deadline and the § 1.3 advisory other-remedies guideline must be handled separately. 28 C.F.R. §§ 1.3, 1.11; DOJ, Frequently Asked Questions

Effect of a grant

A pardon is an act of forgiveness, not a judicial declaration of innocence. DOJ, Frequently Asked Questions

A pardon does not expunge or erase the conviction record; the conviction and the pardon may both remain reflected in official records. DOJ, Frequently Asked Questions

A pardon may remove some federal civil disabilities, but the exact consequence depends on the disability’s source, the grant, and any independent federal, state, territorial, tribal, licensing, or private rule. DOJ, Frequently Asked Questions; Constitution Annotated, Legal Effect of a Pardon

Immigration consequences are not categorically eliminated by a pardon; current immigration statutes and case-specific advice are required, while a commutation has no immigration effect under the current Pardon Attorney guidance. DOJ, Frequently Asked Questions

The current Pardon Attorney FAQ states that a full and unconditional presidential pardon restores federal firearm rights lost solely because of the pardoned federal conviction, but state, territorial, and tribal law and any independent disqualification remain separate. DOJ, Frequently Asked Questions

A commutation reduces a sentence being served but does not vacate the conviction, imply innocence, or automatically remove civil disabilities; it may include remission of an unpaid fine or restitution when the grant so provides. DOJ, Frequently Asked Questions

Presidential clemency may be conditioned within constitutional bounds, and the warrant or grant terms control the sentence reduction and any continuing conditions; a commutation to a shorter prison term does not by itself universally eliminate a supervised-release term. Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266–68 (1974); 28 C.F.R. § 1.7

No source reviewed establishes a universal rule that a pardon automatically ends every sex-offender-registration duty or that a commutation automatically ends supervision; analyze the exact warrant and each independent federal, state, territorial, or tribal law rather than relying on a categorical legacy statement. Schick, 419 U.S. at 266–68; DOJ, Frequently Asked Questions

For a federal death sentence, § 1.10 supplies a special advisory process after direct appeal and the first § 2255 proceeding: absent good cause, the petition is due no later than 30 days after notice of the scheduled execution date and supporting papers no later than 15 days after submission. 28 C.F.R. § 1.10

Classification path

flowchart TD
    A["Executive mercy requested"] --> B{"Federal or qualifying D.C. offense?"}
    B -->|"No"| C["Use the responsible state, territorial, tribal, or other authority"]
    B -->|"Yes"| D{"What relief is requested?"}
    D -->|"Forgiveness after conviction"| E["Pardon application; check five-year guideline and current OPA acceptance policy"]
    D -->|"Reduce sentence being served"| F["Commutation application; check other available remedies and current form"]
    D -->|"Delay punishment"| G["Reprieve request"]
    D -->|"Reduce monetary consequence"| H["Remission request"]
    E --> I["DOJ advisory review and recommendation"]
    F --> I
    G --> I
    H --> I
    I --> J["President decides; exact warrant controls any grant"]

Required individualized checks

• The exact sovereign, offense, judgment, sentence, and current custody or supervision status.
• The current Office of the Pardon Attorney form, submission instructions, and published policy on the filing date.
• Every judicial and administrative deadline, which a clemency application does not itself preserve.
• The exact grant instrument and conditions before describing release, supervision, monetary, firearm, immigration, registration, licensing, or civil-rights effects.
• State, territorial, tribal, immigration, firearm, registration, professional-licensing, and benefit law when any nonfederal consequence is at issue.

Sentence Modification

Sentence Modification

Section 3582, First Step Act § 404, Rules 35 and 36, and vehicle-specific appeal classification. This page is a verified navigation layer. The linked canonical modules, atomic claims, authority cards, and structured controls remain the legal source; this index does not create a rule from omission or shorthand.

Canonical modules

Stage use controls

• Start with the actual docket posture and controlling court, not the desired remedy.
• Calculate every deadline from its stated triggering event and current computation rule.
• Separate jurisdiction, venue, prerequisites, merits, burden, proof, remedy, review, and appealability.
• Use the circuit overlay for any circuit-sensitive proposition and stop at records marked not_verified.
• Preserve the operative filings, orders, transcripts, exhibits, agency record, and proof of filing or service.

Handoff to adjacent stages

Use the federal process decision trees to identify prerequisites, alternative vehicles, appellate routes, and postjudgment interactions. Generated diagrams are navigation aids only; linked canonical modules control.

18 U.S.C. § 3582 — Sentence-Modification Remedy Router

18 U.S.C. § 3582 — Sentence-Modification Remedy Router

Verification boundary

This module verifies the nationwide organization of the sentence-modification mechanisms in § 3582(c), Rules 35 and 36, current Guidelines §§ 1B1.10 and 1B1.13, and the controlling Supreme Court boundaries. It does not decide an individual motion, resolve circuit-specific issue-exhaustion or appellate-review questions, calculate a particular amended range, or validate the legacy 669-line procedural framework as a whole.

Start with the source of authority

An imposed term of imprisonment is final and may be modified only through the three doors in § 3582(c): subsection (c)(1)(A), subsection (c)(1)(B), or subsection (c)(2). Each door has different eligibility, procedure, and limits. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b)–(c)

Subsections (a) and (b) govern imposition and finality, subsection (d) imposes specified Bureau of Prisons notice and assistance duties, and subsection (e) concerns certain nonassociation orders. None is an additional sentence-reduction door. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a), (b), (d), (e)

Claims about conviction validity, ordinary sentencing error outside Rule 35(a), Bureau of Prisons computation or execution, and placement are not interchangeable with § 3582(c) motions. A conviction-validity claim belongs in direct review or § 2255 as applicable; an execution claim may require the administrative-remedy and § 2241 framework; and a placement request is not itself a reduction of the imposed prison term.

Fernandez holds that the supposed invalidity of a conviction cannot constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason under § 3582(c)(1)(A); § 2255 is Congress's designated collateral vehicle for a federal prisoner attacking conviction validity. Fernandez v. United States, 608 U.S. ___, slip op. 8–10 (2026)

Rule 35, Rule 36, and § 3582(c)(1)(B)

Rule 35(a) authorizes the sentencing court to correct an arithmetical, technical, or other clear error within 14 days after sentencing; Rule 35(c) defines “sentencing” as the oral announcement of the sentence. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a), (c)

Rule 35(b) requires a government motion based on substantial assistance. A motion within one year is governed by Rule 35(b)(1); a later motion must fit one of Rule 35(b)(2)'s three information-timing categories. The court may consider presentence assistance and may reduce below a statutory minimum. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b)

Rule 36 separately permits correction at any time of a clerical error in a judgment, order, or other part of the record, or an error arising from oversight or omission. It does not authorize a substantive resentencing and is not a § 3582(c) reduction door. Fed. R. Crim. P. 36

Section 3582(c)(1)(B) is a connector: it permits modification only to the extent Rule 35 or another statute expressly permits. The outside rule or statute supplies the movant, deadline, eligibility, scope, and discretionary limits. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B)

The separately verified First Step Act § 404 module is one example of an express statutory modification authority using the (c)(1)(B) connector. Its covered-offense and prior-order rules cannot be borrowed into other § 3582 tracks.

Section 3582(c)(1)(A)

Filing gate and statutory decision sequence

The Bureau of Prisons Director may move under § 3582(c)(1)(A). A defendant may move after fully exhausting administrative appeal of the Bureau's failure to file, or after 30 days from the warden's receipt of the defendant's request, whichever occurs first. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)

The statute does not answer every issue-exhaustion, waiver, or emergency question that can arise in litigation. Those questions require controlling circuit authority and the actual request, receipt date, response, and motion.

For the ordinary compassionate-release path, the court must consider the applicable § 3553(a) factors and find an extraordinary and compelling reason, consistency with the applicable Commission policy statement, and the policy statement's no-danger requirement. The court may reduce the prison term and may substitute probation or supervised release, with conditions, for no longer than the unserved portion. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a) (2025)

The separate age-70 route requires age 70 or older, at least 30 years served on a sentence imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c), and a Bureau of Prisons determination that the defendant is not dangerous. It is not the ordinary age-based circumstance in § 1B1.13(b)(2). 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii)

Current policy statement and controlling limits

The current policy statement lists medical circumstances, age, family circumstances, abuse while in custody, and other circumstances similar in gravity in § 1B1.13(b)(1) through (5). The exact elements of the selected category must be proved; sympathy or seriousness alone is not a category. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)–(5) (2025)

Rehabilitation cannot by itself establish an extraordinary and compelling reason, although it may be considered in combination with other circumstances. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(d) (2025)

The current policy statement requires a finding that the defendant is not a danger to another person or the community under the § 3142(g) factors. This policy-statement finding is separate from extraordinary-and-compelling eligibility. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a)(2) (2025)

Even when the eligibility and policy-statement requirements are satisfied, the court must consider the applicable § 3553(a) factors and retains discretion to deny or limit the reduction. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)

Rutherford holds that when Congress declines to make a sentencing amendment retroactive, the resulting disparity cannot serve as an extraordinary and compelling reason under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Combining that disparity with other nonqualifying considerations does not convert it into a qualifying eligibility reason. Rutherford v. United States, 608 U.S. ___, slip op. 8–17 (2026)

Section 1B1.13(b)(6) remains printed in the 2025 Guidelines Manual, but it cannot be used to create eligibility from the kind of deliberately nonretroactive sentencing change barred by Rutherford. The Supreme Court's statutory holding controls over inconsistent guideline application. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) (2025); Rutherford, slip op. 2, 15–17

Section 1B1.13(c), as presently printed, permits a legal change to inform the extent of a reduction after some independent extraordinary and compelling reason has established eligibility. Rutherford resolved eligibility and did not supply a general license to use nonretroactive changes at that later step; later controlling decisions and the precise requested use must be checked. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(c) (2025); Rutherford, slip op. 17

Section 3582(c)(2)

Section 3582(c)(2) applies to a defendant sentenced based on a sentencing range that the Commission later lowered under 28 U.S.C. § 994(o), when a reduction is consistent with applicable Commission policy. The defendant or Bureau Director may move, and the court may act on its own motion; the compassionate-release warden-request gate does not apply. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)

Eligibility requires an amendment listed in current § 1B1.10(d) and an actual lowering of the defendant's applicable guideline range. An amendment's effective date or favorable treatment at new sentencings does not by itself make it retroactive under § 3582(c)(2). U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a), (d) (2025)

A Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement does not automatically defeat § 3582(c)(2) eligibility. Under Hughes, the sentence is based on the guideline range when that range was part of the framework the court relied on in imposing sentence or accepting the agreement. Hughes v. United States, 584 U.S. 675, 685–91 (2018)

Dillon establishes a two-step inquiry. First, the court determines whether and to what extent § 1B1.10 authorizes a reduction; second, if a reduction is authorized, the court considers applicable § 3553(a) factors and decides whether the authorized reduction is warranted. Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 826–27 (2010)

At step one, the court substitutes only the listed amendment and leaves all other guideline-application decisions unaffected. A § 3582(c)(2) proceeding does not impose a new sentence in the usual sense and is not a plenary resentencing. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1) (2025); Dillon, 560 U.S. at 825–27, 831

The ordinary § 1B1.10 floor is the bottom of the amended guideline range. A qualifying original substantial-assistance reduction permits a comparably lower term, and no reduction may be below time already served. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2) (2025)

At the discretionary step, the court considers applicable § 3553(a) factors; the policy commentary also directs consideration of public safety and permits consideration of post-sentencing conduct. Eligibility therefore does not guarantee any reduction. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(B) (2025); Dillon, 560 U.S. at 827

Section 1B1.10(e) contains amendment-specific delayed-effective-date provisions. The dates presently printed for Amendments 782 and 821 have passed; do not convert those historical dates into a generic waiting period for every listed amendment.

After an order

For a defendant's criminal appeal, Rule 4(b)(1)(A) ordinarily requires a notice of appeal within 14 days after entry of the judgment or order being appealed, and Rule 3(a)(1) requires filing with the district clerk. The actual order, entry date, party, and any deadline-affecting event must be checked. Fed. R. App. P. 3(a)(1), 4(b)(1)(A)

Rule 4(c) governs timely inmate filing, and Rule 4(b)(4) allows the district court, upon good cause or excusable neglect, to extend the criminal appeal period by no more than 30 days from the original deadline. The possible extension is not part of the ordinary filing period. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(4), (c)

Decision path

flowchart TD
    A["Requested change to a federal prison term"] --> B{"Attack conviction or original sentence validity?"}
    B -->|"Yes"| C["Direct review or § 2255; Fernandez bars compassionate-release substitution"]
    B -->|"No"| D{"Clerical record error only?"}
    D -->|"Yes"| E["Rule 36; not substantive modification"]
    D -->|"No"| F{"Rule 35(a) clear error within 14 days of oral sentence?"}
    F -->|"Yes"| G["Rule 35(a) through § 3582(c)(1)(B)"]
    F -->|"No"| H{"Government Rule 35(b) substantial-assistance motion?"}
    H -->|"Yes"| I["Apply Rule 35(b)'s timing and scope"]
    H -->|"No"| J{"Another statute expressly authorizes modification?"}
    J -->|"Yes"| K["Use that statute through § 3582(c)(1)(B)"]
    J -->|"No"| L{"Listed retroactive amendment lowers actual range?"}
    L -->|"Yes"| M["§ 3582(c)(2): Dillon step one, then discretionary step two"]
    L -->|"No"| N{"§ 3582(c)(1)(A) statutory and policy gates met?"}
    N -->|"Yes"| O["Consider no-danger rule and § 3553(a); relief remains discretionary"]
    N -->|"No"| P["No § 3582(c) route established by this sequence"]

Record-first checklist

1. Identify the exact relief requested: vacatur, clerical correction, Rule 35 correction, substantial-assistance reduction, express statutory modification, compassionate release, retroactive-guideline reduction, or execution relief.
2. Obtain the oral-sentencing transcript, judgment, statement of reasons, plea agreement, presentence report where lawfully available, guideline calculation, amendment, prior reduction orders, and current docket.
3. For (c)(1)(A), preserve the request, warden-receipt proof, response, administrative appeals, current evidence, release plan, dangerousness evidence, and § 3553(a) record.
4. For (c)(2), identify the amendment number, verify current § 1B1.10(d) listing, reconstruct the actual original guideline framework, substitute only the amendment, and apply every floor and timing rule.
5. For an appeal, calendar from the actual entry date under current Rule 4 and verify circuit and district requirements rather than relying on a chart.

Matters not yet verified in this module

• Circuit-specific treatment of issue exhaustion, waiver or forfeiture of the (c)(1)(A) filing gate, emergency requests, hearings, appointment, burdens, reasons, reconsideration, and standards of review.
• The application of Rutherford and § 1B1.13(c) to a particular asserted legal change after an independently valid eligibility reason.
• Individual § 1B1.13 category facts, dangerousness, § 3553(a), amendment eligibility, guideline calculations, mandatory-minimum interactions, substantial-assistance comparisons, and relief amount.
• Whether a particular order is appealable, who may appeal, the correct deadline, or whether an inmate filing, extension, or local rule applies.
• The detailed BOP request-content regulation, BOP program statement, local forms, sealing rules, and evidence sufficiency.

Those questions remain open in data/coverage_matrix.yaml. The legacy prose file remains a research inventory rather than a validated authority.

First Step Act § 404 — Retroactive Fair Sentencing Act Relief

First Step Act § 404 — Retroactive Fair Sentencing Act Relief

Verification boundary

This module verifies the nationwide statutory framework and the Supreme Court holdings in Dorsey, Terry, and Concepcion. It does not decide a particular conviction's statute and penalty provision, a multi-count sentencing-package issue, a disputed drug-quantity record, a prior-order bar, the governing circuit's hearing or appellate rules, or the sentence a court should select.

What Congress changed

Section 404(a) defines a covered offense as a violation of a federal criminal statute whose statutory penalties were modified by Fair Sentencing Act § 2 or § 3 and that was committed before August 3, 2010. First Step Act § 404(a)

Fair Sentencing Act § 2 raised the crack quantities in 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1) and 960(b) from 5 to 28 grams for the lower mandatory-minimum tier and from 50 to 280 grams for the higher tier; § 3 removed the crack-specific mandatory-minimum sentence from 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). Fair Sentencing Act §§ 2–3

For a covered offense, the sentencing court may act on a motion by the defendant, the Bureau of Prisons Director, the attorney for the Government, or the court and may impose a reduced sentence as if Fair Sentencing Act §§ 2 and 3 had been in effect when the offense was committed. First Step Act § 404(b)

Section 404(c) bars the court from entertaining the motion if the sentence was previously imposed or reduced in accordance with the Fair Sentencing Act amendments, or if a previous § 404 motion was denied after December 21, 2018 following a complete review on the merits. First Step Act § 404(c)

Eligibility does not require a reduction: § 404(c) expressly preserves the court's discretion to deny or limit relief. First Step Act § 404(c); Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481, 501–02 (2022)

Dorsey and the temporal boundary

Dorsey held that the Fair Sentencing Act's lower mandatory minimums apply to a pre-August 3, 2010 offender sentenced on or after that date. Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 264, 281 (2012)

Section 404 is not textually limited to defendants whose sentences were already final before August 3, 2010. Its definition turns on the offense date, the statute and statutory penalties, and the § 404(c) bars; Dorsey answers the separate pipeline question for pre-Act conduct followed by post-Act sentencing. First Step Act § 404(a), (c); Dorsey, 567 U.S. at 264

Terry and covered-offense classification

Terry held that the Fair Sentencing Act did not modify the statutory penalties for the petitioner's 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) offense, whose statutory range remained unchanged, so that offense was not covered by § 404. Terry v. United States, 593 U.S. 486, 492–94 (2021)

Covered-offense classification asks whether Fair Sentencing Act § 2 or § 3 modified the statutory penalties for the offense of conviction; a Guidelines change, sentencing conduct, or a crack-cocaine label alone does not satisfy § 404(a). First Step Act § 404(a); Terry, 593 U.S. at 492–94

The statutory amendments also reached 21 U.S.C. § 960(b). A nationwide eligibility screen must therefore identify the actual conviction provision rather than hard-code only §§ 841 and 844.

Procedural vehicle and Concepcion

Section 3582(c)(1)(B) is the gateway allowing a term of imprisonment to be modified when another statute expressly permits it; it adds no substantive or procedural limits of its own to a § 404 motion. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B); Concepcion, 597 U.S. at 497 n.5

When deciding whether and how much to reduce a sentence under § 404, a district court may consider intervening changes of law or fact, including post-sentencing conduct and nonretroactive legal changes. Concepcion, 597 U.S. at 486, 493–500

The court must consider the parties' nonfrivolous arguments, but it may reject unpersuasive arguments without a detailed explanation and need provide only a brief statement of reasons. Concepcion, 597 U.S. at 500–02

Concepcion does not require the court to reduce a sentence because of an intervening change or any other argument; it requires consideration, not persuasion or a particular result. Concepcion, 597 U.S. at 501–02

The benchmark Guidelines range may be recalculated only to reflect retroactive application of Fair Sentencing Act §§ 2 and 3. The court may then consider post-sentencing conduct or nonretroactive legal changes when selecting or rejecting a reduction, using the correctly calculated range as the benchmark. Concepcion, 597 U.S. at 498 & n.6

A § 404 matter remains a sentence-modification proceeding, not a categorical plenary resentencing. Its information-consideration rule is broad, but the statutory authorization, the § 404(c) bars, and the benchmark-range limitation still control. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B); Concepcion, 597 U.S. at 496–98 & nn.4–6

Other reductions, filing gates, and relief ceiling

A prior § 3582(c)(2) Guidelines reduction is not automatically a § 404(c) bar. The prior order and sentence must be examined to determine whether the sentence was imposed or reduced in accordance with Fair Sentencing Act §§ 2 and 3 or whether a prior § 404 merits denial supplies the actual bar. First Step Act § 404(c)

Section 404 itself states no filing deadline and no prior-request or administrative-exhaustion requirement; it authorizes the listed movants to proceed in the court that imposed the sentence. First Step Act § 404(b)–(c)

Section 404 does not erase an amended statutory minimum or make an unrelated legal rule retroactive. Any requested sentence must be authorized under the Fair Sentencing Act's amended statutory framework or under a separately established legal basis. First Step Act § 404(b); Concepcion, 597 U.S. at 498 n.6

Record-first checklist

1. Obtain the indictment, plea or verdict, judgment, presentence report where lawfully available, sentencing findings, and every prior reduction order.
2. Identify the offense date, statute of conviction, penalty subsection, and whether Fair Sentencing Act § 2 or § 3 modified that offense's statutory penalties.
3. Apply both § 404(c) bars to the actual prior orders; do not treat every earlier reduction as disqualifying.
4. Calculate the Fair Sentencing Act benchmark without folding unrelated, nonretroactive changes into the range.
5. Separately organize intervening-law and intervening-fact arguments for discretionary consideration.
6. Research the controlling circuit and district rules for appointment, briefing, presence, hearing, appeal timing, standard of review, multi-count packages, supervised release, and the required explanation.

Decision path

flowchart TD
    A["Potential § 404 motion"] --> B{"Offense committed before Aug. 3, 2010?"}
    B -->|"No"| C["Not a covered offense under § 404(a)"]
    B -->|"Yes"| D{"Did FSA § 2 or § 3 modify this offense's statutory penalties?"}
    D -->|"No"| E["Not covered; Terry controls § 841(b)(1)(C)"]
    D -->|"Yes"| F{"Previously imposed or reduced in accordance with FSA §§ 2–3?"}
    F -->|"Yes"| G["§ 404(c) bar"]
    F -->|"No"| H{"Prior § 404 denial after complete merits review?"}
    H -->|"Yes"| G
    H -->|"No"| I["Calculate FSA-only benchmark range"]
    I --> J["Consider raised nonfrivolous intervening law and facts"]
    J --> K{"Exercise discretion to reduce?"}
    K -->|"No"| L["Brief reasons; no reduction required"]
    K -->|"Yes"| M["Impose legally authorized reduced sentence"]

Matters not yet verified in this module

• Circuit-specific burdens, multi-count and sentencing-package doctrines, hearing or presence rights, and standards of appellate review.
• The correct appellate deadline and any local motion or standing-order process in a particular case.
• Whether § 3553(a) is a mandatory decisional checklist in every circuit, as distinct from permissible consideration of the same subjects.
• Eligibility or the available reduction for any individual judgment, including § 960, conspiracy, attempt, supervised-release, and mixed-count cases.
• Whether a particular earlier order was “in accordance with” the Fair Sentencing Act or was a complete merits review under § 404(c).
• Any transfer of Concepcion's holding to compassionate-release motions; Concepcion decided a § 404 motion.

These questions remain open in data/coverage_matrix.yaml; the legacy framework is not validated as a whole.

Rules 35 and 36 — Sentence Correction, Assistance, Record Error, and Appeals

Rules 35 and 36 — Sentence Correction, Assistance, Record Error, and Appeals

Rules 35(a), 35(b), and 36 solve different problems. Rule 35(a) provides a fourteen-day clear-error correction power; Rule 35(b) permits a government-initiated substantial-assistance reduction; Rule 36 makes the record accurately reflect the decision already made. None is a general resentencing motion.

Finality and classification

A federal judgment of conviction that includes imprisonment is final even though the sentence can later be corrected under Rule 35, appealed and modified under § 3742, or modified under an express § 3582(c) route. Rule 36 separately permits record correction without supplying a substantive sentence-modification power. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b); Fed. R. Crim. P. 36

Section 3582(c)(1)(B) permits modification only to the extent expressly allowed by statute or Rule 35; the cross-reference does not enlarge Rule 35’s own trigger, timing, movant, or scope. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B); Fed. R. Crim. P. 35

Classify the requested act before filing: correction of a qualifying clear sentencing error under Rule 35(a), reduction for qualifying assistance on the government’s motion under Rule 35(b), or correction of a clerical record error under Rule 36. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35–36

Rule 35(a): clear sentencing error

Within fourteen days after sentencing, the court may correct a sentence that resulted from arithmetical, technical, or other clear error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a)

For Rule 35, “sentencing” means the oral announcement of the sentence, not entry of the written judgment. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(c)

Rule 35(a)’s “other clear error” category is deliberately narrow: the official committee note rejects using it to reconsider the Guidelines application, reopen disputed issues, or change the court’s mind about sentence appropriateness. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 advisory committee note to 1991 amendment

An arithmetic or technical mistake is not automatically correctable merely because it can be labeled that way; the sentence must have resulted from an arithmetical, technical, or other clear error within the rule’s narrow meaning. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a) and advisory committee note to 1991 amendment

Because Rule 35(a) authorizes “the court” to correct the sentence and does not require a party’s motion, the court may act on its own within the rule’s authority and time. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a)

Criminal Rule 45 forbids extending the time to act under Rule 35 except as Rule 35 itself permits; do not import an ordinary Rule 45 excusable-neglect extension into Rule 35(a). Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(b)(2); Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a)

A notice of appeal does not divest the district court of authority to correct under Rule 35(a), and a Rule 35(a) motion does not invalidate a notice filed before disposition; the Rule 35(a) clock and appeal clock therefore require separate calculation. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(5); Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a)

The national rules supply no equitable-tolling or party-motion exception to the fourteen-day act-by-court period; whether controlling circuit precedent calls that limit jurisdictional, claim-processing, or another type of authority limit must be verified rather than generalized. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a), 45(b)(2)

Rule 35(a) authorizes correction of the qualifying error, not a plenary resentencing or reconsideration of every original sentencing issue. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a) advisory committee note to 1991 amendment

Rule 35(b): substantial assistance

Only the government may make a Rule 35(b) substantial-assistance motion; a defendant’s own filing cannot substitute for the required government motion. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b)(1)–(2)

On a government motion made within one year after sentencing, the court may reduce the sentence if the defendant, after sentencing, provided substantial assistance in investigating or prosecuting another person. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b)(1)

A government motion made more than one year after sentencing may proceed under Rule 35(b)(2)(A) when the substantial assistance involved information the defendant did not know until one year or more after sentencing. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b)(2)(A)

Rule 35(b)(2)(B) covers information the defendant gave the government within the first year that did not become useful to the government until more than one year after sentencing. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b)(2)(B)

Rule 35(b)(2)(C) covers information whose usefulness could not reasonably have been anticipated by the defendant until more than one year after sentencing and that the defendant promptly gave the government after its usefulness became reasonably apparent. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b)(2)(C)

Rule 35(b)(3)—not subsection (b)(4)—authorizes a reduction below a statutory minimum. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b)(3)

Rule 35(b)(4)—not subsection (b)(3)—allows the court, when evaluating substantial assistance, to consider the defendant’s presentence assistance. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b)(4)

Even after a qualifying government motion, Rule 35(b) says the court “may” reduce the sentence; the existence and amount of a reduction remain judicial decisions within the rule and controlling law. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b)(1)–(2)

Wade v. United States held in the § 3553(e) and Guideline § 5K1.1 context that a government refusal to file a substantial-assistance motion can be reviewed for an unconstitutional motive and that relief may also be appropriate when refusal is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental end. Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185–86 (1992)

Wade also holds that a claim of substantial assistance, standing alone, does not entitle the defendant to relief, discovery, or an evidentiary hearing; a substantial threshold showing of improper motive is required. Wade, 504 U.S. at 186

Because Wade itself did not decide a Rule 35(b) dispute, application of its refusal-to-move framework to a post-sentencing Rule 35(b) request must be supported by current controlling circuit precedent. Wade, 504 U.S. at 183–87; Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b)

An alleged government promise to make or consider a Rule 35(b) motion presents a distinct plea- or cooperation-agreement construction, breach, preservation, prejudice, and remedy question; it is not resolved merely by labeling the cooperation substantial. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262–63 (1971); Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135–43 (2009); Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b)

Rule 35(b) fixes when the government must make its motion but states no national period within which the court must decide a properly filed motion; docket delay, prejudice, and any extraordinary remedy require separate current authority. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b)

Rule 36: clerical record correction

After giving any notice it considers appropriate, the court may at any time correct a clerical error in a judgment, order, or other part of the record, or an error in the record arising from oversight or omission. Fed. R. Crim. P. 36

Rule 36 corrects the record; it does not authorize a new substantive sentencing decision or a second decision on an issue the court actually resolved. Fed. R. Crim. P. 36

The controlling question is whether the proposed correction makes the judgment, order, or record accurately express the decision already made; a clerical correction can have practical legal consequences without becoming a license to change that underlying decision. Fed. R. Crim. P. 36

Recalculating a deliberately imposed Guidelines range, resolving a disputed statutory interpretation, or changing an intended sentence is substantive and therefore outside Rule 36. Fed. R. Crim. P. 36

Rule 36 does not restrict who may alert the court and permits the court to correct on its own, but the correction still must remain clerical and any notice the court considers appropriate must be given. Fed. R. Crim. P. 36

A Rule 36 request belongs on the existing criminal docket containing the judgment, order, or record at issue; it is not an independent civil collateral action. Fed. R. Crim. P. 36

Although Rule 36 says “at any time,” a pending appeal can affect district-court authority; Rule 37 supplies deny, defer, and indicative-ruling options for a timely motion the court lacks authority to grant because an appeal is pending, subject to controlling circuit law. Fed. R. Crim. P. 36–37

Rule 36 itself requires only such notice as the court considers appropriate and does not create an automatic hearing, response, national form, or universal burden formulation; a material dispute about the record requires current circuit and local procedure. Fed. R. Crim. P. 36

Crack-cocaine reduction routes

A request described generally as “crack-cocaine resentencing” must be classified: First Step Act § 404 addresses covered statutory Fair Sentencing Act changes, while § 3582(c)(2) and Guideline § 1B1.10 address a listed retroactive Guidelines amendment that actually lowers the applicable range. First Step Act § 404; 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10

Section 404 eligibility turns on a pre-August 3, 2010 violation whose statutory penalties were modified by Fair Sentencing Act § 2 or § 3, subject to § 404(c); Terry does not treat every crack-related conviction as covered. First Step Act § 404; Fair Sentencing Act §§ 2–3; Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 264, 273–82 (2012); Terry v. United States, 593 U.S. 486, 489–94 (2021)

Section 3582(c)(2) requires a Commission-lowered range, a retroactively listed amendment, and an actual lower amended range under § 1B1.10; Dillon’s two steps and Hughes’s framework-based Rule 11(c)(1)(C) analysis then apply. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10; Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 825–30 (2010); Hughes v. United States, 584 U.S. 675, 685–91 (2018)

Section 404 and § 3582(c)(2) are not interchangeable: Concepcion governs the information a court may consider within § 404’s statutory framework, while Dillon and § 1B1.10 constrain the distinct retroactive-amendment proceeding. Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481, 495–502 (2022); Dillon, 560 U.S. at 825–30

Appeal rights and review

In a criminal case, the defendant’s notice ordinarily is due within fourteen days after entry of the judgment or order appealed, the government’s within thirty days, a confined filer may use Rule 4(c), and the district court may grant no more than thirty additional days for good cause or excusable neglect under Rule 4(b)(4). Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)–(c)

The finality and tolling effect of a post-order reconsideration request is not supplied by a generic civil-motion rule; calendar the underlying criminal appeal deadline and verify current controlling circuit law before assuming reconsideration preserves the appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)

Sections 1291 and 3742 provide different appellate-jurisdiction texts; whether a particular Rule 35, Rule 36, compassionate-release, retroactive-amendment, or § 404 order proceeds under one or both requires the exact order, appellant, issue, and controlling circuit law. 28 U.S.C. § 1291; 18 U.S.C. § 3742

An appeal from an ordinary Rule 35, Rule 36, § 3582, or § 404 order is not a state-process habeas or § 2255 appeal and therefore does not use § 2253(c)’s certificate-of-appealability gate. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)

In a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding, the order and broader record must reveal enough to show a reasoned basis and consideration of the parties’ arguments, but the necessary explanation is contextual and there is no presumption of a proportional reduction. Chavez-Meza v. United States, 585 U.S. 109, 115–20 (2018); Dillon, 560 U.S. at 825–30

In a § 404 proceeding, the court must consider nonfrivolous arguments and give a brief statement of reasons, but it need not accept the arguments or reduce the sentence; the benchmark range is recalculated only for Fair Sentencing Act changes. Concepcion, 597 U.S. at 495–502 & n.6

There is no single undifferentiated sentence-modification standard of review: classify appellate jurisdiction, legal eligibility and statutory interpretation, factual findings, discretionary relief, explanation, preservation, and harmlessness separately under current controlling circuit law. 28 U.S.C. § 1291; 18 U.S.C. § 3742; Chavez-Meza, 585 U.S. at 115–20; Concepcion, 597 U.S. at 501–02

Decision path

flowchart TD
    A["Post-sentencing correction or reduction requested"] --> B{"What is the asserted basis?"}
    B -->|"Clear sentencing error"| C{"Court can act within 14 days after oral sentence?"}
    C -->|"Yes"| D["Apply narrow Rule 35(a) correction authority"]
    C -->|"No"| E["Rule 35(a) unavailable; do not relabel as clerical"]
    B -->|"Substantial assistance"| F{"Government motion satisfying Rule 35(b)(1) or (2)?"}
    F -->|"Yes"| G["Court decides whether and how much to reduce"]
    F -->|"No"| H["Check agreement and circuit-specific Wade route; defendant cannot self-initiate"]
    B -->|"Record does not reflect decision actually made"| I{"Genuinely clerical or oversight error?"}
    I -->|"Yes"| J["Rule 36 correction with appropriate notice"]
    I -->|"No"| E
    B -->|"Crack-cocaine reduction"| K{"§ 404 statutory change or § 3582(c)(2) listed amendment?"}
    K --> L["Apply only the selected vehicle’s eligibility, scope, and remedy rules"]
    D --> M["Calendar appeal independently"]
    G --> M
    J --> M
    L --> M

Required record and circuit checks

• Oral sentencing transcript, written judgment, statement of reasons, Guidelines calculations, and docket-entry dates.
• Exact claimed error and whether correction changes the decision or merely the record of that decision.
• Government motion, cooperation agreement, assistance timeline, information dates, and any refusal-to-move evidence.
• Current circuit law applying Wade to Rule 35(b), enforcing cooperation promises, and defining reviewable Rule 35(b) issues.
• Pending appeal, mandate, Rule 37 procedure, notice, hearing, and local filing requirements.
• Exact sentence-modification vehicle, eligibility, amendment, statutory penalty, prior reduction, and order.
• Appellate jurisdiction, notice deadline, preservation, issue-specific standard of review, and remedy under current circuit law.

Sentence Execution and BOP

Sentence Execution and BOP

Designation, computation, credits, discipline, programs, prerelease custody, administrative remedies, and judicial review. This page is a verified navigation layer. The linked canonical modules, atomic claims, authority cards, and structured controls remain the legal source; this index does not create a rule from omission or shorthand.

Canonical modules

Stage use controls

• Start with the actual docket posture and controlling court, not the desired remedy.
• Calculate every deadline from its stated triggering event and current computation rule.
• Separate jurisdiction, venue, prerequisites, merits, burden, proof, remedy, review, and appealability.
• Use the circuit overlay for any circuit-sensitive proposition and stop at records marked not_verified.
• Preserve the operative filings, orders, transcripts, exhibits, agency record, and proof of filing or service.

Handoff to adjacent stages

Use the federal process decision trees to identify prerequisites, alternative vehicles, appellate routes, and postjudgment interactions. Generated diagrams are navigation aids only; linked canonical modules control.

BOP Designation, Sentence Commencement, Aggregation, and Prior-Custody Credit

BOP Designation, Sentence Commencement, Aggregation, and Prior-Custody Credit

The sentencing court imposes the term; the Bureau of Prisons administers its place, commencement, aggregation, and statutory credit. Keep a judgment error, a sentence-execution computation, a designation request, and a discretionary placement disagreement in separate procedural lanes.

Custody and designation

A person sentenced to imprisonment under Chapter 227, Subchapter D is committed to Bureau of Prisons custody until the term expires or the person is earlier released under § 3624. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a)

The Bureau designates the place of imprisonment and may select an available qualifying federal or nonfederal penal or correctional facility inside or outside the district of conviction. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)

Designation requires consideration of facility resources, the offense, the prisoner's history and characteristics, relevant sentencing-court statements, and pertinent Sentencing Commission policy statements. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)(1)–(5)

Subject to bed availability, security designation, programmatic, mental-health, medical, faith-based, court-recommendation, and other security considerations, the Bureau must place the prisoner as close as practicable to the primary residence and, to the extent practicable, within 500 driving miles. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)

The proximity text also requires the Bureau, subject to the listed factors and the prisoner's stay-or-transfer preference, to transfer prisoners closer to the primary residence even when already within 500 miles; it does not create an unqualified right to a requested institution. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)

A sentencing-court order, recommendation, or request about a community correctional facility has no binding effect on the Bureau's § 3621(b) authority. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)

Section 3621(b) states that a designation made under that subsection is not reviewable by any court; whether a claim instead challenges a statutory computation, constitutional violation, or action outside the delegated authority must be classified separately. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)

BOP Program Statement 5100.08 Change Notice 3, dated May 6, 2026, is the current public agency policy for security designation, custody classification, and designation or redesignation under § 3621(b); statute and valid regulations control over operational policy. BOP PS 5100.08 CN-3

Program Statement 5160.06 provides for designating a state institution for concurrent service of a federal sentence when the federal sentencing court has ordered, recommended, or expressed that intent, or when the Bureau finds designation appropriate after reviewing the five factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). The Bureau must consider an inmate's nunc pro tunc request but is not obliged to grant it, and it will not designate concurrently where the sentencing court has already determined the order of service. BOP PS 5160.06 §§ 1(a), 5(d)(1), 5(d)(8)

Setser holds that a federal sentencing court may order its sentence concurrent with or consecutive to an anticipated state sentence; when later events make the judgment difficult to implement, the Bureau initially administers it and the prisoner may seek administrative and habeas review. Setser v. United States, 566 U.S. 231, 236–44 (2012)

Multiple terms and aggregation

Multiple imprisonment terms imposed at the same time run concurrently unless the court orders or a statute mandates consecutive service; terms imposed at different times run consecutively unless the court orders concurrency. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a)

The sentencing court considers the § 3553(a) factors when choosing concurrent or consecutive terms under § 3584. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b)

For administrative purposes, multiple concurrent or consecutive terms are treated as a single aggregate term; aggregation does not erase count-specific statutory commands or rewrite the judgments. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(c)

The judgment, later state disposition, statutory consecutive command, and actual custody chronology must be reconciled; “concurrent” is not itself a grant of prohibited double credit for a period before the federal term commences. Setser, 566 U.S. at 239–44; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3584–3585

Commencement and prior-custody credit

Section 3585(a) commences a federal imprisonment term on the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting transport to, or voluntarily arrives at, the official detention facility where the sentence is to be served. 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a)

The Attorney General through the Bureau, not the sentencing court at the sentencing hearing, initially computes § 3585(b) prior-custody credit after the defendant begins serving the federal sentence. United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333–35 (1992)

Prior-custody credit covers qualifying official detention before commencement resulting from the federal offense or another charge for which the defendant was arrested after commission of that offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)(1)–(2)

Section 3585(b) forbids crediting a detention period that has been credited against another sentence; a general fairness or concurrency label cannot override that enacted anti-double-credit limit. 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b); Wilson, 503 U.S. at 337

Reno v. Koray holds that restrictive confinement in a community treatment center while “released” on bail was not “official detention” under § 3585(b). Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 56–65 (1995)

The Bail Reform Act's release-versus-detention classification, not merely how restrictive a location feels, controlled Koray; electronic monitoring, curfew, treatment, or residence conditions require the actual custody order and governing law. Koray, 515 U.S. at 57–65

The Bureau's public sentence-computation page identifies the Designation and Sentence Computation Center and current public computation manuals, including Program Statement 5880.28 for CCCA sentences; these operational materials do not displace §§ 3584–3585 or controlling decisions. BOP Sentence Computations; PS 5880.28

For an offense within the current-law branch, Bureau policy does not backdate commencement to a day before the federal sentence existed; a requested earlier effective result must be analyzed through the judgment, § 3584, designation authority, and any other lawful sentencing mechanism rather than invented § 3585 credit. 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a); PS 5880.28

Under Program Statement 5160.06, the Bureau treats a request for federal credit for time spent in state custody and already credited to a state sentence as a request for a nunc pro tunc designation: a placement decision that sets when the federal sentence commences under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a). It is not credit for prior custody, which § 3585(b) allows only for time not credited against another sentence. BOP PS 5160.06 §§ 5(d), 5(d)(5), 8(b); 18 U.S.C. § 3585

“Primary jurisdiction” and the effect of a writ borrowing a prisoner are custody-administration doctrines not stated in § 3585's text; the arrest, sovereign custody, writ, release, judgment, designation, and credit records plus controlling circuit law must be verified before applying those labels. 18 U.S.C. § 3585; Setser, 566 U.S. at 239–44

Prior-custody credit, good-conduct time, First Step Act time credits, RDAP reduction, and prerelease placement are distinct authorities; a computation audit must not merge their days or eligibility rules. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3585, 3624, 3632

Challenge route and remedy

The Bureau's computation should first be presented through the applicable correction and Administrative Remedy Program processes; Wilson identifies judicial review after administrative exhaustion rather than a sentencing-court credit award. Wilson, 503 U.S. at 335–36; 28 C.F.R. pt. 542, subpt. B

A challenge to present physical custody implementing a federal sentence ordinarily proceeds, if cognizable, under § 2241 against the immediate custodian in the district with jurisdiction over that custodian, not as a new § 3585 motion in the criminal case. 28 U.S.C. § 2241; Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434–47 (2004)

Part 542 supplies the agency filing rules, while the effect of nonexhaustion in § 2241 litigation is governed by controlling circuit law; the regulation itself does not create a universal federal habeas jurisdictional bar. 28 C.F.R. pt. 542, subpt. B; 28 U.S.C. § 2241

A court can adjudicate a properly presented statutory computation claim without choosing the prisoner's preferred institution; requested relief must distinguish recalculation from a discretionary designation or transfer. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3585, 3621(b)

A transfer after a properly filed habeas case does not automatically erase jurisdiction, but the remaining custodian, substitution, redressability, and circuit procedure must be verified from the actual transfer and docket. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 304–07 (1944); Padilla, 542 U.S. at 440–41

Release does not mechanically decide mootness: the court must identify the challenged custody calculation, continuing injury, requested relief, and supported exception; collateral consequences are not presumed for every sentence-execution dispute. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7–18 (1998)

An individual audit requires the judgment, every relevant state or federal sentence, official detention and release dates, jail-credit records, writs, detainers, designation history, sentence-computation sheet, and full administrative record. 18 U.S.C. § 3585; BOP Sentence Computations

The calculation must reproduce each step—term commencement, concurrent or consecutive relationship, administrative aggregation, prior-custody credit, and later distinct credits—rather than reason backward from a projected release date. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3584–3585

No nationwide result follows merely from a sentencing recommendation, institutional preference, silence about another sovereign's sentence, or disagreement with a projected date; the claim, authority, record, exhaustion, proper respondent, and available remedy must all align. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3585, 3621; 28 U.S.C. § 2241

Decision path

flowchart TD
    A["BOP custody or sentence-administration dispute"] --> B{"Requested result?"}
    B -->|"Different institution or transfer"| C["Apply § 3621(b) factors and current designation policy"]
    B -->|"Earlier commencement or custody credit"| D["Reconstruct §§ 3584–3585 computation"]
    B -->|"Concurrent state service"| E["Read judgment, Setser, custody chronology, and designation record"]
    D --> F{"Same days credited elsewhere?"}
    F -->|"Yes"| G["§ 3585(b) bars double credit; classify any distinct designation request"]
    F -->|"No"| H["Verify official detention and statutory nexus"]
    C --> I["Use Part 542; distinguish discretionary placement from legal error"]
    E --> I
    G --> I
    H --> I
    I --> J["If still live and cognizable, analyze § 2241 custodian, district, exhaustion, and relief"]

Required records and limits

• Every judgment and later modification from each sovereign.
• Chronology of arrest, temporary writ custody, sentence imposition, release, parole, and facility receipt.
• Official jail-credit certifications and proof of credit against other terms.
• BOP computation, aggregation, designation, classification, and administrative-remedy records.
• Current circuit law for primary custody, retroactive designation review, exhaustion, transfer, remedy, and standard of review.

Detainers, Prison Discipline, Good-Time Consequences, and RDAP

Detainers, Prison Discipline, Good-Time Consequences, and RDAP

A detainer, a final removal order, a disciplinary charge, a loss of sentence credit, and RDAP early-release eligibility are different legal events. Identify the document, issuing sovereign, governing authority, and requested remedy before selecting a procedure.

Detainer classification

An immigration detainer under 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 is a Department of Homeland Security request that another law-enforcement agency notify DHS before release and maintain custody temporarily so DHS can assume custody; it is not itself a criminal judgment or final removal order. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a)–(d)

Section 287.7(d) authorizes detention under an immigration detainer for no more than 48 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, after the person otherwise would have been released; custody beyond that regulatory period requires an independent lawful basis. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d)

The detainer regulation does not direct the receiving agency to disregard its own discretion concerning confinement before the person's ordinary release date. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a)

The First Step Act bars application of earned time credits to a prisoner who is the subject of a final order of removal under immigration law; a database flag or detainer must not be substituted for the final-order finding required by the statute and regulation. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(E); 28 C.F.R. § 523.44(a)(2)

Whether immigration status affects designation, community placement, RDAP transition, or time-credit application must be tied to the exact statute, regulation, program criterion, and immigration record; there is no single consequence shared by every immigration detainer. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4); 8 C.F.R. § 287.7

Interstate Agreement on Detainers

The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act governs qualifying detainers based on an untried indictment, information, or complaint lodged against a person already serving a term of imprisonment in a party jurisdiction; its text and the jurisdictions' party status must be checked. IADA arts. I, III–IV, Pub. L. No. 91-538, 84 Stat. 1397

Article III permits the prisoner to request final disposition and provides a 180-day period only after the required written notice and request are delivered through the prescribed process, subject to a necessary-or-reasonable continuance for good cause in open court. IADA art. III(a)–(b)

Fex v. Michigan holds that Article III's 180-day clock begins when the prisoner's request actually is delivered to both the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court, not when the prisoner gives it to custodial officials. 507 U.S. 43, 47–52 (1993)

Article IV authorizes the receiving prosecutor to obtain temporary custody after a detainer and written request, includes a 120-day trial period after arrival subject to qualifying continuances, and contains an anti-shuttling rule. IADA art. IV(a), (c)–(e)

United States v. Mauro holds that a federal writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is not itself a detainer, but after the United States files a detainer its use of the writ can constitute the Article IV written request for temporary custody. 436 U.S. 340, 349–61 (1978)

Carchman v. Nash holds that Article III does not cover a detainer based on a probation-violation charge because it is not an untried indictment, information, or complaint within the Agreement. 473 U.S. 716, 725–34 (1985)

Alabama v. Bozeman enforces Article IV(e)'s anti-shuttling command according to its text: returning the prisoner to the original place of imprisonment before trial required dismissal of the covered charges even when the return lasted only one day. 533 U.S. 146, 153–56 (2001)

Moody v. Daggett holds, in the federal-parole setting, that a parolee imprisoned for a later offense was not constitutionally entitled to an immediate revocation hearing on an unexecuted parole-violator warrant lodged as a detainer; that narrow holding does not decide every detainer regime. 429 U.S. 78, 86–89 (1976)

For any detainer, obtain the detainer, warrant or charging instrument, lodging date, issuing jurisdiction, custody status, sentence and release dates, notices, delivery proof, transfers, disposition, and removal-order record; labels in a prison database cannot establish those facts. IADA arts. III–IV; 8 C.F.R. § 287.7

Incident reports and discipline

When staff reasonably believe a prohibited act was committed, 28 C.F.R. § 541.5 ordinarily calls for an incident report within 24 hours after staff become aware of the involvement and an investigation ordinarily within 24 hours after the report, but the regulation's “ordinarily” language is not an automatic dismissal rule. 28 C.F.R. § 541.5

During investigation the prisoner must be advised of the right to remain silent and informed that silence may support an adverse inference but cannot alone support a finding; staff must investigate the explanation and relevant evidence. 28 C.F.R. § 541.5(b)

The Unit Discipline Committee ordinarily reviews an incident report within five workdays after issuance, excluding the issue day, weekends, and federal holidays, and may dispose of lower-level matters or refer greater- or high-severity matters to a Discipline Hearing Officer. 28 C.F.R. § 541.7(c), (f)

Before a Discipline Hearing Officer hearing, the prisoner ordinarily must receive written notice of the charges at least 24 hours in advance and written notice of rights, unless the prisoner waives the timing in writing. 28 C.F.R. §§ 541.7(g), 541.8(c)

The prisoner may request a staff representative and witnesses, but the DHO may limit witnesses or evidence for institutional safety, relevance, redundancy, unavailability, or similar stated reasons and must document the reason when a requested witness does not appear. 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(d)–(f)

The DHO must be an impartial decisionmaker who was not a victim, witness, investigator, or otherwise significantly involved in the charged incident. 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(b)

The DHO's decision must rest on at least some facts and, when the evidence conflicts, on the greater weight of the evidence; the DHO must provide a written report stating the evidence relied on, decision, sanctions, and reasons. 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(f)–(h)

Permitted sanctions depend on the prohibited act's severity level and the sanctions table; the charged code, proven code, sanction, credit type, amount, and statutory sentence regime must be recorded separately. 28 C.F.R. § 541.3, tbl. 1

When prison discipline threatens an already-created good-time interest, Wolff v. McDonnell requires advance written notice, a qualified opportunity to present evidence consistent with institutional safety, and a written statement of evidence and reasons, but does not constitutionalize the full criminal-trial process. 418 U.S. 539, 563–72 (1974)

Wolff did not establish an unrestricted right to retained or appointed counsel, confrontation, or cross-examination in prison disciplinary hearings; any additional regulatory or policy protections must be analyzed on their own terms. 418 U.S. at 567–70

Due process for a disciplinary loss of good time is satisfied only if some evidence in the record supports the decision; Superintendent v. Hill does not authorize a court to reweigh the record as the original factfinder. 472 U.S. 445, 454–57 (1985)

A DHO decision may be appealed through the Administrative Remedy Program; because the special route begins at the Regional Director rather than with an institution BP-9, the decision date, report receipt, region, filing, rejection, resubmission, and response history matter. 28 C.F.R. §§ 541.8(i), 542.14(d)(2)

Lost credit and restoration

Good-conduct time under § 3624(b) and 28 C.F.R. § 523.20 is distinct from First Step Act time credit; forfeited, withheld, vested, and restored good-conduct time must be matched to the prisoner's sentence regime and disciplinary record. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b); 28 C.F.R. § 523.20

Under the First Step Act regulation, a prisoner may lose earned time credits for violating prohibited-act rules, may appeal the loss through the Administrative Remedy Program, and may later be considered for restoration under the regulation and Bureau procedures; none of those events should be inferred from a projected-release-date change alone. 28 C.F.R. § 523.43

A disciplinary audit must reconcile the incident report, investigation, UDC and DHO records, code and severity, sanctions, appeals, restoration action, sentence computation, and separate GCT and FSA-credit ledgers. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3624(b), 3632(d)(4); 28 C.F.R. pt. 541

RDAP and § 3621(e) reduction

Section 3621(e) directs the Bureau to provide residential substance-abuse treatment for eligible prisoners, but it makes an eligible nonviolent prisoner's post-completion sentence reduction discretionary and caps it at one year. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(1)–(2)

Current RDAP admission requires the regulatory eligibility findings, including a verifiable substance-use disorder, willingness to participate, ability to complete all phases, and ordinarily enough time remaining to complete the program; a treatment recommendation is evidence, not automatic admission. 28 C.F.R. § 550.53

RDAP has unit-based, follow-up, and community-treatment components, and successful completion requires satisfying the regulation's components rather than merely entering or completing classroom hours. 28 C.F.R. §§ 550.53–550.56

Early-release eligibility is narrower than RDAP admission and is governed by § 3621(e)(2)(B), 28 C.F.R. § 550.55, the conviction and sentence record, program completion, and the prisoner's ability to complete community-based treatment. 28 C.F.R. § 550.55

Lopez v. Davis holds that § 3621(e)(2)(B) permits the Bureau to exercise discretion categorically, including excluding otherwise eligible prisoners based on preconviction conduct involving a firearm. 531 U.S. 230, 238–44 (2001)

BOP Program Statement 5331.02 Change Notice 3, dated May 7, 2026, is the current public early-release procedure; it supersedes earlier change notices and must be read with the statute and current regulation. BOP PS 5331.02 CN-3

The current public policy uses a maximum provisional reduction of six months for sentences of 30 months or less, nine months for 31 through 36 months, and 12 months for 37 months or more; the final reduction remains subject to continued eligibility, completion, and Bureau discretion. BOP PS 5331.02 CN-3

A detainer matters to RDAP early release only to the extent the verified detainer and custody plan prevent the required community-based component or trigger another stated exclusion; “has a detainer” is not a sufficient legal analysis. 28 C.F.R. §§ 550.53–550.55; BOP PS 5331.02 CN-3

A sentencing court may recommend treatment, but Tapia prohibits imposing or lengthening imprisonment to promote rehabilitation and does not transfer RDAP admission or § 3621(e) reduction authority from the Bureau to the court. Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 326–35 (2011); 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)

An RDAP dispute must distinguish treatment access, clinical diagnosis, program removal, successful completion, early-release eligibility, provisional reduction, final reduction, and community placement because each asks a different factual and remedial question. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e); 28 C.F.R. pt. 550, subpt. F

Review must identify whether the asserted error is statutory, regulatory, constitutional, evidentiary, or an exercise of placement or early-release discretion; § 3625 excludes specified APA provisions from subchapter-C determinations, while Lopez confirms the breadth of the Bureau's lawful § 3621(e) discretion. 18 U.S.C. § 3625; Lopez, 531 U.S. at 238–44

Decision path

flowchart TD
    A["BOP record says detainer, discipline, or RDAP"] --> B{"What document or decision exists?"}
    B -->|"ICE request"| C["Separate § 287.7 detainer from final removal order"]
    B -->|"Pending charge in another jurisdiction"| D["Test IADA coverage, delivery, clocks, transfers, and remedy"]
    B -->|"Incident report or lost credit"| E["Audit Part 541 process, evidence, sanctions, appeal, and ledger"]
    B -->|"RDAP decision"| F["Separate admission, completion, eligibility, and discretionary reduction"]
    C --> G["Identify concrete program or custody consequence"]
    D --> G
    E --> G
    F --> G
    G --> H["Use the correct administrative route and classify any live judicial claim"]

Required records and limits

• The actual detainer, warrant, charging paper, final removal order if any, and issuing-jurisdiction docket.
• Custody, delivery, transport, return, sentence, and release chronology.
• Incident report, investigation, UDC and DHO packets, hearing recording if available, sanctions, credit ledgers, and appeals.
• RDAP diagnosis, referrals, eligibility reviews, offense review, participation and removal records, provisional and final reduction decisions, and community-treatment plan.
• Current circuit law governing the asserted judicial claim, exhaustion, remedy, and standard of review.

18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) — Good Conduct Time

18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) — Good Conduct Time

Verification boundary

This module verifies the current nationwide statutory and regulatory calculation structure for good-conduct time (GCT), the First Step Act change, and the historical boundary of Barber v. Thomas. It does not verify a particular prisoner's computation, disciplinary loss, restoration, administrative-exhaustion history, or § 2241 remedy.

Current statutory rule

Section 3624(a) directs the Bureau of Prisons to release a prisoner when the term of imprisonment expires, less credit toward service of the sentence provided by § 3624(b). 18 U.S.C. § 3624(a)

A prisoner serving more than one year, other than a life term, may receive up to fifty-four days of GCT for each year of the sentence imposed by the court, subject to the Bureau's determination of exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1)

“Up to” is consequential: the statute does not promise the maximum award. A sentence of one year or less and a life term fall outside this authorization.

If the Bureau determines that the prisoner did not satisfactorily comply during the relevant year, the prisoner receives no GCT or a lesser amount the Bureau determines appropriate; the Bureau also must consider high-school-diploma progress, and credit not earned may not later be granted. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1)

Subject to § 3624(b)(2), the statute directs that credit for the last year of a term be credited on the first day of the last year. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1)

That timing sentence does not eliminate partial-final-year proration. The current regulation separately addresses both proration and the anniversary-period mechanics.

GCT awarded under § 3624(b) after enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act vests on the date the prisoner is released from custody. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(2)

Current regulatory calculation

For offenses committed on or after November 1, 1987, 28 C.F.R. § 523.20(b)(1) directs the Bureau to project the maximum possible GCT from the imposed sentence while recognizing that the projected release date can change during incarceration. 28 C.F.R. § 523.20(b)(1)

The Bureau awards prorated GCT for a partial final year of the sentence imposed. 28 C.F.R. § 523.20(b)(2)

This corrects the legacy statement that the First Step Act's timing change replaced proration. The 2022 final rule expressly chose proration for a partial final year.

Under the regulation, an inmate may receive up to fifty-four days on each anniversary date; last-year credit is awarded after the final anniversary period unless the final year is complete, in which case it is awarded on the first day of that final anniversary period. 28 C.F.R. § 523.20(b)(3)

For an offense committed on or after April 26, 1996, the regulation sets a maximum of fifty-four days per imposed-sentence year when the literacy condition is met and forty-two days when it is not, subject to the regulation's final-removal-order exception. 28 C.F.R. § 523.20(d)(2)–(3)

The regulation permits GCT reduction for qualifying disciplinary sanctions or failure to comply with applicable literacy requirements. 28 C.F.R. § 523.20(a)

Actual loss, disallowance, forfeiture, and restoration require the disciplinary record, the offense-date branch, and the current rules in Parts 541 and 544; they are not calculated by this module.

First Step Act change and historical rule

The First Step Act changed GCT from a time-served calculation to a sentence-imposed calculation, made the amendment applicable to offenses committed before, on, or after enactment except offenses before November 1, 1987, and the change took effect when the risk-and-needs system was released on July 19, 2019. First Step Act § 102(b), 132 Stat. 5210–11; BOP First Step Act FAQ

The correct dividing fact is therefore amendment coverage—especially offense date—not whether a particular day of the sentence was served before July 19, 2019. Covered computations were recalculated under the amended rule.

Barber v. Thomas upheld the Bureau's time-served method under the pre-First Step Act text, but the First Step Act superseded that calculation rule for covered current sentences. Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 476–87 (2010); First Step Act § 102(b)

Good-conduct-time credit under § 3624(b) is distinct from First Step Act time credits earned through recidivism-reduction programs and applied under §§ 3632(d)(4) and 3624(g). Good Conduct Time Credit Under the First Step Act, 87 Fed. Reg. 7938, 7941 (Feb. 11, 2022)

Computation audit checklist

1. Obtain the judgment, statement of reasons if relevant, and the Bureau sentence-computation sheet.
2. Record the offense date, imposed term, and whether the sentence is life or no more than one year.
3. Separate GCT from prior-custody credit, RDAP reduction, First Step Act time credits, and prerelease-placement dates.
4. Check the maximum projection, each disciplinary adjustment, literacy status, anniversary periods, and partial-final-year proration.
5. Do not switch to the historical Barber formula merely because some custody occurred before July 19, 2019.
6. Preserve the Bureau's actual calculation and administrative record before researching exhaustion and a possible § 2241 challenge.

Decision path

flowchart TD
    A["GCT computation question"] --> B{"Offense on or after Nov. 1, 1987?"}
    B -->|"No"| C["Current § 523.20 branch does not apply; research old-law credit"]
    B -->|"Yes"| D{"Term more than one year and not life?"}
    D -->|"No"| E["Outside § 3624(b)(1) GCT authorization"]
    D -->|"Yes"| F["Project up to 54 days per imposed-sentence year"]
    F --> G["Prorate partial final year"]
    G --> H["Apply conduct, literacy, and offense-date rules"]
    H --> I["Compare Bureau computation and records"]

Matters not yet verified in this module

• Old-law credit for offenses before November 1, 1987 and D.C. Code credit.
• Particular disciplinary procedures, restoration standards, and due-process claims.
• Administrative-remedy deadlines, exceptions to exhaustion, proper § 2241 respondent, venue, and available relief.
• Interaction with prior-custody credit, aggregated sentences, RDAP, and First Step Act time credits in a particular computation.

Those matters remain open in data/coverage_matrix.yaml; this bounded correction does not validate the legacy file as a whole.

18 U.S.C. § 3632 — First Step Act Time Credits

18 U.S.C. § 3632 — First Step Act Time Credits

Verification boundary

This module verifies the current nationwide earning and application structure for First Step Act time credits (FTCs). It does not calculate a particular prisoner's credits, resolve an aggregated-sentence dispute, validate a PATTERN score, decide an offense under § 3632(d)(4)(D), or establish exhaustion, habeas jurisdiction, venue, or relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

The legacy-control instruction calls for verification of a legacy “Maxwell” reference. Exhaustive repository and legacy-corpus searches found that name only in the instruction itself, not in any legal-content file. No Maxwell case identity, citation, proposition, or holding is therefore asserted here.

System development and reassessment

Section 3632(a) required the Attorney General, in consultation with the Independent Review Committee, to develop and publicly release the risk-and-needs assessment system no later than 210 days after enactment. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(a)

The system must reassess each prisoner's recidivism risk periodically using indicators of progress and regression that are dynamic and reasonably expected to change in prison. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(a)(4)

The Department of Justice published the initial risk-and-needs assessment system, PATTERN, on July 19, 2019; DOJ contemporaneously and subsequently identified that publication as meeting the statutory deadline. DOJ release (July 19, 2019); NIJ Director's implementation remarks

The later January 2022 time-credit regulation is not evidence that the separate 210-day system-development and publication deadline was missed.

Earning credits

Except for a prisoner made ineligible by § 3632(d)(4)(D), successful participation earns ten days of FTCs for every thirty days of qualifying evidence-based recidivism-reduction programming or productive activities. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A)(i); 28 C.F.R. § 523.42(c)(1)

A prisoner at minimum or low recidivism risk earns an additional five days for every thirty days of successful participation when the statutory two-assessment condition is met; the regulation expresses that condition as maintaining a consistent minimum or low risk over the two most recent consecutive assessments. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A)(ii); 28 C.F.R. § 523.42(c)(2)

The statute bars credit for a program successfully completed before December 21, 2018 and for a program completed during official detention before the prisoner's sentence commences under § 3585(a). 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(B)

The regulation allows an otherwise eligible inmate to earn for programming and activities from December 21, 2018 through January 14, 2020; beginning January 15, 2020, earning requires successful participation in programs or activities recommended from the individualized risk-and-needs assessment. 28 C.F.R. § 523.42(b)

Since September 30, 2026, 28 C.F.R. § 523.42(a) provides that an eligible inmate begins earning FSA Time Credits after the term of imprisonment commences. The amendment removed the earlier clause that tied commencement to arrival or voluntary surrender at the designated Bureau facility, which courts had held conflicts with the First Step Act. A sentence commences under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a) when the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily at, the official detention facility. Earning still requires successful participation in assigned programs or productive activities. 91 FR 55740 (Aug. 31, 2026); Miles v. Bowers, No. 25-1291 (1st Cir. Apr. 27, 2026); 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a) 28 C.F.R. § 523.42(a)

Eligibility to earn

Section 3632(d)(4)(D) makes a prisoner ineligible to earn FTCs when the prisoner is serving a sentence for a conviction under an enumerated provision; the current exact statutory list—not a category label or a fixed estimate of the number of offenses—controls the federal offense screen. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D); 28 C.F.R. § 523.41(d)

An individualized screen requires the judgment, conviction statutes, sentence structure, and current governing authority. This module does not resolve how an aggregated term containing eligible and ineligible counts is treated.

A final removal order is an application bar, not one of § 3632(d)(4)(D)'s earning exclusions: the regulation's earning rule excludes the enumerated-offense category, while § 3632(d)(4)(E) and § 523.44(a)(2) prohibit applying FTCs for a prisoner subject to a final order of removal. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D)–(E); 28 C.F.R. §§ 523.41(d), 523.44(a)(2)

Application is a separate gate

Section 3632(d)(4)(C) directs that earned FTCs be applied toward prerelease custody or supervised release and requires transfer of prisoners who are eligible under § 3624(g); earning a credit and qualifying to apply it are therefore separate determinations. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(C); 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)

Before application, the prisoner must have credits equal to the remainder of the imposed term, must have demonstrated risk reduction or maintained minimum or low risk during imprisonment, and must have had the remainder of the term computed under applicable law. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(A)–(C); 28 C.F.R. § 523.44(b)

For prerelease custody, § 3624(g) and § 523.44(c) additionally require minimum or low risk in the last two assessments, unless the warden approves the statutory petition after making the required danger, good-faith-effort, and recidivism findings. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(D)(i); 28 C.F.R. § 523.44(c)

For early transfer to supervised release, the prisoner must satisfy the general application criteria, have minimum or low risk at the last assessment, and have a court-imposed supervised-release term; FTCs cannot advance that transfer by more than twelve months. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(D)(ii); 28 C.F.R. § 523.44(d)

Loss, review, and agency implementation

An inmate may lose earned FTCs for violating program or activity requirements under Part 541 procedures, may seek review through the Bureau's Part 542 Administrative Remedy Program, and may receive case-specific restoration after clear conduct for two consecutive risk-and-needs assessments. 28 C.F.R. § 523.43

BOP Program Statement 5410.01, Change Notice 2, dated March 10, 2023, is official agency implementation policy for § 3632(d)(4); it does not displace the statute or regulation. BOP Program Statement 5410.01 CN-2

Individual audit checklist

1. Obtain the judgment, conviction statutes, presentence report where lawfully available, and Bureau FTC worksheet.
2. Separate eligibility to earn, actual successful-participation days, the ten- versus fifteen-day rate, loss or restoration, and eligibility to apply.
3. Check the precise current text of § 3632(d)(4)(D); do not rely on an offense label or an estimated number of categories.
4. Identify any final removal order, detainer, non-U.S.-Code sentence issue, PATTERN assessments, and warden-petition record.
5. Compare the worksheet against §§ 523.41–523.44 and the current Program Statement.
6. Preserve all administrative-remedy submissions, receipts, rejections, extensions, and responses before researching a § 2241 claim.

Decision path

flowchart TD
    A["FTC question"] --> B{"Serving a § 3632(d)(4)(D) offense?"}
    B -->|"Yes"| C["Ineligible to earn under the federal statutory screen"]
    B -->|"No"| D["Measure qualifying successful participation"]
    D --> E["Award 10 days per 30-day period"]
    E --> F{"Minimum/low and two-assessment condition?"}
    F -->|"Yes"| G["Add 5 days per 30-day period"]
    F -->|"No"| H["No additional 5-day rate"]
    G --> I{"Credits equal remaining term and § 3624(g) gates met?"}
    H --> I
    I -->|"No"| J["Credits earned but not yet applicable"]
    I -->|"Yes"| K{"Final removal order or other application bar?"}
    K -->|"Yes"| L["Do not apply under current bar"]
    K -->|"No"| M["Apply to eligible prerelease custody or supervised release"]

Matters not yet verified in this module

• Particular offense eligibility and aggregated or concurrent sentence treatment.
• The validity of a particular PATTERN or needs assessment and program assignment.
• Day-level Bureau computation, waitlist treatment, interruptions, detainers, D.C. Code sentences, and combinations with RDAP.
• Administrative-remedy deadlines and exceptions, § 2241 exhaustion, proper respondent, venue, certificate-of-appealability rules, and available relief.
• Any case supposedly named “Maxwell”; no such legal-content reference exists in the inventoried legacy corpus.

Those matters remain open in data/coverage_matrix.yaml; this bounded correction does not validate the legacy § 3632 file as a whole.

Prerelease Custody, Residential Reentry, Home Confinement, and the CARES Act

Prerelease Custody, Residential Reentry, Home Confinement, and the CARES Act

Residential reentry-center placement, ordinary home confinement, First Step Act prerelease custody, transfer to supervised release, and CARES Act home confinement are related but noninterchangeable authorities. A valid analysis identifies the governing lane, eligibility date, placement decision, and decisionmaker.

Ordinary prerelease custody under § 3624(c)

Section 3624(c)(1) directs the Bureau, to the extent practicable, to ensure that a prisoner spends a reasonable part of the final portion of the term—up to 12 months—under conditions that afford a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and prepare for reentry. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1)

The 12-month language is a ceiling for prerelease conditions, not a guaranteed residential reentry-center term; the statute retains practicability and individualized administration. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1), (6)

Under ordinary § 3624(c)(2), the Bureau may place a prisoner in home confinement for the shorter of ten percent of the imprisonment term or six months, and, to the extent practicable, must place lower-risk and lower-needs prisoners in home confinement for the maximum time permitted. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2)

The Bureau retains authority to return a prisoner from prerelease custody to a correctional facility when the statutory or placement conditions are violated. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(4)

Prerelease placement must be administered consistently with § 3621(b)'s individualized designation factors, the available facility and community resources, the judgment, public-safety constraints, and the prisoner's circumstances. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621(b), 3624(c)(6)

Section 251 of the Second Chance Act of 2007 expanded ordinary prerelease custody to a maximum of 12 months and required regulations assuring individualized decisions; it did not guarantee 12 months or replace later First Step Act mechanisms. Pub. L. No. 110-199, § 251, 122 Stat. 657, 692–94

The Bureau's community-confinement regulation requires individual determinations of duration consistent with § 3621(b), ordinarily made with enough time for planning, and confirms that an inmate may be considered for up to 12 months. 28 C.F.R. §§ 570.20–570.22

The regulation does not impose a categorical six-month cap on residential reentry-center placement; it also does not create a right to the maximum statutory period. 28 C.F.R. §§ 570.21–570.22

First Step Act prerelease custody and supervised-release transfer

First Step Act time credits are earned under § 3632(d)(4), but they are applied through the separate eligibility and placement rules in § 3624(g); earning a credit and becoming eligible to apply it are not the same event. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3624(g), 3632(d)(4)

For prerelease custody under § 3624(g), the prisoner must have earned credits equal to the remainder of the imposed term, shown reduced recidivism risk or maintained minimum or low risk over the specified assessments, and had the remainder computed under applicable law. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(A)–(D)(i)

A prisoner who does not satisfy the minimum-or-low-risk route may seek approval through the warden-petition route if the statutory prerequisites, including a determination that the prisoner would not endanger society and made a good-faith effort to lower risk, are met. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(D)(i)(II)

Section 3624(g)(2) defines prerelease custody for this lane as home confinement or placement in a residential reentry center, subject to the subsection's conditions and Bureau administration. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(2)

First Step Act home confinement includes monitoring requirements and permits the Bureau to reduce monitoring after a prisoner demonstrates compliance; the statute separately authorizes return to prison for violations. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(2)(A)

First Step Act residential reentry-center placement must provide 24-hour staff, safe and adequate conditions, accountability, employment and family services, and substance-abuse and mental-health treatment access as specified by statute. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(2)(B)

Section 3624(g)(3) permits the Bureau to transfer an eligible prisoner to begin a court-imposed supervised-release term up to 12 months before the ordinary release date; it does not create supervised release when the judgment imposed none. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(3)

The early supervised-release transfer cannot exceed the prisoner's earned time credits, and the resulting supervision remains governed by the judgment and Chapter 229 rather than by BOP institutional rules. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(3)

The current First Step Act regulation implements credit application, including prerelease-custody and supervised-release transfer requirements, exclusions, risk criteria, and restoration; the official computation record controls the individualized credit balance. 28 C.F.R. §§ 523.42–523.44

The Bureau's Federal Time Credit Application Guide, announced October 16, 2025, was an informational explanation of how time credits are earned, calculated, and applied. The Bureau removed it from bop.gov in 2026 without a published notice, and an archived copy of the announcement remains. Guidance of this kind cannot enlarge or narrow the governing statute and regulation. BOP announcement, archived June 19, 2026

Ordinary home confinement administration

The Bureau's May 28, 2025 home-confinement directive instructs staff to maximize lawful home-confinement use, make individualized assessments, and avoid adding categorical barriers not found in statute or policy; it remains subordinate to governing law. BOP, Expanding Home Confinement

A sentencing-court recommendation may inform placement but does not itself order the Bureau to place a prisoner in home confinement or an RRC; the Bureau administers place of imprisonment and prerelease custody under the governing statutes. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621(b), 3624(c)

Home confinement is still service of the imprisonment term under Bureau custody and conditions; it is not the same as release from imprisonment, probation, or supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c), (g)

An individualized placement review requires the projected release date, statutory eligibility calculation, earned-credit ledger, PATTERN history, needs, discipline, detainers and unresolved charges, residence, treatment and employment plan, accessibility and medical needs, community resources, and reasons for the decision. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621(b), 3624(c), (g); 28 C.F.R. pt. 570, subpt. B

CARES Act home confinement

CARES Act § 12003(b)(2) temporarily authorized the Bureau Director, after the Attorney General's emergency finding and during the defined covered emergency period, to lengthen the maximum home-confinement period otherwise authorized by § 3624(c)(2). Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 12003(b)(2), 134 Stat. 281, 516

The CARES Act defined the covered emergency period by reference to the March 13, 2020 national emergency and 30 days after its termination; Public Law 118-3 terminated that national emergency on April 10, 2023, so the temporary authority to make new expanded-period placements is not an open-ended present authority. Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 12003(a)(2); Pub. L. No. 118-3, 137 Stat. 6

The 2023 final rule confirms that, after the covered emergency period, the Director retains discretion to allow prisoners already placed in CARES Act home confinement to remain there or to return them to secure custody, consistent with law and individualized administration. 28 C.F.R. § 0.120; 88 Fed. Reg. 19830 (Apr. 4, 2023)

The final rule does not convert CARES Act home confinement into a judicial sentence reduction or a guarantee against return; it preserves Bureau discretion and permits proportional sanctions, RRC transfer, or secure-custody return under applicable criteria. 28 C.F.R. § 0.120; 88 Fed. Reg. 19830

For a person now in CARES Act home confinement, distinguish the historical placement authority, present custody status, remaining imprisonment term, imposed supervised-release term, alleged violation, sanction process, and any requested return or continuation decision. 18 U.S.C. § 3624; 28 C.F.R. § 0.120

Review and remedy classification

Section 3625 excludes specified APA provisions from determinations under §§ 3621–3624; a challenge therefore must identify a reviewable statutory, regulatory, or constitutional error rather than ask a court to make the placement choice entrusted to the Bureau. 18 U.S.C. § 3625

A prisoner ordinarily should present a disputed eligibility calculation, omitted individualized consideration, or asserted legal error through the Administrative Remedy Program with the supporting computation and placement records. 28 C.F.R. pt. 542, subpt. B

If a live claim challenges the execution of physical custody and is cognizable in habeas, § 2241's immediate-custodian and territorial-jurisdiction rules ordinarily govern; the requested relief still cannot exceed the court's lawful authority. 28 U.S.C. § 2241; Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434–47 (2004)

The requested remedy must be stated precisely: correct a credit balance or eligibility date, perform an omitted individualized review, comply with a governing legal limit, or reverse a procedurally defective return—not “order home confinement” without identifying a source of judicial power. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3624–3625

No release date or placement follows from the phrase “First Step Act eligible” alone; the conviction exclusions, earning periods, assessment history, credit ledger, disciplinary adjustments, final removal order, sentence remainder, residence and community plan, and current custody authority all require verification. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3624(g), 3632(d)(4)

Release and the supervised-release boundary

Section 3624(a) directs release when the imprisonment term expires, less properly credited time, and § 3624(d) specifies release planning and identification duties; neither provision authorizes an unverified release-date estimate. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(a), (d)

A supervised-release term commences on the day the person is released from imprisonment and does not run during imprisonment of more than 30 consecutive days in connection with a conviction unless the imprisonment runs concurrently with supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e)

United States v. Johnson holds that excess prison time does not reduce a supervised-release term under § 3624(e), while identifying § 3583(e)'s modification and early-termination mechanisms as the statutory tools for equitable concerns after supervision begins. 529 U.S. 53, 57–60 (2000)

Mont v. United States holds that pretrial detention later credited toward a new conviction qualifies as imprisonment “in connection with a conviction” and tolls supervised release under § 3624(e), even though the credit determination occurs later. 587 U.S. 514, 518–24 (2019)

Decision path

flowchart TD
    A["Requested community placement or earlier transition"] --> B{"Which authority?"}
    B -->|"Ordinary prerelease"| C["Apply § 3624(c), § 3621(b), and Part 570"]
    B -->|"Earned FSA credits"| D["Audit §§ 3632(d)(4) and 3624(g) plus Part 523"]
    B -->|"Existing CARES placement"| E["Apply § 0.120 and current individualized record"]
    C --> F{"RRC, home confinement, or supervised release?"}
    D --> F
    E --> F
    F --> G["Calculate statutory ceiling and verify eligibility, record, conditions, and decisionmaker"]
    G --> H["Use Part 542; separate legal error from discretionary placement choice"]

Required records and limits

• Judgment, sentence computation, projected release date, good-time and FSA-credit ledgers.
• PATTERN assessments, needs assessments, programming and discipline records, detainers, and final removal order if any.
• RRC and home-confinement referrals, reviews, reasons, bed or monitoring availability, residence and reentry plans.
• CARES Act placement and conditions, incident and sanction record, and current custody decision.
• Current circuit authority on cognizability, exhaustion, § 3625, available relief, and mootness.

BOP Administrative Remedies, § 2241 Review, APA Limits, and Mootness

BOP Administrative Remedies, § 2241 Review, APA Limits, and Mootness

The Bureau's Administrative Remedy Program creates a record and agency review path. It does not by itself answer whether a later claim is habeas, civil, jurisdictional, prudentially exhausted, reviewable, or moot. Those questions require the governing statute, circuit law, custody facts, and requested relief.

Scope and initial presentation

The Administrative Remedy Program generally permits a prisoner to seek formal review of an issue relating to any aspect of confinement, subject to the exclusions and specialized procedures in 28 C.F.R. part 542. 28 C.F.R. § 542.10

Except where the regulation provides otherwise, a prisoner first must attempt informal resolution before submitting a formal Administrative Remedy Request. 28 C.F.R. § 542.13(a)

The institution request, commonly called a BP-9, ordinarily must be submitted within 20 calendar days after the event giving rise to the complaint; staff must extend the filing period when the prisoner demonstrates a valid reason for delay. 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(a), (b)

A formal request generally must contain one complaint or a reasonable number of closely related issues and must state the requested relief; unrelated claims may be rejected for separate submission. 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(c)

A prisoner who reasonably believes an issue is sensitive and safety would be endangered by institution filing may submit directly to the Regional Director with a sensitivity explanation; if the Regional Director disagrees, the matter is returned for local filing rather than decided on the merits. 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(d)(1)

An appeal from a Discipline Hearing Officer decision initially is submitted to the Regional Director, while placement-center and other special categories follow the routes stated in § 542.14(d). 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(d)(2)–(5)

Appeals, responses, and rejection

A prisoner ordinarily has 20 calendar days after the Warden signs the response to appeal to the Regional Director and 30 calendar days after the Regional Director signs the response to appeal to General Counsel; the regulation allows an extension for a demonstrated valid reason. 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a)

An appeal must attach the required lower-level submissions and responses and may not introduce issues that were not raised below; General Counsel's response is the final administrative appeal. 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(b)

The ordinary response periods are 20 calendar days for the Warden, 30 for the Regional Director, and 40 for General Counsel; written extensions are allowed within the regulation's limits. 28 C.F.R. § 542.18

If no response is received within the allotted response time, including a notified extension, the prisoner may treat the absence as a denial at that level and proceed to the next step. 28 C.F.R. § 542.18

A coordinator may reject a submission that does not satisfy the regulation and must give written notice explaining the defect; when the defect is correctable, the notice ordinarily must provide a reasonable resubmission period. 28 C.F.R. § 542.17(a)–(b)

A prisoner may appeal a rejection to the next level when the prisoner believes the rejection is erroneous, but the appeal must address the rejection and preserve the underlying record rather than assume a rejected filing received merits review. 28 C.F.R. § 542.17(c)

An exhaustion record must preserve the event date, informal attempt or exception, each signed submission and attachment, receipt or tracking number, rejection and resubmission notice, response and extension, appeal, and proof of mailing or electronic submission. 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.13–542.18

§ 2241 classification, custodian, and exhaustion

Section 2241 supplies habeas jurisdiction for a person “in custody” under federal authority within its terms; whether a particular prison claim challenges the fact or duration of custody, conditions, or an unreviewable discretionary placement must be classified before filing. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)

For a core challenge to present physical confinement, the proper respondent ordinarily is the immediate custodian and the petition ordinarily must be filed in the district with territorial jurisdiction over that custodian. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434–47 (2004)

Part 542 prescribes the agency process but does not declare a universal jurisdictional exhaustion rule for § 2241; the source, character, exceptions, waiver, and remedy for nonexhaustion must be taken from controlling circuit law. 28 C.F.R. pt. 542, subpt. B; 28 U.S.C. § 2241

Futility, irreparable injury, unavailable process, and prejudice are not self-proving labels; any asserted exception must be supported by the actual agency route, timing, requested relief, and controlling circuit standard. 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.13–542.18; 28 U.S.C. § 2241

For § 3585 credit, United States v. Wilson identifies initial Bureau computation and administrative review before judicial review; a sentencing-court request cannot bypass that allocation simply by relabeling the computation as clarification. 503 U.S. 329, 333–36 (1992)

Section 3625 and legal review

Section 3625 makes 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 555, and 701–706 inapplicable to the making of determinations, decisions, or orders under 18 U.S.C. chapter 229, subchapter C (§§ 3621–3626). 18 U.S.C. § 3625

The § 3625 exclusion is statutory and must be applied to the source and nature of the challenged action; it is not a license to call every BOP action unreviewable or to ignore a properly presented constitutional or ultra vires claim. 18 U.S.C. § 3625

After Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, a reviewing court must exercise independent judgment on statutory meaning rather than apply Chevron's mandatory deference framework; lawful agency discretion and § 3625's express review exclusion remain distinct questions. 603 U.S. 369, 392–413 (2024)

Section 3621(b) separately states that a designation made under that subsection is not reviewable by any court; a court therefore must distinguish a designation choice from a claim that the Bureau used the wrong statute, ignored a mandatory condition, or violated the Constitution. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621(b), 3625

The remedy must match the proven error: recalculation, lawful reconsideration, restored process, or relief from unconstitutional custody is different from judicial selection of an institution, RRC, home-confinement address, RDAP admission, or discretionary reduction. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621–3625

Transfer, release, and mootness

A postfiling transfer does not automatically terminate a properly filed habeas case when a respondent within the court's reach retains authority to effect relief, but substitution, jurisdiction, and circuit procedure must be assessed on the actual record. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 304–07 (1944); Padilla, 542 U.S. at 440–41

Release from the challenged custody does not mechanically establish either a live controversy or mootness; the claimant must identify a continuing concrete injury redressable by the court, and collateral consequences are not presumed for every custody-administration decision. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7–18 (1998)

Mootness analysis must specify the challenged calculation or decision, present custody and supervision, remaining sentence, requested order, authority of the current respondent, and whether any recognized exception is supported rather than assumed. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7–18; 28 U.S.C. § 2241

Before filing, identify jurisdiction, proper respondent, venue, custody status, administrative exhaustion, claim type, standard of review, § 3625 or other review limit, requested remedy, and a live redressable injury. 28 U.S.C. § 2241; 18 U.S.C. § 3625

No exhaustion or merits conclusion can be drawn from a remedy tracking code alone; preserve and read every submission, response, rejection, extension, attachment, computation, decision, and subsequent custody event. 28 C.F.R. pt. 542, subpt. B; 28 U.S.C. § 2241

PREA-adjusted grievance rules

For an administrative grievance alleging sexual abuse, the agency may not require informal resolution, impose a filing deadline, or require submission to a staff member who is the subject of the complaint; third parties may assist under the regulation. 28 C.F.R. § 115.52(b)–(e)

The agency ordinarily must issue a final decision on the merits within 90 days of initial filing, excluding the prisoner's appeal-preparation time, and may extend up to 70 days with written notice; absence of a timely response at a level may be treated as a denial at that level. 28 C.F.R. § 115.52(d)

An emergency grievance alleging a substantial risk of imminent sexual abuse must receive an initial response within 48 hours and a final agency decision within five calendar days, with documentation of the risk determination and protective action. 28 C.F.R. § 115.52(f)

Discipline for filing a sexual-abuse grievance is permitted only when the agency demonstrates bad faith; a good-faith report is protected even when the evidence is insufficient to substantiate it. 28 C.F.R. § 115.52(g)

Decision path

flowchart TD
    A["BOP dispute"] --> B["Classify issue and requested remedy"]
    B --> C["Build Part 542 record using the correct ordinary or special route"]
    C --> D{"Agency response complete, rejected, late, or absent?"}
    D --> E["Apply exact regulatory next step and controlling exhaustion law"]
    E --> F{"Judicial claim type?"}
    F -->|"Fact or duration of custody"| G["Analyze § 2241, immediate custodian, district, and relief"]
    F -->|"Conditions or other injury"| H["Identify authorized cause of action and defenses"]
    F -->|"Placement discretion"| I["Apply §§ 3621(b) and 3625 review limits"]
    G --> J["Recheck transfer, release, redressability, and mootness"]
    H --> J
    I --> J

Required records and limits

• Complete Administrative Remedy Program file at every level, including rejected and resubmitted filings.
• The underlying computation, classification, designation, discipline, program, medical, or placement record.
• Current facility, custodian, district, custody and supervision status, projected release date, and transfer history.
• Current controlling circuit authority for exhaustion, cognizability, reviewability, cause of action, remedy, and mootness.
• This module does not decide an individual case without those records and circuit-specific verification.

Supervised Release and Reentry

Supervised Release and Reentry

Commencement, conditions, transfer, modification, termination, revocation, constitutional limits, and bounded reentry remedies. This page is a verified navigation layer. The linked canonical modules, atomic claims, authority cards, and structured controls remain the legal source; this index does not create a rule from omission or shorthand.

Canonical modules

Stage use controls

• Start with the actual docket posture and controlling court, not the desired remedy.
• Calculate every deadline from its stated triggering event and current computation rule.
• Separate jurisdiction, venue, prerequisites, merits, burden, proof, remedy, review, and appealability.
• Use the circuit overlay for any circuit-sensitive proposition and stop at records marked not_verified.
• Preserve the operative filings, orders, transcripts, exhibits, agency record, and proof of filing or service.

Handoff to adjacent stages

Use the federal process decision trees to identify prerequisites, alternative vehicles, appellate routes, and postjudgment interactions. Generated diagrams are navigation aids only; linked canonical modules control.

Supervised Release Commencement, Conditions, Modification, Termination, and Transfer

Supervised Release Commencement, Conditions, Modification, Termination, and Transfer

Supervised release is a distinct post-imprisonment sentence component. Before choosing a procedure, identify the original offense and judgment, statutory maximum and any offense-specific term, actual release and custody dates, every condition, the district holding jurisdiction, and whether the requested relief is correction, modification, early termination, transfer, or a later revocation question.

Imposition and authorized term

A court may include supervised release after imprisonment and must do so when a statute requires it; the domestic-violence provision in § 3583(a) supplies an additional mandatory circumstance. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a)

Unless another statute provides otherwise, § 3583(b) sets default maximum terms of five years for a Class A or B felony, three years for a Class C or D felony, one year for a Class E felony or misdemeanor other than a petty offense, and no term for a petty offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)

At initial imposition, § 3583(c) directs consideration of only the listed § 3553(a) factors; it does not incorporate every subsection of § 3553(a). 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c)

The applicable offense statute can require a minimum, authorize a different maximum, or otherwise displace § 3583(b)'s defaults, so the statute of conviction and offense date must be checked before calculating the permissible term. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)

Commencement and tolling

A supervised-release term begins on the day the person is released from imprisonment, and it runs concurrently with federal, state, or local probation, supervised release, or parole for another offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e)

Section 3624(e) excludes from the supervised-release term a period of imprisonment exceeding thirty consecutive days in connection with a federal, state, or local conviction. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e)

Pretrial detention later credited to a new conviction qualifies as imprisonment in connection with that conviction and tolls supervised release under § 3624(e). Mont v. United States, 587 U.S. 514, 518–24 (2019)

Excess time served in prison does not shorten the supervised-release term because § 3624(e) starts that term on actual release; equitable relief, if warranted, lies through § 3583(e)'s modification or termination tools. United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 57–60 (2000)

The Sentencing Reform Act does not automatically stop or extend a supervised-release term merely because a person absconds; Rico requires use of the enacted tolling, modification, and delayed-revocation provisions rather than a judge-made fugitive-tolling rule. Rico v. United States, 607 U.S. ___, slip op. 1–16 (2026)

The actual release, detention, conviction-credit, warrant, summons, transfer, and expiration records control the term calculation; labels such as “absconded,” “inactive,” or “tolled” cannot replace that chronology. Rico, 607 U.S. ___, slip op. 8–16

Conditions

Section 3583(d) imposes listed mandatory conditions and authorizes discretionary conditions drawn from § 3563(b) plus other appropriate conditions. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)

A discretionary condition must be reasonably related to the specified history, deterrence, protection, and treatment factors, involve no greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary for the specified purposes, and be consistent with Sentencing Commission policy statements. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1)–(3)

Current Guidelines § 5D1.3 distinguishes mandatory, standard, and special conditions and directs individualized selection within the statutory limits; a guideline condition does not override § 3583(d). U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3 (2025)

An occupational restriction under § 5F1.5 requires a reasonably direct relationship between the occupation and offense conduct, necessity to protect the public from similar unlawful conduct, and the minimum time and extent needed. U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5 (2025)

For a person required to register under SORNA, § 3583(d) authorizes the stated search condition only on reasonable suspicion and at a reasonable time and manner, with a probation-officer search also permitted when necessary for the probation officer's duties. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)

The court imposes the condition of supervised release; probation may administer implementation details only within the lawful condition and the controlling circuit's nondelegation boundaries. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)

Whether an internet, treatment, search, association, travel, residence, employment, financial, or third-party-notification condition is valid depends on its precise text, the sentencing record, statutory fit, constitutional burden, and controlling circuit law. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)

Modification, extension, and early termination

Before the term expires or is terminated, the court may modify, reduce, or enlarge conditions under § 3583(e)(2), subject to Rule 32.1(c). 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2); Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(c)

Rule 32.1(c) ordinarily requires a modification hearing, counsel, and an opportunity to make a statement and present mitigation. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(c)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(1)(E)

The court may dispense with a Rule 32.1(c) hearing if the person waives it, or if the proposed change is favorable and does not extend the term and the government has notice, an opportunity to object, and does not object. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(c)(2)

If the original term was shorter than the maximum authorized term, § 3583(e)(2) permits extension before expiration or termination; it does not authorize revival of an already expired term outside § 3583(i). 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2), (i)

After one year of felony supervised release, the court may terminate the remaining term if the person's conduct and the interest of justice warrant it after considering the factors listed in § 3583(e). 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1)

Early termination is discretionary rather than automatic; the statute does not make government or probation consent a prerequisite. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1)

Effective November 1, 2025, Guidelines § 5D1.4 recommends an individualized assessment for modification, early termination after one year, and extension; its consultation recommendation does not add a consent requirement to § 3583(e). U.S.S.G. § 5D1.4 (2025)

Section 3583(e) permits a court to consider excess imprisonment and other verified post-sentencing circumstances when deciding modification or termination, but Johnson does not require a particular equitable result. Johnson, 529 U.S. at 60

For modification, termination, extension, and revocation decisions under § 3583(e), the court considers only the factors that subsection expressly lists, including § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)–(D), (a)(4)–(7), but not § 3553(a)(2)(A). 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)

Transfer and record controls

The sentencing court may transfer jurisdiction over supervised release to another district only with that district court's concurrence; after transfer, the receiving court may exercise the statutory powers specified in § 3605. 18 U.S.C. § 3605

Supervision in another district is not by itself a transfer of judicial jurisdiction; the transfer order, concurrence, docket, and probation arrangements must be distinguished. 18 U.S.C. § 3605

A filing should identify the court holding jurisdiction, requested statutory action, current term calculation, exact condition or relief, supporting record, and any pending violation or transfer proceeding. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e), 3605

Rule 32.1(d) contains only a cross-reference to the governing disposition statutes; it does not itself require written or oral findings, so any findings or reasons requirement must come from another verified authority. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(d)

Practical audit

1. Identify the statute of conviction, offense class, offense date, and offense-specific supervised-release provision.
2. Obtain the judgment, amended judgments, conditions, release date, custody chronology, and current probation record.
3. Calculate commencement and only enacted tolling; do not insert automatic absconding tolling.
4. Confirm which district holds jurisdiction and whether a § 3605 transfer was completed.
5. Select correction, modification, early termination, extension, or a revocation route and apply its distinct hearing and timing rules.

Supervised Release Violations, Rule 32.1, Revocation, and Sentencing

Supervised Release Violations, Rule 32.1, Revocation, and Sentencing

A violation allegation is not a new federal prosecution by default. The operative path is a postjudgment proceeding under Rule 32.1 and § 3583, with constitutional minimums, statutory proof and sentencing limits, current advisory Chapter 7 policy statements, and claim-specific appellate law.

Initial appearance, district, and detention

A person held for an alleged violation must be taken without unnecessary delay before a magistrate judge; Rule 32.1(a)(1) controls the district of initial appearance. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(1)

At the initial appearance the judge must advise the person of the alleged violation, the right to retained or appointed counsel, and—if in custody—the right to a preliminary hearing. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(3)

If the person appears in the district with revocation jurisdiction, whether original or transferred, that court proceeds under Rule 32.1(b)–(e). Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(4)

In a district lacking jurisdiction, an alleged violation occurring in that district requires a preliminary hearing: probable cause leads to transfer, while no probable cause requires dismissal and notice to the jurisdiction court. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(5)(A)

If the alleged violation did not occur in the arrest district, transfer requires the specified certified judgment, warrant, and warrant-application materials plus an identity finding. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(5)(B)

Pending further proceedings, release or detention is governed by § 3143(a)(1); Rule 32.1 places on the person the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that the person will not flee or endanger another person or the community. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(6); 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1)

Preliminary and final hearings

For a person in custody, the preliminary hearing must be prompt and determines probable cause; the person may waive it. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(1)(A)

The preliminary hearing must be recorded and include notice, an opportunity to appear and present evidence, and on request an opportunity to question an adverse witness unless the judge determines the interest of justice does not require appearance. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(1)(B)

The revocation hearing, unless waived, must occur within a reasonable time in the district having jurisdiction; Rule 32.1 does not supply a fixed nationwide day count. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)

At the revocation hearing the person has rights to written notice, disclosure of evidence, counsel, an opportunity to appear and present evidence, questioning of adverse witnesses unless the interest of justice does not require appearance, and a statement and mitigation. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2); 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(1)(E)

Morrissey treats parole revocation as a loss of conditional liberty rather than a new criminal prosecution and identifies minimum due-process protections for preliminary and final parole-revocation proceedings. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480–90 (1972)

Gagnon extends Morrissey's due-process framework to probation revocation and applies a case-specific constitutional counsel inquiry; federal Rule 32.1 and § 3006A independently provide the operative federal counsel protections. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781–91 (1973)

Except for privilege rules, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to proceedings granting or revoking supervised release; Rule 32.1's disclosure and adverse-witness protections still govern. Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3)

Rule 26.2 applies at both revocation and modification hearings, and failure to produce a covered witness statement requires the court not to consider that witness's testimony. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(e)

The current rule uses an “interest of justice” adverse-witness standard; any more specific confrontation balancing test, waiver doctrine, or appellate review rule must be verified in the controlling circuit and record. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(1)(B)(iii), (b)(2)(C)

Violation proof and disposition

The court may revoke supervised release on a preponderance finding that a condition was violated. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)

The maximum imprisonment on any revocation under § 3583(e)(3) is keyed to the class of the original offense—five, three, two, or one year as specified—not to the Chapter 7 violation grade. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)

Section 3583(e)(3) gives no credit for time previously served on postrelease supervision and uses the phrase “on any such revocation”; offense-specific statutes and prior revocation terms still must be audited. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)

Section 3583(g) requires revocation and imprisonment for possession of a controlled substance, firearm possession, refusal to comply with drug testing, or more than three positive illegal-drug tests in one year, subject to the treatment consideration required by § 3583(d). 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), (g)

After revocation imprisonment, § 3583(h) permits a new supervised-release term whose length may not exceed the authorized term for the original offense minus imprisonment imposed on revocation; aggregation beyond the text must follow controlling precedent and the complete revocation record. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h)

Postrevocation penalties are attributed to the original conviction for the constitutional and statutory analysis addressed in Johnson; the decision's historical treatment of pre-1994 law must not replace current § 3583(h). Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 699–713 (2000)

Under Esteras, § 3583(e)'s list is exhaustive and excludes § 3553(a)(2)(A); a revocation court may not use retribution for the underlying offense as a revocation-sentencing factor. Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. ___, slip op. 4–11 (2025)

A court may discuss treatment and may impose appropriate treatment conditions, but it may not impose or lengthen imprisonment to promote rehabilitation. Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 327–35 (2011)

Haymond invalidated the application of § 3583(k)'s judge-found mandatory minimum in the posture before the Court, but Justice Breyer's controlling concurrence rested on three combined features that made § 3583(k) unlike ordinary revocation. United States v. Haymond, 588 U.S. 634, 657–61 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment)

Haymond does not establish a jury-trial requirement for every ordinary § 3583(e)(3) revocation, and the remedy for a particular § 3583(k) case must be taken from controlling post-Haymond law rather than assumed nationally. Haymond, 588 U.S. at 657–61 (Breyer, J., concurring)

Current Chapter 7 policy statements

Effective November 1, 2025, supervised-release violation policy statements are in §§ 7C1.1–7C1.6; legacy citations to §§ 7B1.1–7B1.5 are no longer the current section numbers. U.S.S.G. ch. 7, pt. C (2025)

Section 7C1.1 classifies supervised-release violations by the person's actual conduct and uses the most serious grade when more than one violation exists; the current text enumerates Grades A, B, and C. U.S.S.G. § 7C1.1 (2025)

The current § 7C1.1 introductory sentence says “four grades” but then defines only three; this official-source inconsistency must be preserved as a source anomaly rather than repaired by inventing a Grade D. U.S.S.G. § 7C1.1 (2025)

Section 7C1.2 generally calls for prompt reporting of Grade A and B violations and permits nonreporting of a Grade C violation only within its stated minor, nonpattern, risk, and directive conditions. U.S.S.G. § 7C1.2 (2025)

Section 7C1.3 directs an individualized disposition, recognizes statutory mandatory-revocation provisions, and supplies policy guidance rather than a new statutory command for every violation. U.S.S.G. § 7C1.3 (2025)

Section 7C1.4 generally recommends consecutive revocation imprisonment and addresses additional supervised release, but §§ 3583(e) and (h) set the enacted limits. U.S.S.G. § 7C1.4 (2025)

Section 7C1.5's imprisonment table uses the criminal-history category applicable at the original sentence rather than recalculating a current category. U.S.S.G. § 7C1.5(a) & cmt. n.1 (2025)

For Grade C violations, § 7C1.5 ranges are 3–9, 4–10, 5–11, 6–12, 7–13, and 8–14 months for criminal-history categories I through VI. U.S.S.G. § 7C1.5(a) (2025)

For Grade B violations, § 7C1.5 ranges are 4–10, 6–12, 8–14, 12–18, 18–24, and 21–27 months for categories I through VI. U.S.S.G. § 7C1.5(a) (2025)

For ordinary Grade A violations, § 7C1.5 ranges are 12–18, 15–21, 18–24, 24–30, 30–37, and 33–41 months for categories I through VI. U.S.S.G. § 7C1.5(a) (2025)

For a Grade A violation when the supervised-release term followed a Class A felony sentence, the table instead lists 24–30, 27–33, 30–37, 37–46, 46–57, and 51–63 months for categories I through VI. U.S.S.G. § 7C1.5(a) (2025)

Chapter 7 policy statements are advisory; the court must separately observe § 3583(e)'s factors, statutory cap, mandatory provisions, explanation duties under applicable law, and controlling appellate precedent. U.S.S.G. ch. 7, pt. C (2025)

The Chapter 7 table range and the § 3583(e)(3) statutory ceiling are separate calculations; a table range cannot enlarge the offense-class cap. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3); U.S.S.G. § 7C1.5 (2025)

Expiration, judgment challenge, and appeal

After expiration, revocation power continues only if a warrant or summons based on an alleged violation issued before expiration and the later period is reasonably necessary to adjudicate matters arising before expiration. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i)

Absconding does not substitute for § 3583(i)'s pre-expiration warrant-or-summons requirement; Rico enforces Congress's express delayed-revocation boundary. Rico, 607 U.S. ___, slip op. 11–16

A person may waive the preliminary or final hearing, but the validity and scope of any waiver must be established from the actual record; silence alone is not assigned a universal nationwide effect here. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)

A revocation appeal requires the notice, judgment, violation findings, hearing transcript, admitted materials, objections, sentence reasons, statutory calculations, and controlling circuit standards; no single universal appellate standard is asserted for every issue. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)

A direct challenge to the original judgment or condition and a challenge to a later revocation order are procedurally distinct; vehicle, timeliness, waiver, custody, and appealability must be classified from the challenged order. Johnson, 529 U.S. at 700–01

Rule 32.1(d) does not itself state a written-findings rule; Morrissey, other procedural rules, sentencing statutes, and controlling circuit precedent must be applied for the precise findings or reasons question. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(d)

Revocation audit

1. Establish the jurisdiction court, term expiration, pre-expiration warrant or summons, and any § 3605 transfer.
2. Separate initial appearance, cross-district transfer, detention, preliminary hearing, and final hearing.
3. Identify each condition and the actual conduct alleged; preserve objections and adverse-witness requests.
4. Calculate the original offense class, statutory cap, mandatory provisions, current Chapter 7 grade and table, prior revocation record, and possible § 3583(h) term separately.
5. Exclude § 3553(a)(2)(A), do not lengthen prison for rehabilitation, and treat Haymond narrowly.

Constitutional Conditions, Delegation, and Reentry Remedies

Constitutional Conditions, Delegation, and Reentry Remedies

Reentry problems do not share one federal remedy. Begin with the exact condition, actor, jurisdiction, order, present injury, and requested relief. Judicial supervised-release tools can modify or terminate federal supervision, but they do not automatically remove state licensing, voting, registration, immigration, housing, employment, or private-background consequences.

Condition challenge framework

Every discretionary condition must satisfy § 3583(d)'s relationship, liberty, and policy-statement limits; the exact wording and record matter. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)

A condition listed in the Guidelines remains subject to the statute and constitutional constraints; “standard” does not mean immune from individualized review. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3 (2025)

Packingham invalidated a broad state post-sentence social-media ban under the First Amendment; it is constitutional background, not a holding deciding the validity of a particular federal supervised-release condition. Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98, 104–10 (2017)

An internet or social-media condition requires review of its scope, duration, approval mechanism, offense relationship, less restrictive alternatives, record support, and controlling circuit law; Packingham does not dictate one nationwide supervised-release result. Packingham, 582 U.S. at 104–10

Treatment, testing, search, monitoring, residence, travel, association, contact, employment, financial, and disclosure conditions must each be tested against their own text and burden rather than approved as a package. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)

Conditions affecting family, speech, religion, bodily integrity, occupation, or other substantial liberty interests require especially careful record and circuit-specific review; this system does not declare a categorical nationwide rule without controlling authority. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)

Delegation and probation administration

The court must impose the sentence and its conditions; probation administers supervision within the judicially imposed condition and statutory authority. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)

Whether a condition unlawfully delegates the choice whether a major liberty restriction will exist, or permissibly delegates implementation details, depends on the condition's wording and controlling circuit law. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)

If probation's implementation effectively enlarges or changes the judicial condition, the record should be presented to the court through an authorized clarification or modification route rather than treated as an unreviewable oral command. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2); Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(c)

The judgment, oral pronouncement, written conditions, probation instructions, treatment contract, approval denials, notices, and enforcement record should be preserved separately to identify the source of the disputed obligation. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), (e)

Timing and procedural vehicle

During an unexpired term, § 3583(e)(2) and Rule 32.1(c) provide a route to modify, reduce, or enlarge a condition; the court's jurisdiction and the requested change must be explicit. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2)

A modification request is not a universal substitute for a timely direct appeal from an original condition; claim-processing, waiver, finality, and circuit law must be checked. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2)

After expiration, § 3583(e)(2) no longer supplies ordinary condition-modification jurisdiction, and § 3583(i) preserves only bounded delayed-revocation power meeting its express prerequisites. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2), (i)

When supervision or residence spans districts, verify whether jurisdiction was formally transferred under § 3605 before filing a modification or termination motion. 18 U.S.C. § 3605

The requested remedy should be no broader than necessary: define the words to delete or revise, replacement terms, factual change, legal defect, constitutional burden, and proposed safeguards. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), (e)(2)

Early termination and reentry

After the one-year threshold for felony supervised release, early termination may remove federal supervision if the conduct and interest-of-justice criteria are satisfied; it does not erase the conviction. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1)

Current § 5D1.4 identifies an individualized ongoing-supervision assessment and relevant conduct, risk, compliance, adjustment, and reentry considerations; it remains a policy statement operating within § 3583(e). U.S.S.G. § 5D1.4 (2025)

Compliance with conditions is relevant but does not create automatic entitlement to early termination; exceptional circumstances are not stated as a statutory prerequisite. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1)

A motion may document stable housing, lawful employment, treatment progress, restitution or support compliance, risk reduction, family responsibilities, travel or licensing burdens, and supervision history, but the court applies the statutory factors to verified evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1)

Termination or modification of federal supervised release does not by itself restore voting rights, remove registration duties, alter immigration status, reinstate a license, seal public records, or bind private employers, landlords, or reporting agencies. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)

Voting, jury service, office holding, firearms, occupational licensing, sex-offender registration, immigration, housing, benefits, and employment restrictions each require current consequence-specific federal, state, territorial, or local authority. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)

There is no general federal judicial expungement remedy stated in § 3583(e); any sealing, expungement, certificate, pardon, statutory relief, or record-correction route requires its own jurisdictional authority. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)

If a reentry barrier is caused by a supervised-release condition, modification or termination may be directly relevant; if the barrier instead arises from another sovereign's law, an agency rule, or a private policy, a different decisionmaker and remedy are required. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)

A reentry plan should identify who controls each barrier, the governing jurisdiction, prerequisite records, deadline or trigger, requested act, evidence of eligibility, and the effect of any pending violation or transfer. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e), 3605

Record and remedy map

For condition modification, preserve the original sentencing record, condition text, subsequent orders, probation implementation, changed facts, proposed language, government position, and Rule 32.1(c) hearing or waiver record. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(c)

For early termination, preserve term commencement, one-year eligibility, complete compliance and violation history, restitution or support status, risk and needs information, concrete supervision burdens, probation and government responses, and the requested effective date. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1)

If a condition is enforced through a violation proceeding, the condition challenge, notice, preservation, violation proof, and requested disposition must be coordinated with Rule 32.1 and § 3583(e) rather than litigated as an abstract advisory question. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), (e)

No reentry outcome should be predicted without the current judgment, supervision status, target jurisdiction's law, agency or private decision rule, eligibility facts, and an authorized remedy tied to the responsible decisionmaker. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)

Practical sequence

1. Inventory every active condition and every separate collateral consequence.
2. Identify the source and decisionmaker for each burden.
3. Use direct appeal, modification, termination, transfer, revocation defense, agency review, state relief, or executive clemency only where its jurisdiction exists.
4. Build the actual factual record and request narrow, implementable relief.
5. Verify controlling circuit, local-rule, state, and consequence-specific law before filing.

Circuit Overlays

Circuit Overlays

The overlay layer keeps binding nationwide authority separate from circuit law and makes unresolved circuit propositions visible. Start with the Supreme Court and nationwide floor, then use the circuit with appellate jurisdiction over the actual case.

• First Circuit
• Second Circuit
• Third Circuit
• Fourth Circuit
• Fifth Circuit
• Sixth Circuit
• Seventh Circuit
• Eighth Circuit
• Ninth Circuit
• Tenth Circuit
• Eleventh Circuit
• D.C. Circuit

The administrative-exhaustion comparison now contains a bounded published holding for every regional circuit except the D.C. Circuit. The D.C. Circuit exhaustion row remains expressly not_verified because the public-source review did not locate an exact published controlling BOP/§ 2241 formulation. The First Step Act § 404 procedure-and-review, § 3582(c)(1)(A) defendant-filing procedure, and § 3583(e) modification-or-early-termination comparisons contain bounded published controlling holdings for all 12 regional circuits. The § 3582 comparison preserves whether the filing prerequisite is nonjurisdictional, when waiver or mandatory enforcement applies, the remedy for prematurity, renewed-motion treatment, and the First and D.C. Circuits' express nonholdings on issue exhaustion; it does not import superseded compassionate-release merits law. The § 3583(e) comparison separately preserves early termination, condition modification, factor consideration, explanation, changed-circumstance, hearing, pending-appeal jurisdiction, and collateral-attack limits rather than presenting a false uniform rule. The federal-process § 2241 COA comparison contains a bounded published controlling holding for every regional circuit except the Fourth Circuit; that circuit remains not_verified because current Rule 22 and unpublished dispositions do not establish the exact published precedential formulation required by this project. The residual-writ comparison contains bounded published audita-querela holdings for the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits. The Fourth and Eighth Circuits remain not_verified because the located published or unpublished material did not decide the required controlling question, and the Sixth Circuit remains not_verified because its squarely relevant Ejelonu panel opinion was vacated on rehearing en banc and the appeal was dismissed. All other unresolved issue rows remain not_verified until a current published precedential opinion and applicable local rule are checked; silence is never treated as a rule.

Supreme Court and Nationwide Floor

Supreme Court and Nationwide Floor

This overlay is the jurisdiction guardrail for the circuit pages. It identifies the nationwide source hierarchy and the questions that remain circuit sensitive; it does not restate every claim in the canonical process modules.

Controlling hierarchy

1. Current Constitution and statutes.
2. Current Federal Rules and valid nationwide regulations.
3. Controlling Supreme Court holdings in the actual procedural posture.
4. Published, current law of the circuit with jurisdiction.
5. Circuit local rules, internal operating procedures, and standing orders.
6. Persuasive authority, labeled as such.

Nationwide floor and circuit-sensitive remainder

Circuit pages

• First Circuit
• Second Circuit
• Third Circuit
• Fourth Circuit
• Fifth Circuit
• Sixth Circuit
• Seventh Circuit
• Eighth Circuit
• Ninth Circuit
• Tenth Circuit
• Eleventh Circuit
• D.C. Circuit

Verification limits

The circuit pages record publication status, conflicts, local-rule source, split status, and check date. An entry marked not_verified is a conspicuous research dependency that flows into the Jira backlog. No absence of a listed circuit case should be read as a legal conclusion.

First Circuit Overlay

First Circuit Overlay

This page prevents nationwide rules from being mistaken for First Circuit doctrine and prevents unresearched circuit law from being guessed. It is a bounded overlay, not an exhaustive treatise or a substitute for the current docket, published opinions, local rules, or citator.

Official rule source and currency

• Official First Circuit rules and procedures
• Official rules portal and rulebook effective through June 1, 2026 checked on 2026-08-25.
• Source authority: AUTH-CA1-LOCAL-RULES.
• A portal check does not prove that no issue-specific local rule exists. Open the current rule, amendments, internal operating procedures, and standing orders for the actual filing.

Verified circuit holdings

• CLM-CIR1-001: In the First Circuit, a federal sentence-credit request under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) must first be presented to the Bureau of Prisons; after administrative exhaustion, the prisoner may seek review of the BOP determination through § 2241. Rogers v. United States, 180 F.3d 349, 357–58 (1st Cir. 1999)

Limitation: Binding only in the First Circuit and limited to BOP sentence-credit computation. Rogers does not supply a general catalog of exhaustion exceptions or characterize every § 2241 exhaustion rule.

• CLM-CIR1-002: In the First Circuit, appellate review of a First Step Act § 404 ruling is deferential absent a legal benchmark error; the district court may explain its exercise of discretion briefly, and the explanation may be understood from the full record, but it must show consideration of the parties' nonfrivolous arguments. United States v. Rodríguez-Reyes, No. 23-2037, slip op. at 9–15 (1st Cir. June 10, 2026)

Limitation: Binding only in the First Circuit. Rodríguez-Reyes does not require a detailed rebuttal to every argument or a sentence reduction, and the adequacy of an explanation remains record dependent.

• CLM-CIR1-003: In the First Circuit, the certificate-of-appealability and appellate preclearance requirements do not directly apply to a federal prisoner's claim that actually proceeds under § 2241; whether a filing is properly classified under § 2241 rather than § 2255 remains a separate question. United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d 34, 42 (1st Cir. 1999)

Limitation: Binding only in the First Circuit and limited to the COA consequence after correct classification. Barrett involved alternative § 2255, § 2241, and All Writs Act theories; no saving-clause merits rule is adopted, and current filing-office instructions should be checked before filing.

• CLM-CIR1-004: In the First Circuit, § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s defendant-filing prerequisite is a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule; the court has expressly left unresolved whether, and to what extent, a defendant must present each ground to the warden before relying on it in court. United States v. Texeira-Nieves, 23 F.4th 48, 52–53 (1st Cir. 2022)

Limitation: Binding only in the First Circuit. Texeira-Nieves assumed issue exhaustion rather than deciding it; this claim does not establish which factual or legal grounds must match the warden request, and it does not adopt the opinion's superseded discussion of the former policy-statement landscape.

• CLM-CIR1-005: In the First Circuit, a pending appeal from a supervised-release revocation does not divest the district court of its continuing § 3583(e)(2) authority to modify release conditions during the term of supervision. United States v. D'Amario, 412 F.3d 253, 255–56 (1st Cir. 2005)

Limitation: Binding only in the First Circuit and limited to continuing modification jurisdiction while a revocation appeal was pending. D'Amario does not establish an early-termination standard, a changed-circumstances rule, or a universal hearing rule.

• CLM-CIR1-006: In the First Circuit, assuming audita querela survives in federal criminal cases, it can address only a legal objection arising after conviction that is not redressable through another postconviction remedy; equitable hardship alone is insufficient. United States v. Holder, 936 F.2d 1, 2–5 (1st Cir. 1991)

Limitation: Binding only in the First Circuit. Holder expressly did not decide whether audita querela survives; it rejected a pure-equity immigration-consequence theory and did not identify any actual remedial gap. Section 2255 classification and the current nationwide limits, including Jones v. Hendrix, still must be applied independently.

Circuit-sensitive issue register

Each row records the nationwide floor, the circuit rule actually verified or the exact missing source, intra-circuit conflict status, publication status, relevant local-rule source, inter-circuit comparison, current-split status, and the check date. “Not verified” is a stop condition, not an invitation to infer the rule.

Application controls

1. Classify the judgment, custody source, motion, court, requested relief, and appellate posture before selecting an overlay row.
2. Use only a verified published circuit holding for a circuit proposition; do not promote a district opinion, unpublished disposition, dicta, or a party's characterization into binding law.
3. Run a current citator and check en banc, Supreme Court, statutory, rule, and local-rule changes before filing.
4. Preserve issue presentation, objections, the operative record, deadline trigger, and the governing standard of review.
5. If the issue register says not_verified, use the linked nationwide module only for its bounded nationwide proposition and obtain the missing controlling authority.

Coverage and limitations

• Canonical overlay claims on this page: CLM-CIR1-001, CLM-CIR1-002, CLM-CIR1-003, CLM-CIR1-004, CLM-CIR1-005, CLM-CIR1-006.
• Comprehensive commercial citator: not run.
• Individual docket, judgment, custody, and administrative record: not reviewed.
• Issue-specific local-rule absence: not asserted.
• Unverified rows are included in the coverage matrix and therefore the generated Jira backlog.

Second Circuit Overlay

Second Circuit Overlay

This page prevents nationwide rules from being mistaken for Second Circuit doctrine and prevents unresearched circuit law from being guessed. It is a bounded overlay, not an exhaustive treatise or a substitute for the current docket, published opinions, local rules, or citator.

Official rule source and currency

• Official Second Circuit rules and procedures
• Official rules repository checked on 2026-08-25; issue-specific current text must be opened before use.
• Source authority: AUTH-CA2-LOCAL-RULES.
• A portal check does not prove that no issue-specific local rule exists. Open the current rule, amendments, internal operating procedures, and standing orders for the actual filing.

Verified circuit holdings

• CLM-CIR2-001: In the Second Circuit, federal prisoners ordinarily must exhaust BOP remedies before § 2241 review; when a prisoner procedurally defaults and the administrative path has closed, review is barred unless cause and prejudice are shown. Carmona v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 243 F.3d 629, 633–34 (2d Cir. 2001)

Limitation: Binding only in the Second Circuit and limited to a federal disciplinary proceeding and procedural default. Legitimate circumstances beyond the prisoner's control may supply cause, but this claim does not define every excuse from ordinary exhaustion.

• CLM-CIR2-002: In the Second Circuit, a district court is not categorically required to hold a hearing at which the defendant is present before denying a First Step Act § 404 sentence-reduction motion. United States v. Gadsden, 982 F.3d 106, 112–15 (2d Cir. 2020)

Limitation: Binding only in the Second Circuit and limited to the absence of a categorical hearing-and-presence requirement before denial. Gadsden does not prohibit a hearing, resolve every due-process question, or excuse compliance with Concepcion's later nationwide explanation rule.

• CLM-CIR2-003: In the Second Circuit, § 2253(c)'s certificate-of-appealability requirement does not apply to a federal habeas proceeding under § 2241. Drax v. Reno, 338 F.3d 98, 106 n.12 (2d Cir. 2003)

Limitation: Binding only in the Second Circuit. Drax arose from federal immigration detention; the proposition does not address state-process detention, § 2255 proceedings, or whether a filing is correctly classified under § 2241.

• CLM-CIR2-004: In the Second Circuit, § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s defendant-filing prerequisite is a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule that the government may waive or forfeit; after the government withdrew the defense, the district court could consider the motion even if the defendant had not satisfied the prerequisite. United States v. Saladino, 7 F.4th 120, 121–24 (2d Cir. 2021)

Limitation: Binding only in the Second Circuit. The panel did not decide which of two competing readings of the 30-day route was correct; the separate concurrence's equitable-exception analysis is not attributed to the court.

• CLM-CIR2-005: In the Second Circuit, a court deciding whether to modify or terminate supervised release must consider the § 3583(e) subset of § 3553(a) factors, but it need not make a separate factual finding on each factor; a statement, read with the record, that the statutory factors were considered is sufficient. United States v. Gammarano, 321 F.3d 311, 315–16 (2d Cir. 2003)

Limitation: Binding only in the Second Circuit. Gammarano does not require a particular explanation length, create a presumption of termination, or decide whether changed circumstances are required for condition modification; Parisi separately clarifies that they are not.

• CLM-CIR2-006: In the Second Circuit, audita querela supplies at most a hypothetical avenue when the complete absence of collateral review would raise serious constitutional questions; a nonretroactive Booker claim did not create that circumstance or a remedial gap. United States v. Richter, 510 F.3d 103, 104 (2d Cir. 2007)

Limitation: Binding only in the Second Circuit. Richter did not hold that the writ lies in any actual case, did not make statutory nonretroactivity a constitutional defect, and predates Jones v. Hendrix; no post-Jones expansion or exception is inferred.

Circuit-sensitive issue register

Each row records the nationwide floor, the circuit rule actually verified or the exact missing source, intra-circuit conflict status, publication status, relevant local-rule source, inter-circuit comparison, current-split status, and the check date. “Not verified” is a stop condition, not an invitation to infer the rule.

Application controls

1. Classify the judgment, custody source, motion, court, requested relief, and appellate posture before selecting an overlay row.
2. Use only a verified published circuit holding for a circuit proposition; do not promote a district opinion, unpublished disposition, dicta, or a party's characterization into binding law.
3. Run a current citator and check en banc, Supreme Court, statutory, rule, and local-rule changes before filing.
4. Preserve issue presentation, objections, the operative record, deadline trigger, and the governing standard of review.
5. If the issue register says not_verified, use the linked nationwide module only for its bounded nationwide proposition and obtain the missing controlling authority.

Coverage and limitations

• Canonical overlay claims on this page: CLM-CIR2-001, CLM-CIR2-002, CLM-CIR2-003, CLM-CIR2-004, CLM-CIR2-005, CLM-CIR2-006.
• Comprehensive commercial citator: not run.
• Individual docket, judgment, custody, and administrative record: not reviewed.
• Issue-specific local-rule absence: not asserted.
• Unverified rows are included in the coverage matrix and therefore the generated Jira backlog.

Third Circuit Overlay

Third Circuit Overlay

This page prevents nationwide rules from being mistaken for Third Circuit doctrine and prevents unresearched circuit law from being guessed. It is a bounded overlay, not an exhaustive treatise or a substitute for the current docket, published opinions, local rules, or citator.

Official rule source and currency

• Official Third Circuit rules and procedures
• Official rules-and-requirements portal checked on 2026-08-25; linked instruments carry their own dates.
• Source authority: AUTH-CA3-LOCAL-RULES.
• A portal check does not prove that no issue-specific local rule exists. Open the current rule, amendments, internal operating procedures, and standing orders for the actual filing.

Verified circuit holdings

• CLM-CIR3-001: In the Third Circuit, 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)'s certificate-of-appealability requirement did not apply to the federal prisoner's appeal from denial of a saving-clause § 2241 petition; that classification does not establish saving-clause availability on the merits. Bruce v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 868 F.3d 170, 177 n.3 (3d Cir. 2017)

Limitation: Bruce's saving-clause merits analysis is limited by Jones v. Hendrix. This record uses only the published opinion's COA proposition and does not decide a state-process detention appeal or a § 2255 appeal.

• CLM-CIR3-002: In the Third Circuit, federal prisoners ordinarily must exhaust administrative remedies before a § 2241 petition; a procedural default that closes the administrative path bars merits review unless the prisoner shows cause and prejudice. Moscato v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760–62 (3d Cir. 1996)

Limitation: Binding only in the Third Circuit and limited to federal institutional discipline and a defaulted administrative appeal. It does not establish that every unexhausted filing is jurisdictionally barred.

• CLM-CIR3-003: In the Third Circuit, § 404 does not itself entitle a defendant to an in-person or plenary resentencing hearing, but the defendant must receive a reasonable opportunity to present written sentencing arguments, and the court must give enough explanation for meaningful appellate review. United States v. Shields, 48 F.4th 183, 195–202 (3d Cir. 2022)

Limitation: Binding only in the Third Circuit. Shields does not create an entitlement to oral allocution or a plenary resentencing; its error finding turned on denying both a hearing and the requested opportunity for written sentencing submissions in the circumstances presented.

• CLM-CIR3-004: In the Third Circuit, a defendant's § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion must be addressed first to the sentencing court; a motion made before 30 days elapsed and without completed administrative review was a roadblock that defeated first-instance appellate relief and made a limited remand futile. United States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594, 595–97 (3d Cir. 2020)

Limitation: Binding only in the Third Circuit and limited to Raia's unusual posture, where a government sentencing appeal was pending and the defendant asked the court of appeals to grant relief or remand. The claim does not rely on Raia's pandemic-specific merits observations or convert its procedural holding into a universal issue-exhaustion rule.

• CLM-CIR3-005: In the Third Circuit, § 3583(e)(1) does not require an exceptional, extraordinary, new, or unforeseen circumstance before early termination may be granted, although changed circumstances may often be relevant to the discretionary assessment. United States v. Melvin, 978 F.3d 49, 52–53 (3d Cir. 2020)

Limitation: Binding only in the Third Circuit. Melvin disavows a threshold prerequisite but does not guarantee relief for compliance, eliminate factor consideration, or prescribe the result on remand.

• CLM-CIR3-006: In the Third Circuit, the All Writs Act is residual and cannot displace § 2255: a federal-sentence claim cognizable under § 2255 cannot be recast as audita querela, and prior use of § 2255 or the successive-motion gate does not create a gap. Massey v. United States, 581 F.3d 172, 174 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam)

Limitation: Binding only in the Third Circuit. Massey involved a Booker sentencing claim by a prisoner who had already pursued § 2255; it does not establish that audita querela survives or define relief outside § 2255's field.

Circuit-sensitive issue register

Each row records the nationwide floor, the circuit rule actually verified or the exact missing source, intra-circuit conflict status, publication status, relevant local-rule source, inter-circuit comparison, current-split status, and the check date. “Not verified” is a stop condition, not an invitation to infer the rule.

Application controls

1. Classify the judgment, custody source, motion, court, requested relief, and appellate posture before selecting an overlay row.
2. Use only a verified published circuit holding for a circuit proposition; do not promote a district opinion, unpublished disposition, dicta, or a party's characterization into binding law.
3. Run a current citator and check en banc, Supreme Court, statutory, rule, and local-rule changes before filing.
4. Preserve issue presentation, objections, the operative record, deadline trigger, and the governing standard of review.
5. If the issue register says not_verified, use the linked nationwide module only for its bounded nationwide proposition and obtain the missing controlling authority.

Coverage and limitations

• Canonical overlay claims on this page: CLM-CIR3-001, CLM-CIR3-002, CLM-CIR3-003, CLM-CIR3-004, CLM-CIR3-005, CLM-CIR3-006.
• Comprehensive commercial citator: not run.
• Individual docket, judgment, custody, and administrative record: not reviewed.
• Issue-specific local-rule absence: not asserted.
• Unverified rows are included in the coverage matrix and therefore the generated Jira backlog.

Fourth Circuit Overlay

Fourth Circuit Overlay

This page prevents nationwide rules from being mistaken for Fourth Circuit doctrine and prevents unresearched circuit law from being guessed. It is a bounded overlay, not an exhaustive treatise or a substitute for the current docket, published opinions, local rules, or citator.

Official rule source and currency

• Official Fourth Circuit rules and procedures
• Official rulebook dated December 1, 2025 checked on 2026-08-25.
• Source authority: AUTH-CA4-LOCAL-RULES.
• A portal check does not prove that no issue-specific local rule exists. Open the current rule, amendments, internal operating procedures, and standing orders for the actual filing.

Verified circuit holdings

• CLM-CIR4-001: The Fourth Circuit recognizes administrative exhaustion as a judicial restraint that can make a § 2241 petition premature, but not as a jurisdictional prerequisite to the district court's habeas power. Dragenice v. Ridge, 389 F.3d 92, 98 (4th Cir. 2004)

Limitation: Binding only in the Fourth Circuit. Dragenice involved immigration detention and a pending removal proceeding, not the BOP Part 542 remedy program, so it does not establish BOP-specific steps or exceptions.

• CLM-CIR4-002: In the Fourth Circuit, § 404 does not require a reduction even when the existing sentence exceeds a revised statutory maximum, but the record must demonstrate that the district court considered every nonfrivolous argument presented; an ambiguous record can require vacatur and remand. United States v. Reed, 58 F.4th 816, 819–23 (4th Cir. 2023)

Limitation: Binding only in the Fourth Circuit. Reed recognizes that Concepcion displaced Collington's mandatory-reduction rule; it does not guarantee a reduction or make every sparse order reversible.

• CLM-CIR4-003: In the Fourth Circuit, § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s threshold requirement is nonjurisdictional and waived if not timely raised; after first asking the warden, a defendant may file upon full administrative exhaustion or 30 days after the warden's receipt, whichever occurs first, even if the warden denied the request during those 30 days. United States v. Muhammad, 16 F.4th 126, 129–31 (4th Cir. 2021)

Limitation: Binding only in the Fourth Circuit. Muhammad addresses the statutory filing gateway, not whether later judicial grounds must match the warden request or the merits of compassionate release.

• CLM-CIR4-004: In the Fourth Circuit, § 3583(e)(1) ordinarily authorizes a conduct-based inquiry and permits consideration of a broad range of interests-of-justice factors, but it is not a mechanism for collaterally attacking an original, unappealed sentence. United States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282–83 (4th Cir. 1999)

Limitation: Binding only in the Fourth Circuit. Pregent reviewed denial for abuse of discretion and did not create entitlement to termination whenever conduct and interests of justice favor relief; the original-sentence challenge belongs in the procedurally proper review vehicle.

Circuit-sensitive issue register

Each row records the nationwide floor, the circuit rule actually verified or the exact missing source, intra-circuit conflict status, publication status, relevant local-rule source, inter-circuit comparison, current-split status, and the check date. “Not verified” is a stop condition, not an invitation to infer the rule.

Application controls

1. Classify the judgment, custody source, motion, court, requested relief, and appellate posture before selecting an overlay row.
2. Use only a verified published circuit holding for a circuit proposition; do not promote a district opinion, unpublished disposition, dicta, or a party's characterization into binding law.
3. Run a current citator and check en banc, Supreme Court, statutory, rule, and local-rule changes before filing.
4. Preserve issue presentation, objections, the operative record, deadline trigger, and the governing standard of review.
5. If the issue register says not_verified, use the linked nationwide module only for its bounded nationwide proposition and obtain the missing controlling authority.

Coverage and limitations

• Canonical overlay claims on this page: CLM-CIR4-001, CLM-CIR4-002, CLM-CIR4-003, CLM-CIR4-004.
• Comprehensive commercial citator: not run.
• Individual docket, judgment, custody, and administrative record: not reviewed.
• Issue-specific local-rule absence: not asserted.
• Unverified rows are included in the coverage matrix and therefore the generated Jira backlog.

Fifth Circuit Overlay

Fifth Circuit Overlay

This page prevents nationwide rules from being mistaken for Fifth Circuit doctrine and prevents unresearched circuit law from being guessed. It is a bounded overlay, not an exhaustive treatise or a substitute for the current docket, published opinions, local rules, or citator.

Official rule source and currency

• Official Fifth Circuit rules and procedures
• Official rules-and-procedures repository checked on 2026-08-25; issue-specific current text must be opened before use.
• Source authority: AUTH-CA5-LOCAL-RULES.
• A portal check does not prove that no issue-specific local rule exists. Open the current rule, amendments, internal operating procedures, and standing orders for the actual filing.

Verified circuit holdings

• CLM-CIR5-001: In the Fifth Circuit, a federal prisoner challenging a Parole Commission decision ordinarily must exhaust before § 2241 review; an exception requires extraordinary circumstances such as an unavailable or wholly inappropriate remedy or a patently futile course, and the prisoner bears the burden. Fuller v. Rich, 11 F.3d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1994)

Limitation: Binding only in the Fifth Circuit and limited to a Parole Commission administrative appeal. The opinion required presentation even when the appeal might be rejected as untimely and does not excuse BOP Part 542 exhaustion on speculation alone.

• CLM-CIR5-002: In the Fifth Circuit, § 404(c)'s bar on a later motion after a prior merits denial is a mandatory claim-processing rule rather than a jurisdictional limit; when the government properly invokes the bar and the first motion received a complete merits review, the court must enforce it. United States v. Naranjo, 102 F.4th 280, 283–85 (5th Cir. 2024)

Limitation: Binding only in the Fifth Circuit and limited to § 404(c)'s successive-motion bar. Naranjo does not resolve hearing rights, the merits of an initial motion, or whether a materially different prior disposition was a complete merits review.

• CLM-CIR5-003: In the Fifth Circuit, a federal prisoner proceeding under § 2241 does not need a certificate of appealability to appeal the denial of the petition. Jeffers v. Chandler, 253 F.3d 827, 830 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)

Limitation: Binding only in the Fifth Circuit and limited to the COA rule after correct § 2241 classification. Jeffers's saving-clause merits analysis is not adopted and must be read in light of later Supreme Court law.

• CLM-CIR5-004: In the Fifth Circuit, § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s defendant-filing prerequisite is a nonjurisdictional but mandatory claim-processing rule: both statutory routes begin with a request to BOP, and a court must enforce the rule when the government properly raises it. United States v. Franco, 973 F.3d 465, 467–69 (5th Cir. 2020)

Limitation: Binding only in the Fifth Circuit. Franco involved a defendant who made no BOP request before filing and does not decide issue exhaustion after a qualifying request or the merits of relief.

• CLM-CIR5-005: In the Fifth Circuit, changed circumstances are not a jurisdictional prerequisite to modifying a supervised-release condition under § 3583(e)(2), but illegality alone is not one of the enumerated grounds and cannot itself supply the basis for modification. United States v. Caillier, 79 F.4th 506, 509–12 (5th Cir. 2023)

Limitation: Binding only in the Fifth Circuit. Caillier permits modification for statutory reasons such as deterrence and public safety even when an invalid original condition prompted review; it does not allow § 3583(e)(2) to replace direct or collateral review of legality.

• CLM-CIR5-006: In the Fifth Circuit, assuming audita querela survives in criminal cases, it is limited to a postjudgment legal objection unavailable through another postconviction remedy; purely equitable grounds are insufficient. United States v. Miller, 599 F.3d 484, 488–90 (5th Cir. 2010)

Limitation: Binding only in the Fifth Circuit. Miller left survival of the writ open and arose from a restitution-offset request; its actual disposition does not establish that AEDPA limits, nonretroactivity, or hardship alone creates a gap.

Circuit-sensitive issue register

Each row records the nationwide floor, the circuit rule actually verified or the exact missing source, intra-circuit conflict status, publication status, relevant local-rule source, inter-circuit comparison, current-split status, and the check date. “Not verified” is a stop condition, not an invitation to infer the rule.

Application controls

1. Classify the judgment, custody source, motion, court, requested relief, and appellate posture before selecting an overlay row.
2. Use only a verified published circuit holding for a circuit proposition; do not promote a district opinion, unpublished disposition, dicta, or a party's characterization into binding law.
3. Run a current citator and check en banc, Supreme Court, statutory, rule, and local-rule changes before filing.
4. Preserve issue presentation, objections, the operative record, deadline trigger, and the governing standard of review.
5. If the issue register says not_verified, use the linked nationwide module only for its bounded nationwide proposition and obtain the missing controlling authority.

Coverage and limitations

• Canonical overlay claims on this page: CLM-CIR5-001, CLM-CIR5-002, CLM-CIR5-003, CLM-CIR5-004, CLM-CIR5-005, CLM-CIR5-006.
• Comprehensive commercial citator: not run.
• Individual docket, judgment, custody, and administrative record: not reviewed.
• Issue-specific local-rule absence: not asserted.
• Unverified rows are included in the coverage matrix and therefore the generated Jira backlog.

Sixth Circuit Overlay

Sixth Circuit Overlay

This page prevents nationwide rules from being mistaken for Sixth Circuit doctrine and prevents unresearched circuit law from being guessed. It is a bounded overlay, not an exhaustive treatise or a substitute for the current docket, published opinions, local rules, or citator.

Official rule source and currency

• Official Sixth Circuit rules and procedures
• Official rulebook amended July 13, 2026 checked on 2026-08-25.
• Source authority: AUTH-CA6-LOCAL-RULES.
• A portal check does not prove that no issue-specific local rule exists. Open the current rule, amendments, internal operating procedures, and standing orders for the actual filing.

Verified circuit holdings

• CLM-CIR6-001: In the Sixth Circuit, federal prisoners ordinarily must exhaust before filing under § 2241, but the judge-made requirement may be excused where remedies are futile or cannot provide the relief sought, or where the administrator—not the prisoner—caused the failure; a missing final response does not automatically defeat exhaustion. Fazzini v. Northeast Ohio Correctional Center, 473 F.3d 229, 231–36 (6th Cir. 2006)

Limitation: Binding only in the Sixth Circuit and arising from a Parole Commission appeal. The opinion's treatment of what must be attached at pleading is distinct from whether a particular BOP Part 542 claim was properly exhausted.

• CLM-CIR6-002: In the Sixth Circuit, the § 404 benchmark recalculation incorporates only the Fair Sentencing Act's retroactive changes; the court then may consider other relevant intervening information, must reason through nonfrivolous arguments, and must explain the decision adequately for abuse-of-discretion review. United States v. Domenech, 63 F.4th 1078, 1083–86 (6th Cir. 2023)

Limitation: Binding only in the Sixth Circuit. Domenech does not require the benchmark Guidelines range to absorb nonretroactive changes and does not require a reduction; reassignment on remand was tied to the repeated failures in that record.

• CLM-CIR6-003: In the Sixth Circuit, no certificate of appealability is required for a § 2241 appeal when the detention arises from federal process; § 2253(c)(1)'s state-process and § 2255 categories remain controlling. Witham v. United States, 355 F.3d 501, 504 (6th Cir. 2004)

Limitation: Binding only in the Sixth Circuit. Witham involved federal court-martial process; the opinion does not eliminate a COA for state-process detention or § 2255 and does not decide whether a filing is correctly classified under § 2241.

• CLM-CIR6-004: In the Sixth Circuit, § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s defendant-filing prerequisite is nonjurisdictional but mandatory when the government timely invokes it; courts may not create a pandemic or futility exception, and a prematurely filed motion is dismissed without prejudice. United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 832–36 (6th Cir. 2020)

Limitation: Binding only in the Sixth Circuit. Alam recognizes waiver or forfeiture of the nonjurisdictional rule but found neither because the government objected throughout; its pandemic discussion does not supply a current merits rule.

• CLM-CIR6-005: In the Sixth Circuit, § 3583(e)(1) does not make exceptionally good behavior an absolute prerequisite to early termination; conduct and changed circumstances remain relevant within the statute's broader discretionary inquiry. United States v. Hale, No. 24-5362, slip op. at 3–5 (6th Cir. Jan. 30, 2025)

Limitation: Binding only in the Sixth Circuit. Hale rejects a categorical threshold and vacated for use of the wrong standard; it does not hold ordinary compliance sufficient or direct that termination be granted.

Circuit-sensitive issue register

Each row records the nationwide floor, the circuit rule actually verified or the exact missing source, intra-circuit conflict status, publication status, relevant local-rule source, inter-circuit comparison, current-split status, and the check date. “Not verified” is a stop condition, not an invitation to infer the rule.

Application controls

1. Classify the judgment, custody source, motion, court, requested relief, and appellate posture before selecting an overlay row.
2. Use only a verified published circuit holding for a circuit proposition; do not promote a district opinion, unpublished disposition, dicta, or a party's characterization into binding law.
3. Run a current citator and check en banc, Supreme Court, statutory, rule, and local-rule changes before filing.
4. Preserve issue presentation, objections, the operative record, deadline trigger, and the governing standard of review.
5. If the issue register says not_verified, use the linked nationwide module only for its bounded nationwide proposition and obtain the missing controlling authority.

Coverage and limitations

• Canonical overlay claims on this page: CLM-CIR6-001, CLM-CIR6-002, CLM-CIR6-003, CLM-CIR6-004, CLM-CIR6-005.
• Comprehensive commercial citator: not run.
• Individual docket, judgment, custody, and administrative record: not reviewed.
• Issue-specific local-rule absence: not asserted.
• Unverified rows are included in the coverage matrix and therefore the generated Jira backlog.

Seventh Circuit Overlay

Seventh Circuit Overlay

This page prevents nationwide rules from being mistaken for Seventh Circuit doctrine and prevents unresearched circuit law from being guessed. It is a bounded overlay, not an exhaustive treatise or a substitute for the current docket, published opinions, local rules, or citator.

Official rule source and currency

• Official Seventh Circuit rules and procedures
• Official rulebook dated December 1, 2025 checked on 2026-08-25.
• Source authority: AUTH-CA7-LOCAL-RULES.
• A portal check does not prove that no issue-specific local rule exists. Open the current rule, amendments, internal operating procedures, and standing orders for the actual filing.

Verified circuit holdings

• CLM-CIR7-001: The Seventh Circuit applies a common-law exhaustion rule to § 2241 even though the PLRA's statutory exhaustion rule does not apply; judge-made exceptions exist, but the hurdle is high and self-created delay does not establish an excuse. Richmond v. Scibana, 387 F.3d 602, 604–06 (7th Cir. 2004)

Limitation: Binding only in the Seventh Circuit. Richmond ultimately classified the placement-policy challenge outside § 2241, so the common-law exhaustion proposition must not be converted into a merits holding that every BOP placement challenge sounds in habeas.

• CLM-CIR7-002: In the Seventh Circuit, the adequacy of a § 404 explanation is context dependent; a district court abuses its discretion when a materially changed record presents new nonfrivolous arguments and the ruling effectively repeats an earlier order without showing that those arguments were considered. United States v. Williams, 93 F.4th 389, 391–94 (7th Cir. 2024)

Limitation: Binding only in the Seventh Circuit. Williams does not prescribe a required explanation length or guarantee relief; it addresses a current record materially different from the one underlying the earlier order.

• CLM-CIR7-003: In the Seventh Circuit, a federal prisoner properly proceeding under § 2241 does not need a certificate of appealability; for federal cases, § 2253(c) extends the COA requirement to § 2255 but not to § 2241. Walker v. O'Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 638 (7th Cir. 2000)

Limitation: Binding only in the Seventh Circuit and limited to federal-process custody. Walker's separate treatment of state-prisoner petitions is not adopted as a nationwide rule, and proceeding classification remains a distinct inquiry.

• CLM-CIR7-004: In the Seventh Circuit, § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s defendant-filing prerequisite is an affirmative defense and a mandatory claim-processing rule: the government can forfeit it, but the court must enforce it when the government properly invokes it. United States v. Sanford, 986 F.3d 779, 781–82 (7th Cir. 2021)

Limitation: Binding only in the Seventh Circuit. Sanford resolved a motion filed three days after the warden received the request and did not reach the merits or establish a general issue-exhaustion rule.

• CLM-CIR7-005: In the Seventh Circuit, an early-termination ruling must give some indication that the district court considered the statutory factors; a blanket policy of waiting until only twelve months of supervision remain circumvents § 3583(e)(1)'s individualized process. United States v. Lowe, 632 F.3d 996, 998–99 (7th Cir. 2011)

Limitation: Binding only in the Seventh Circuit. Lowe does not require findings on every factor or a hearing on every motion; it requires a reviewable indication of factor consideration and rejects the categorical timing policy used there.

• CLM-CIR7-006: In the Seventh Circuit, audita querela would require a legal defense or discharge arising after judgment; equity, harsh collateral consequences, or gross injustice alone does not satisfy that requirement. United States v. Johnson, 962 F.2d 579, 581–83 (7th Cir. 1992)

Limitation: Binding only in the Seventh Circuit. Johnson declined to decide the writ's ultimate survival and addressed a deportation consequence after conviction; no broader gap or § 2255-circumvention rule is inferred beyond the opinion's express limits.

Circuit-sensitive issue register

Each row records the nationwide floor, the circuit rule actually verified or the exact missing source, intra-circuit conflict status, publication status, relevant local-rule source, inter-circuit comparison, current-split status, and the check date. “Not verified” is a stop condition, not an invitation to infer the rule.

Application controls

1. Classify the judgment, custody source, motion, court, requested relief, and appellate posture before selecting an overlay row.
2. Use only a verified published circuit holding for a circuit proposition; do not promote a district opinion, unpublished disposition, dicta, or a party's characterization into binding law.
3. Run a current citator and check en banc, Supreme Court, statutory, rule, and local-rule changes before filing.
4. Preserve issue presentation, objections, the operative record, deadline trigger, and the governing standard of review.
5. If the issue register says not_verified, use the linked nationwide module only for its bounded nationwide proposition and obtain the missing controlling authority.

Coverage and limitations

• Canonical overlay claims on this page: CLM-CIR7-001, CLM-CIR7-002, CLM-CIR7-003, CLM-CIR7-004, CLM-CIR7-005, CLM-CIR7-006.
• Comprehensive commercial citator: not run.
• Individual docket, judgment, custody, and administrative record: not reviewed.
• Issue-specific local-rule absence: not asserted.
• Unverified rows are included in the coverage matrix and therefore the generated Jira backlog.

Eighth Circuit Overlay

Eighth Circuit Overlay

This page prevents nationwide rules from being mistaken for Eighth Circuit doctrine and prevents unresearched circuit law from being guessed. It is a bounded overlay, not an exhaustive treatise or a substitute for the current docket, published opinions, local rules, or citator.

Official rule source and currency

• Official Eighth Circuit rules and procedures
• Official rules-and-procedures repository checked on 2026-08-25; the linked local-rules PDF is dated June 17, 2024.
• Source authority: AUTH-CA8-LOCAL-RULES.
• A portal check does not prove that no issue-specific local rule exists. Open the current rule, amendments, internal operating procedures, and standing orders for the actual filing.

Verified circuit holdings

• CLM-CIR8-001: In the Eighth Circuit, a prisoner challenging the BOP's execution of a federal sentence must first present the claim to the BOP; failure to request the available BOP designation required dismissal of the § 2241 petition without prejudice. Mathena v. United States, 577 F.3d 943, 946 (8th Cir. 2009)

Limitation: Binding only in the Eighth Circuit and limited to the available nunc pro tunc designation process in the sentence-execution posture. No general exception rule is inferred.

• CLM-CIR8-002: In the Eighth Circuit, eligibility under § 404 is reviewed de novo and the grant or denial of an eligible motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion; the First Step Act does not require a hearing on the motion. United States v. McDonald, 944 F.3d 769, 771–72 (8th Cir. 2019)

Limitation: Binding only in the Eighth Circuit. McDonald's no-hearing and review holdings survive as bounded propositions; any pre-Concepcion restriction on intervening information is not adopted.

• CLM-CIR8-003: In the Eighth Circuit, the certificate-of-appealability requirement does not apply to a federal prisoner effectively filing under § 2241. Langella v. Anderson, 612 F.3d 938, 939 n.2 (8th Cir. 2010)

Limitation: Binding only in the Eighth Circuit. Langella involved federal parole detention; no rule is adopted for state-process custody, § 2255, or disputed classification of a mislabeled filing.

• CLM-CIR8-004: In the Eighth Circuit, § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s filing prerequisite is a mandatory claim-processing rule that must be enforced when properly raised; an unexhausted motion is dismissed without prejudice, and asserted futility based on the Attorney General's home-confinement memorandum did not excuse the missing request. United States v. Houck, 2 F.4th 1082, 1084–85 (8th Cir. 2021)

Limitation: Binding only in the Eighth Circuit. Houck's futility holding is limited to the theory actually presented; compassionate release and BOP home-confinement placement remain distinct remedies.

• CLM-CIR8-005: In the Eighth Circuit, Rule 32.1(c)(1) does not require counsel or a hearing before a court denies a motion to terminate supervision or modify conditions, and § 3583(e) does not require a separate explanation for denial when the existing record makes the court's basis discernible. United States v. Norris, 62 F.4th 441, 445–51 (8th Cir. 2023)

Limitation: Binding only in the Eighth Circuit and limited to denial. Rule 32.1 ordinarily requires a hearing and counsel before an actual condition modification unless an enumerated exception applies; Norris does not authorize an unexplained denial when the record supplies no discernible basis.

Circuit-sensitive issue register

Each row records the nationwide floor, the circuit rule actually verified or the exact missing source, intra-circuit conflict status, publication status, relevant local-rule source, inter-circuit comparison, current-split status, and the check date. “Not verified” is a stop condition, not an invitation to infer the rule.

Application controls

1. Classify the judgment, custody source, motion, court, requested relief, and appellate posture before selecting an overlay row.
2. Use only a verified published circuit holding for a circuit proposition; do not promote a district opinion, unpublished disposition, dicta, or a party's characterization into binding law.
3. Run a current citator and check en banc, Supreme Court, statutory, rule, and local-rule changes before filing.
4. Preserve issue presentation, objections, the operative record, deadline trigger, and the governing standard of review.
5. If the issue register says not_verified, use the linked nationwide module only for its bounded nationwide proposition and obtain the missing controlling authority.

Coverage and limitations

• Canonical overlay claims on this page: CLM-CIR8-001, CLM-CIR8-002, CLM-CIR8-003, CLM-CIR8-004, CLM-CIR8-005.
• Comprehensive commercial citator: not run.
• Individual docket, judgment, custody, and administrative record: not reviewed.
• Issue-specific local-rule absence: not asserted.
• Unverified rows are included in the coverage matrix and therefore the generated Jira backlog.

Ninth Circuit Overlay

Ninth Circuit Overlay

This page prevents nationwide rules from being mistaken for Ninth Circuit doctrine and prevents unresearched circuit law from being guessed. It is a bounded overlay, not an exhaustive treatise or a substitute for the current docket, published opinions, local rules, or citator.

Official rule source and currency

• Official Ninth Circuit rules and procedures
• Official rules repository showing rules effective June 1, 2026 checked on 2026-08-25.
• Source authority: AUTH-CA9-LOCAL-RULES.
• A portal check does not prove that no issue-specific local rule exists. Open the current rule, amendments, internal operating procedures, and standing orders for the actual filing.

Verified circuit holdings

• CLM-CIR9-001: The Ninth Circuit treats ordinary § 2241 administrative exhaustion as prudential rather than jurisdictional and recognizes waiver when administrative pursuit would be futile. Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1045–46 (9th Cir. 2012)

Limitation: Binding only in the Ninth Circuit and not a nationwide permission to bypass a claim-specific statutory exhaustion provision or the BOP record process.

• CLM-CIR9-002: When BOP retained designation discretion but used an unlawful decision process, the Ninth Circuit ordered lawful reconsideration rather than the requested discretionary designation. Rodriguez v. Copenhaver, 823 F.3d 1238, 1243 (9th Cir. 2016)

Limitation: Binding only in the Ninth Circuit and limited to the particular § 3621(b) process error; it does not establish a universal § 2241 remedy.

• CLM-CIR9-003: In the Ninth Circuit, audita querela is a gap-filling writ and is unavailable for claims cognizable under § 2255; § 2255's successive-motion restrictions or nonretroactivity do not themselves create the required gap. Carrington v. United States, 503 F.3d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 2007)

Limitation: Binding only in the Ninth Circuit and not a nationwide elements test for audita querela.

• CLM-CIR9-004: In the Ninth Circuit after Concepcion, a district court deciding a § 404 motion must consider the parties' nonfrivolous arguments based on intervening legal or factual developments and give a brief statement of reasons; an unexplained denial can require vacatur and remand. United States v. Carter, 44 F.4th 1227, 1228–29 (9th Cir. 2022)

Limitation: Binding only in the Ninth Circuit. Carter recognizes that Concepcion abrogated Kelley's contrary intervening-change restriction; it does not require a reduction or a detailed point-by-point opinion.

• CLM-CIR9-005: In the Ninth Circuit, a person in federal custody does not need a certificate of appealability to appeal the denial of a properly classified § 2241 petition. Close v. Thomas, 653 F.3d 970, 974 n.2 (9th Cir. 2011)

Limitation: Binding only in the Ninth Circuit. Close involved federal BOP program-eligibility claims; the COA proposition does not decide § 2241 merits, state-process custody, § 2255, or filing classification.

• CLM-CIR9-006: In the Ninth Circuit, § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s defendant-filing prerequisite is a mandatory claim-processing rule enforced when the government invokes it; a renewed motion based on changed circumstances required a new qualifying BOP request, and the filing defect was not cured by the passage of 30 days while the motion was pending. United States v. Keller, 2 F.4th 1278, 1281–84 (9th Cir. 2021)

Limitation: Binding only in the Ninth Circuit and limited to a later motion premised on changed circumstances. Keller does not establish a universal issue-exhaustion test for every supplemental fact or argument.

• CLM-CIR9-007: In the Ninth Circuit, § 3583(e)(1) does not impose a threshold requirement of exceptional or extraordinary circumstances, exceptionally good behavior, or undue hardship before a court may consider early termination. United States v. Ponce, 22 F.4th 1045, 1047–49 (9th Cir. 2022)

Limitation: Binding only in the Ninth Circuit. Ponce remanded because the applied standard was unclear, did not hold compliance sufficient, and expressly did not reach the separate explanation challenge.

Circuit-sensitive issue register

Each row records the nationwide floor, the circuit rule actually verified or the exact missing source, intra-circuit conflict status, publication status, relevant local-rule source, inter-circuit comparison, current-split status, and the check date. “Not verified” is a stop condition, not an invitation to infer the rule.

Application controls

1. Classify the judgment, custody source, motion, court, requested relief, and appellate posture before selecting an overlay row.
2. Use only a verified published circuit holding for a circuit proposition; do not promote a district opinion, unpublished disposition, dicta, or a party's characterization into binding law.
3. Run a current citator and check en banc, Supreme Court, statutory, rule, and local-rule changes before filing.
4. Preserve issue presentation, objections, the operative record, deadline trigger, and the governing standard of review.
5. If the issue register says not_verified, use the linked nationwide module only for its bounded nationwide proposition and obtain the missing controlling authority.

Coverage and limitations

• Canonical overlay claims on this page: CLM-CIR9-001, CLM-CIR9-002, CLM-CIR9-003, CLM-CIR9-004, CLM-CIR9-005, CLM-CIR9-006, CLM-CIR9-007.
• Comprehensive commercial citator: not run.
• Individual docket, judgment, custody, and administrative record: not reviewed.
• Issue-specific local-rule absence: not asserted.
• Unverified rows are included in the coverage matrix and therefore the generated Jira backlog.

Tenth Circuit Overlay

Tenth Circuit Overlay

This page prevents nationwide rules from being mistaken for Tenth Circuit doctrine and prevents unresearched circuit law from being guessed. It is a bounded overlay, not an exhaustive treatise or a substitute for the current docket, published opinions, local rules, or citator.

Official rule source and currency

• Official Tenth Circuit rules and procedures
• Official 2026 rules repository, with local rules effective January 1, 2026, checked on 2026-08-25.
• Source authority: AUTH-CA10-LOCAL-RULES.
• A portal check does not prove that no issue-specific local rule exists. Open the current rule, amendments, internal operating procedures, and standing orders for the actual filing.

Verified circuit holdings

• CLM-CIR10-001: In the Tenth Circuit, exhaustion of available BOP remedies is a prerequisite to § 2241 relief despite the absence of an express statutory clause; a narrow futility exception exists, but alleged local categorical denial is insufficient where regional and national review remain available. Garza v. Davis, 596 F.3d 1198, 1203–04 (10th Cir. 2010)

Limitation: Binding only in the Tenth Circuit and limited to the BOP placement posture. A prisoner cannot establish futility merely by styling the claim as a facial regulatory challenge, but materially different facts require separate analysis.

• CLM-CIR10-002: In the Tenth Circuit, a § 404 proceeding is a sentence modification rather than a plenary resentencing; no hearing or defendant presence is categorically required, and the discretionary disposition is reviewed for abuse of discretion with enough reasoning to permit review. United States v. Mannie, 971 F.3d 1145, 1155–58 (10th Cir. 2020)

Limitation: Binding only in the Tenth Circuit. Mannie's surviving nonplenary, hearing, presence, and review holdings are used; any pre-Concepcion restriction on intervening information is not adopted.

• CLM-CIR10-003: In the Tenth Circuit, a federal prisoner appealing a final order in a properly classified § 2241 proceeding does not need a certificate of appealability. McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Commission, 115 F.3d 809, 810 n.1 (10th Cir. 1997)

Limitation: Binding only in the Tenth Circuit. McIntosh involved federal parole revocation; the proposition does not address state-process detention, § 2255, or whether a filing is properly classified under § 2241.

• CLM-CIR10-004: In the Tenth Circuit, § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s defendant-filing prerequisite is a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule that the government can waive or forfeit; when the government abandoned its exhaustion argument on appeal, the court proceeded to the merits. United States v. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th 1027, 1030–31 (10th Cir. 2021)

Limitation: Binding only in the Tenth Circuit. Hemmelgarn does not decide issue exhaustion or create a judicial exception when the government timely preserves the filing defense; only its durable procedural holdings are adopted.

• CLM-CIR10-005: In the Tenth Circuit, § 3583(e)(2) does not require changed circumstances before a district court may modify supervised-release conditions; the court must instead consider the listed factors, follow Rule 32.1, and ensure the new conditions satisfy the requirements applicable to supervised-release conditions. United States v. Begay, 631 F.3d 1168, 1171–73 (10th Cir. 2011)

Limitation: Binding only in the Tenth Circuit. Begay addresses condition modification, not early termination, and does not dispense with factor consideration, Rule 32.1 procedure, or substantive limits on the modified condition.

• CLM-CIR10-006: In the Tenth Circuit, a federal prisoner cannot use audita querela to challenge a conviction or sentence when the claim is cognizable under § 2255; the substance of the filing controls and a custody-based collateral attack may be treated as a § 2255 motion subject to the applicable authorization rules. United States v. Torres, 282 F.3d 1241, 1245–46 & n.6 (10th Cir. 2002)

Limitation: Binding only in the Tenth Circuit. Torres assumed without deciding that audita querela might survive, distinguished coram nobis by custody, and tied notice before recharacterization to whether the filing would be the prisoner's first § 2255 motion.

Circuit-sensitive issue register

Each row records the nationwide floor, the circuit rule actually verified or the exact missing source, intra-circuit conflict status, publication status, relevant local-rule source, inter-circuit comparison, current-split status, and the check date. “Not verified” is a stop condition, not an invitation to infer the rule.

Application controls

1. Classify the judgment, custody source, motion, court, requested relief, and appellate posture before selecting an overlay row.
2. Use only a verified published circuit holding for a circuit proposition; do not promote a district opinion, unpublished disposition, dicta, or a party's characterization into binding law.
3. Run a current citator and check en banc, Supreme Court, statutory, rule, and local-rule changes before filing.
4. Preserve issue presentation, objections, the operative record, deadline trigger, and the governing standard of review.
5. If the issue register says not_verified, use the linked nationwide module only for its bounded nationwide proposition and obtain the missing controlling authority.

Coverage and limitations

• Canonical overlay claims on this page: CLM-CIR10-001, CLM-CIR10-002, CLM-CIR10-003, CLM-CIR10-004, CLM-CIR10-005, CLM-CIR10-006.
• Comprehensive commercial citator: not run.
• Individual docket, judgment, custody, and administrative record: not reviewed.
• Issue-specific local-rule absence: not asserted.
• Unverified rows are included in the coverage matrix and therefore the generated Jira backlog.

Eleventh Circuit Overlay

Eleventh Circuit Overlay

This page prevents nationwide rules from being mistaken for Eleventh Circuit doctrine and prevents unresearched circuit law from being guessed. It is a bounded overlay, not an exhaustive treatise or a substitute for the current docket, published opinions, local rules, or citator.

Official rule source and currency

• Official Eleventh Circuit rules and procedures
• Official December 2025 rulebook checked on 2026-08-25.
• Source authority: AUTH-CA11-LOCAL-RULES.
• A portal check does not prove that no issue-specific local rule exists. Open the current rule, amendments, internal operating procedures, and standing orders for the actual filing.

Verified circuit holdings

• CLM-CIR11-001: The Eleventh Circuit holds that § 2241 administrative exhaustion is not jurisdictional; it remains a requirement that a court ordinarily enforces when the respondent properly asserts it, but the court need not raise it sua sponte. Santiago-Lugo v. Warden, 785 F.3d 467, 474–75 (11th Cir. 2015)

Limitation: Binding only in the Eleventh Circuit. The opinion does not create a nationwide exception or excuse, and a claim-specific statutory exhaustion provision may require separate analysis.

• CLM-CIR11-002: The Eleventh Circuit reviews denial of § 3583(e) modification or early termination for abuse of discretion and requires the order or record to show enough consideration of the relevant statutory factors to permit meaningful appellate review, without a ritual statement of every factor. United States v. Cordero, 7 F.4th 1058, 1069–71 (11th Cir. 2021)

Limitation: Binding only in the Eleventh Circuit; the adequacy of a particular record remains case specific and the relevant § 3553(a) subset is supplied by § 3583(e).

• CLM-CIR11-003: The Eleventh Circuit holds that § 3583(e)(2) is not a vehicle for a collateral attack on the original legality or constitutionality of an imposed supervised-release condition; the opinion identifies direct appeal or § 2255 as the ordinary channels for such an attack. United States v. Cordero, 7 F.4th 1058, 1066–68 (11th Cir. 2021)

Limitation: Binding only in the Eleventh Circuit and limited to collateral attacks on the condition as originally imposed; later changed facts and permissible modification grounds require separate analysis.

• CLM-CIR11-004: In the Eleventh Circuit, denial of an eligible § 404 motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion; a court may deny relief even when the existing sentence exceeds the revised statutory maximum, may not use § 404 as a collateral vehicle to invalidate the original sentence, and may satisfy Concepcion with a brief explanation evident from the record. United States v. Williams, 63 F.4th 908, 912–14 (11th Cir. 2023)

Limitation: Binding only in the Eleventh Circuit. Williams does not permit a court to ignore nonfrivolous arguments, require a reduction, or decide an independent collateral attack through § 404.

• CLM-CIR11-005: In the Eleventh Circuit, a federal prisoner proceeding under § 2241 does not need a certificate of appealability because § 2253(c)(1)(B) reaches § 2255 proceedings, not federal-process § 2241 proceedings. Sawyer v. Holder, 326 F.3d 1363, 1364 n.3 (11th Cir. 2003)

Limitation: Binding only in the Eleventh Circuit and limited to the COA question. Sawyer's saving-clause merits analysis is not adopted and must be read in light of later Supreme Court law; state-process custody and filing classification remain separate.

• CLM-CIR11-006: In the Eleventh Circuit, § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s defendant-filing prerequisite is a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule; when the government does not assert noncompliance, the court may reach the merits rather than raise the prerequisite on its own. United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 910–12 (11th Cir. 2021)

Limitation: Binding only in the Eleventh Circuit. Harris did not decide whether the filing rule is mandatory when invoked and its pandemic-specific merits analysis is not adopted as current law.

• CLM-CIR11-007: In the Eleventh Circuit, audita querela may not be granted when the challenge is cognizable under § 2255; after recharacterization, an unauthorized second or successive motion remains outside the district court's jurisdiction. United States v. Holt, 417 F.3d 1172, 1174–75 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)

Limitation: Binding only in the Eleventh Circuit. Holt did not hold that audita querela survives for claims outside § 2255; it addressed a constitutional sentencing attack by a prisoner with a prior § 2255 motion and an absent successive-motion authorization.

Circuit-sensitive issue register

Each row records the nationwide floor, the circuit rule actually verified or the exact missing source, intra-circuit conflict status, publication status, relevant local-rule source, inter-circuit comparison, current-split status, and the check date. “Not verified” is a stop condition, not an invitation to infer the rule.

Application controls

1. Classify the judgment, custody source, motion, court, requested relief, and appellate posture before selecting an overlay row.
2. Use only a verified published circuit holding for a circuit proposition; do not promote a district opinion, unpublished disposition, dicta, or a party's characterization into binding law.
3. Run a current citator and check en banc, Supreme Court, statutory, rule, and local-rule changes before filing.
4. Preserve issue presentation, objections, the operative record, deadline trigger, and the governing standard of review.
5. If the issue register says not_verified, use the linked nationwide module only for its bounded nationwide proposition and obtain the missing controlling authority.

Coverage and limitations

• Canonical overlay claims on this page: CLM-CIR11-001, CLM-CIR11-002, CLM-CIR11-003, CLM-CIR11-004, CLM-CIR11-005, CLM-CIR11-006, CLM-CIR11-007.
• Comprehensive commercial citator: not run.
• Individual docket, judgment, custody, and administrative record: not reviewed.
• Issue-specific local-rule absence: not asserted.
• Unverified rows are included in the coverage matrix and therefore the generated Jira backlog.

D.C. Circuit Overlay

D.C. Circuit Overlay

This page prevents nationwide rules from being mistaken for D.C. Circuit doctrine and prevents unresearched circuit law from being guessed. It is a bounded overlay, not an exhaustive treatise or a substitute for the current docket, published opinions, local rules, or citator.

Official rule source and currency

• Official D.C. Circuit rules and procedures
• Official circuit rules amended December 4, 2025 and FRAP through December 1, 2025 checked on 2026-08-25.
• Source authority: AUTH-CADC-LOCAL-RULES.
• A portal check does not prove that no issue-specific local rule exists. Open the current rule, amendments, internal operating procedures, and standing orders for the actual filing.

Verified circuit holdings

• CLM-CIRDC-001: In the D.C. Circuit, § 404 does not create a categorical right to allocution before decision; after Concepcion, review of the discretionary ruling is not overly searching absent legal error, a sentence above the revised maximum does not itself compel reduction, and a sufficiently reasoned record can sustain denial. United States v. Lawrence, 1 F.4th 40, 46–48 (D.C. Cir. 2021); United States v. Smith, 104 F.4th 314, 333–35 (D.C. Cir. 2024)

Limitation: Binding only in the D.C. Circuit. Lawrence addresses no categorical allocution right, while Smith supplies the current post-Concepcion review and explanation rules; neither guarantees relief or eliminates case-specific procedural requirements.

• CLM-CIRDC-002: In the D.C. Circuit, a federal prisoner proceeding under § 2241 does not need a certificate of appealability, but a person detained under D.C. Superior Court process is treated as detained pursuant to state-court process for § 2253(c)(1)(A) and does need one. Sugarman v. Pitzer, 170 F.3d 1145, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Madley v. U.S. Parole Commission, 278 F.3d 1306, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 2002)

Limitation: Binding only in the D.C. Circuit. The custody-producing court controls this distinction: Sugarman addresses federal process, while Madley treats D.C. Superior Court process as state-court process for § 2253(c)(1)(A). Filing classification remains separate.

• CLM-CIRDC-003: In the D.C. Circuit, § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s defendant-filing prerequisite is a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule; the court expressly declined to decide whether each ground later presented in court must first have been presented to the warden. United States v. Wilson, 77 F.4th 837, 842–45 (D.C. Cir. 2023)

Limitation: Binding only in the D.C. Circuit. Wilson assumed issue exhaustion without deciding it. Its separate change-in-law eligibility analysis is not adopted here and must be assessed under current Supreme Court law and the current Sentencing Guidelines.

• CLM-CIRDC-004: In the D.C. Circuit, a court must consider the specified § 3553(a) factors before granting or denying early termination, but a denial needs no standalone explanation if the court's reasoning is discernible from the record. United States v. Mathis-Gardner, 783 F.3d 1286, 1287–90 (D.C. Cir. 2015)

Limitation: Binding only in the D.C. Circuit. Mathis-Gardner does not require findings on every factor or relief on the merits; an unexplained order is sustainable only when the record makes the reasoning discernible.

• CLM-CIRDC-005: In the D.C. Circuit, audita querela cannot rest on pure equity and, if it survives at all, can reach only a legal objection not cognizable through existing federal postconviction remedies; a claim cognizable under § 2255 belongs there. United States v. Ayala, 894 F.2d 425, 427–30 (D.C. Cir. 1990)

Limitation: Binding only in the D.C. Circuit. Ayala did not definitively decide whether the writ survives, rejected an immigration-consequence equity theory, and remanded for treatment under § 2255 without deciding the constitutional merits.

Circuit-sensitive issue register

Each row records the nationwide floor, the circuit rule actually verified or the exact missing source, intra-circuit conflict status, publication status, relevant local-rule source, inter-circuit comparison, current-split status, and the check date. “Not verified” is a stop condition, not an invitation to infer the rule.

Application controls

1. Classify the judgment, custody source, motion, court, requested relief, and appellate posture before selecting an overlay row.
2. Use only a verified published circuit holding for a circuit proposition; do not promote a district opinion, unpublished disposition, dicta, or a party's characterization into binding law.
3. Run a current citator and check en banc, Supreme Court, statutory, rule, and local-rule changes before filing.
4. Preserve issue presentation, objections, the operative record, deadline trigger, and the governing standard of review.
5. If the issue register says not_verified, use the linked nationwide module only for its bounded nationwide proposition and obtain the missing controlling authority.

Coverage and limitations

• Canonical overlay claims on this page: CLM-CIRDC-001, CLM-CIRDC-002, CLM-CIRDC-003, CLM-CIRDC-004, CLM-CIRDC-005.
• Comprehensive commercial citator: not run.
• Individual docket, judgment, custody, and administrative record: not reviewed.
• Issue-specific local-rule absence: not asserted.
• Unverified rows are included in the coverage matrix and therefore the generated Jira backlog.

Federal District and Territorial Court Map

Federal District and Territorial Court Map

Boundary: court identity, circuit assignment, official homepage, and official rules-location coverage are verified as listed. The substantive text of each district's local rules is not verified until an issue-specific reviewer checks the current rule, standing orders, filing procedures, and later amendments.

National structure

The federal judicial system has 94 district-level courts: 91 Article III district courts and three Article IV territorial courts—the District Court of Guam, District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, and District Court of the Virgin Islands. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts

Federal courts may prescribe local rules under 28 U.S.C. § 2071 and the applicable national procedural rule, and federal courts must post local rules on their public websites. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts

The Federal Circuit is not included as a geographic parent circuit because it does not receive ordinary federal criminal appeals based on district location.

Coverage summary

The complete official source inventory at docs/96-district-courts/rule-source-catalog.md lists every cataloged link and its technical status.

First Circuit (5)

Second Circuit (6)

Third Circuit (6)

Fourth Circuit (9)

Fifth Circuit (9)

Sixth Circuit (9)

Seventh Circuit (7)

Eighth Circuit (10)

Ninth Circuit (15)

Tenth Circuit (8)

Eleventh Circuit (9)

D.C. Circuit (1)

Change monitoring and legal review

The committed registry is canonical for court identity and source location. A separate network monitor fingerprints the official rule locations and reports changes. Its output always says legal conclusions were not changed; a detected difference enters a review queue and cannot alter a claim, authority, module, or verification status.

Run:

python scripts/check_district_rules.py --fail-on-change
python scripts/catalog_district_rules.py --fail-on-change

The accepted document catalog covers official court-wide local-rule, rules-and-orders collection, and filing-procedure sources discoverable from each registered rules location. Judge-specific chambers practices are excluded. A successful fetch or unchanged hash proves only that the monitored resource was reachable or unchanged. It does not prove that any local rule, standing order, filing instruction, or later amendment has been legally interpreted or applied correctly.

Decision Trees

Federal Process Decision Trees

These trees classify a federal procedural problem; they do not predict an outcome. Each route ends at a canonical module, and the linked module and claim records control over the shorthand.

Whole-case router

Stage sequence

Federal process root
  -> investigation and charging
  -> pretrial
  -> plea or trial
  -> sentencing and judgment
  -> direct review and finality
  -> post-conviction, modification, or sentence execution
  -> supervised release and reentry
Every branch -> jurisdiction + deadline + record + remedy + circuit overlay checks

Structured remedy routes

Jurisdiction stops